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Recidivism: A Multi-Level Explanation 
Dissertation Abstract  
 
Brian E. Oliver 
 
 Numerous studies have shown that several characteristics of offenders are 
related to their likelihood of recidivism after release from prison. Nearly all of 
these studies, however, have focused on offenders from just one state. Few studies 
have examined recidivism rates controlling for the characteristics of offenders 
from multiple states, and virtually none have examined recidivism rates 
controlling for characteristics of offenders from multiple states during different 
periods of time. Additionally, few studies have explored different types of 
recidivism across multiple jurisdictions to determine whether the same individual 
level factors explain variations in rearrest, reconviction, reimprisonment, and 
parole violations. 
 To address these shortcomings, this dissertation applied logistic regression 
models to data from the publicly available Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset to 
investigate the extent to which nine individual level factors explain variation in 
recidivism rates within three years of release from prison across 15 states. The 
nine factors are: 1) gender, 2) age at first arrest, 3) race, 4) age at release, 5) 
number of prior arrests, 6) type of current offense, 7) time served, 8) admission 
type and 9) release type. Eight forms of recidivism were examined: 1) rearrest for 
any offense, 2) rearrest for a new violent offense, 3) rearrest for a new property 
offense, 4) rearrest for a new drug offense, 5) rearrest for a new public order 
offense, 6) reconviction probability if rearrested, 7) reimprisonment probability if 
reconvicted, and 8) parole violations. The dissertation investigated differences in 
the effects of the individual level factors on each form of recidivism. 
 To investigate the effects of criminal justice policies and practices on state 
differences in recidivism rates, multilevel models were estimated that include 
three contextual variables, in addition to the nine individual factors.  The state-
level contextual variables are: 1) drug arrests per 100,000 residents, 2) police 
officers per 1,000 residents and 3) the arrest-offense ratio. In a final analysis, 
regression analyses were conducted to determine the extent to which the nine 
individual factors explain the increase in the three-year rearrest rates among 
persons released from prison in 1983 and 1994. 
 The findings reveal that differences in individual level characteristics help 
to explain the variation across states for some, but not all, forms of recidivism. 
The findings related to rearrest for a new violent offense, reconviction probability, 
and parole violations were not conclusive.  Results from the multilevel models 
indicate that the contextual factor of police officers per 1,000 has a significant 
impact on property rearrests and a marginal impact on drug rearrests and 
reconviction probability. The analysis of rearrests during two separate time 
periods revealed that changes in contextual factors, as opposed to individual level 
characteristics, were responsible for the increase in rearrest rates which occurred 
between 1983 and 1994. 
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 This study provides evidence that both individual level and contextual 
factors play a role in recidivism and need to be taken into consideration in 
implementing policy and designing programming. Two conclusions consistent 
with the findings are that treatment services need to be based on offender need 
and risk level and that states should consider reinstating discretionary parole. It 
would be beneficial for future research to examine the effect of additional 
individual and contextual variables on recidivism rates, particularly if a multi-
state dataset, similar to the one used in this study, becomes available in which 
county of release is specified. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1: Introduction 
Much attention has been drawn to the fact that the United States has the 
highest incarceration rate in the world. The prison and jail incarceration rate at 
yearend 2008 was 754 inmates per 100,000 U.S. residents (Sabol, West and 
Cooper, 2009). Although this represented a slight decline over the 2007 rate, it is 
nevertheless five to twelve times the average incarceration rate in most European 
countries (Tonry, 2004). Also, given that at least 95 percent of all U.S. prisoners 
will be released at some time (Hughes and Wilson, 2002), an unprecedented 
number of people are being released from prison in the United States. In 2008, 
735,454 inmates were released to the community after serving time in prison 
(Sabol et al., 2009). 
Unfortunately, many of the people who leave prison end up back in prison. 
Langan and Levin (2002) found that, within three years of their release, 67.5 
percent of state prisoners released in 1994 were rearrested, 46.9 percent were 
reconvicted and 51.8 percent were back in prison, serving time for a new prison 
sentence or for a technical violation of the conditions of their release. Hughes and 
Wilson (2002) similarly found that 42 percent of those released on parole were 
returned to prison or jail and another nine percent absconded. What these numbers 
indicate is that less than half of the people released from prison are successfully 
reintegrated back into society. Meanwhile, the hundreds of thousands of offenders 
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on parole or conditional release who return to prison each year end up costing 
states billions of dollars (Petersilia, 2001). 
In light of the high level of recidivism in the United States, it is not 
surprising that much research has been done on why it occurs. The preponderance 
of the research over the past 25 years has focused on the effects that individual 
level characteristics, such as age, gender and race, have on recidivism. While such 
studies can be extremely enlightening in determining policies and programming, 
their ability to provide broadly applicable conclusions is limited in that very few 
address variations that exist either from state to state or during different periods of 
time. If offenders released from prison in Delaware have twice the rearrest rate as 
offenders released from prison in Michigan, for example, is this because the 
offenders in Delaware have a higher number of traits that are associated with 
reoffending, or does it have to do with differing state policies? Similarly, if 
national recidivism rates go up over a period of ten or eleven years, is it because 
the release cohorts are different – or is it because there have been changes in 
rehabilitative services offered to offenders released, because police have become 
more proactive in their response to crime or because of some other macro-level 
change? 
Given the high human and monetary costs of recidivism and the complex 
interplay between state and federal systems, these are not idle questions. Even 
small statistical differences can tip decisions impacting thousands of lives and 
millions of dollars. Finding answers to these questions is, moreover, no easy task. 
A possible method, comparing recidivism rates across studies, may seem 
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appealing, but would, unfortunately, not lead to scientifically valid results. Beck 
(2001) pointed out three major problems in this approach. One is that what is 
counted as recidivism in one jurisdiction or study may not be counted as 
recidivism in a second jurisdiction or study (some states include technical 
violators as recidivists while others don’t). A second problem is that different 
jurisdictions and studies utilized different time frames. A third problem is that 
many studies do not include sufficient information to control for variables which 
would affect recidivism rates. These three problems make the idea of comparing 
recidivism rates across dissimilar studies an unwise proposition. 
Instead of comparing previous studies, this dissertation draws its material 
on the effect of nine individual-level characteristics on recidivism directly from 
two multi-state data sets. Primary of these is the Recidivism of Prisoners Released 
in 1994 dataset (United States Department of Justice, 2009a), from which 
262,529 of the 302,309 prisoners’ cases were used. Data on 108,580 prisoners 
from the Prisoners Released in 1983 dataset (United States Department of 
Justice, 2004) are also brought into discussion of changes over time. From these 
two datasets, nine individual-level characteristics were extracted. These nine 
individual-level characteristics include gender, age at release, race, age at first 
arrest, number of prior arrests, current offense type, time served, type of 
admission, and type of release. These nine specific individual-level characteristics 
were chosen because data on these nine specific variables were included for all or 
most of the offenders in both the 1994 and 1983 Prisoners Released datasets. 
Although data was also included in both datasets regarding Hispanic origin, it was 
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not included as an individual-level characteristic in this dissertation because of the 
large amount of missing data on this indicator (over 19 percent of cases from the 
1994 dataset and over 33 percent of cases from the 1983 dataset). 
In addition, data on three state-level contextual variables – drug arrest 
rates, police per 1,000 residents and arrest-offense ratio – were gathered from 
several issues of Crime in the United States (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998), from the Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data 
[United States]: 1975-1997 dataset (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2000) and 
from information provided by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, the 
Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority and the Delaware State Police. It 
is noteworthy that very little past research has looked specifically at the role of 
contextual variables and recidivism (Fischer, 2007). In producing this dissertation, 
there were no problems locating published studies that explore the relationship 
between drug arrest rates and crime rates (e.g., Benson, Kim, Rasmussen, and 
Zuehlke, 1992; Benson, Rasmussen, and Sollars, 1995; Mendes, 2000; Shepard 
and Blackley, 2005). Also found were recent studies which explore the 
relationship between either police per capita or arrest-offense ratio and crime rates 
(Sampson and Cohen, 1988, Marvell and Moody, 1996; Weiss and Freels, 1996; 
Levitt, 1997; MacDonald, 2002). There were no published studies found, 
however, that looked directly at the relationship between these three contextual 
variables and any form of recidivism. This dissertation will thus provide 
information in an area which, to date, has been ignored by the research 
community. 
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Eight measures of recidivism are examined in this dissertation: 1) rearrest 
for any offense, 2) rearrest for a violent offense, 3) rearrest for a property offense, 
4) rearrest for a drug offense, 5) rearrest for a public order offense (other than a 
parole violation), 6) reconviction following arrest for a new offense, 7) 
reimprisonment following conviction for a new offense, and 8) parole violations. 
Because parole violations result from either a new arrest or a technical violation 
without an accompanying arrest, a somewhat more detailed analysis of parole 
violations is undertaken. The use of multiple measures of recidivism allows for 
distinctions to be made regarding whether certain individual-level characteristics 
are equally effective in predicting variation in different measures of recidivism or 
if they have differing effects based on either the type of offense or the measure of 
recidivism used. All eight measures of recidivism came from variables included in 
the two datasets on prisoners released earlier described. 
Three primary research questions are addressed in this dissertation: 1) To 
what extent can the variation in recidivism rates across space be explained by 
variations in the individual-level characteristics of offenders released from 
prison? 2) Can the addition of state-level contextual characteristics of police per 
1,000 residents, arrest-offense ratio and state-level drug arrest rates help explain 
the variation in prevalence of recidivism across space that is not explained by the 
individual-level factors? 3) To what extent can the variation in rearrest rates over 
time be explained by variations in the individual-level characteristics of offenders 
released from prison and are there any state-level contextual variables which 
might help improve the explanation? 
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1.2: Research Question 1: To what extent can the variation in recidivism 
rates across space be explained by variations in the individual-level 
characteristics of offenders released from prison? 
Although a widely cited statistic in the criminological literature is that, on 
average, two-thirds of offenders released from prison end up rearrested for a new 
crime (see, for example, Petersilia, 2001; Solomon, Johnson, Travis, and 
McBride, 2004), this is a national average that does not persist on a state-level 
basis. When three year state-level rearrest for a new offense percentages are 
computed for offenders released from prisons in 15 states in 1994, it is clear that 
there is a wide degree of variation – with a low of 43.7 percent reported for 
Michigan and a high of 86.2 percent reported for Delaware (see Figure 1). As is 
shown later in this dissertation, there is similarly a wide degree of variation 
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between states in rearrest rates for drug and public order offenses and violations 
of parole, as well as a lesser degree of variation between states in rearrest rates for 
violent and property offenses. There is also a wide degree of variation between 
states in the reconviction rate of rearrested offenders and the reimprisonment rate 
of reconvicted offenders. 
What this information does not reveal, however, and what the current 
research addresses, is to what extent the variation in prevalence of various forms 
of recidivism across states can be explained by differences in the individual-level 
characteristics of the state-level release cohorts. Knowing this will help in 
understanding the degree to which differences in recidivism are the result of 
variations in the characteristics of prisoner populations and the degree to which 
differences are related to variations in policy and programming in different states. 
 
1.3: Research Question 2: Can the addition of state-level contextual 
characteristics of police per capita, arrest-offense ratio and state-level drug 
arrest rates help explain the variation in prevalence of recidivism across 
space that is not explained by the individual-level factors? 
The second research question is geared towards identifying if and to what 
extent the addition of three contextual factors – police per capita, arrest-offense 
ratio, and state-level drug arrest rates – can be used to explain some of the 
remaining variation that exists in recidivism probabilities across space. While 
differences in the previously described individual-level characteristics may very 
well explain a great deal of variation, there are also other variables that may 
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explain differences in recidivism probabilities. Although no research to date has 
directly examined the relationship that exists between either police-strength or 
arrest-offense ratio and recidivism, some prior research has found that crime rates 
may be influenced by police strength and arrest-offense ratio (Tittle and Rowe, 
1974; Wilson and Boland, 1978; Sampson and Cohen, 1988, Marvell and Moody, 
1996, Levitt, 1997, MacDonald, 2002 - although it should noted that some studies 
have found no relationship – i.e., see Decker and Kohlfield, 1985; Weiss and 
Freels, 1996). Therefore, it would seem useful to test if these contextual factors 
could help explain variation in recidivism rates across space. Additionally, it 
would help to examine if variations in state-level drug arrest rates help explain 
variation in recidivism across space. This is an important factor to look at 
because, although it has commonly been stated that America has been fighting a 
War on Drugs since at least the early 1980s, research has found that, during this 
time, some states were more aggressive than others in targeting drug offenders 
(Mast, Benson, and Rasmussen, 2000; Benson, 2009). 
 
1.4: Research Question 3: To what extent can the variation in rearrest rates 
over time be explained by variations in the individual-level characteristics of 
offenders released from prison and are there any state-level contextual 
variables which might help improve the explanation? 
The third research question is very much like the first. To what extent can 
individual-level factors help explain the difference in three-year prevalence of 
rearrest for a new offense between the 1983 cohort and the 1994 cohort? To 
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answer this question, the analysis will compare the rearrest rates from the 1983 
cohort with those from the 1994 cohort. This section will additionally explore 
possible changes in criminal justice policy that led to the changes in national 
rearrest rates. It should be noted that while the section exploring recidivism 
variation across space includes eight different measures of recidivism, for 
recidivism over time, the only measure of recidivism used is rearrest for a new 
offense. This measure was chosen for the temporal analysis because arrests 
initiate reconviction and reimprisonment. It’s the first link in the recidivism chain. 
 
1.5: Chapter Overview 
Chapter Two discusses the data, measures and analytic strategy for the full 
dissertation. This includes reviewing the sources of the data and explaining how 
missing or improperly entered data is dealt with. The eight separate outcome 
measures are defined. A discussion also describes additional steps taken to 
formulate the reconviction and reimprisonment outcomes. The chapter then closes 
with a discussion of the three sets of analyses to be conducted in the dissertation. 
Chapter Three provides a review of prior research findings related to the 
nine individual-level characteristics to be analyzed in the dissertation and 
summaries of the state averages for the 1994 dataset. Logistic regressions were 
also run for each individual level characteristics for the recidivism measures of 
rearrest for a new offense, rearrest for a violent offense, rearrest for a property 
offense, rearrest for a drug offense and rearrest for a public order offense. Where 
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possible, theoretical explanations were further given explaining why people with 
specific characteristics were at greater risk of offending than others. 
 Chapter Four explores whether the inclusion of the nine individual-level 
characteristics helps explain variation between states in the overall rearrest rates 
and rearrests for specific types of offenses. The offense types include violent 
offenses, property offenses, drug offenses and public order offenses (excluding 
parole violations). Along with the calculations, there is a discussion of the 
theoretical perspectives related to the findings. 
Chapter Five examines the helpfulness of the nine individual-level 
characteristics in explaining variation between states for other forms of 
recidivism. These include reconviction probability, reimprisonment probability 
and parole violations. Parole violations are analyzed separately from public order 
offenses because they may result from either a criminal charge accompanied by 
an arrest or a non-criminal technical violation that does not involve an arrest. 
Chapter Six uses Hierarchical Linear Modeling to explore whether three 
state-level criminal justice factors help improve on the explanation of variation in 
recidivism between states. Once again, a discussion of the theoretical perspectives 
related to the findings accompanies the results. 
Chapter Seven looks at recidivism over time to see to what extent 
individual-level factors can help explain variations in the three-year prevalence of 
rearrest that exists between the 1983 cohort and the 1994 cohort. After this 
analysis, possible alternative explanations will be discussed, though formal tests 
of these alternative hypotheses will not be conducted. 
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Chapter Eight concludes with policy implications and suggestions that 
stem from the findings presented in the previous chapters and offers suggestions 
for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 – DATA, MEASURES AND ANALYTIC STRATEGY 
 
2.1: Introduction 
 This chapter first provides details about the primary sources of data used 
in analyses that seek to answer the three research questions that were raised in 
chapter one. It next explains how the constructs for both the individual-level 
(level-one) and state-level (level-two) variables were operationalized for use in 
several quantitative analyses. It concludes with a discussion of the three analytic 
strategies that were used to answer the three research questions previously raised. 
 
2.2: Data 
The first step in gathering data for the dissertation involved accessing two 
large Bureau of Justice Statistics datasets containing information on prisoners 
released from state prisons in 1983 and 1994 and determining which of the cases 
therein were usable. The data sets are available from the Interuniversity 
Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) website 
(http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/). The Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994 
dataset consists of 38,624 cases representative of 302,309 offenders released from 
15 states in 1994. The 15 states include Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, 
Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Oregon, Texas and Virginia. In line with Langan and Levin’s (2002) 
analysis of the 1994 dataset, offenders were not included in this dissertation 
unless 1) a RAP sheet on the prisoner was found in the State criminal history 
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repository, 2) the released prisoner was alive through the three-year follow-up 
period, 3) the prisoner's sentence was one year or longer, and 4) the prisoner's 
release was not recorded as release to custody/detainer/warrant, absent without 
leave, escape, transfer, administrative release, or release on appeal (Langan and 
Levin, 2002). This left a total sample of 33,625 cases representative of 271,669 
offenders released in 1994.  
The Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1983 dataset consists of 16,355 
cases representative of 108,580 offenders released from California, Florida, 
Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oregon and Texas. The dataset is based on an original sample of 18,374 cases; 
however, 2,019 were not included in the final sample because their sentence was 
less than one year, they died during the follow-up period or their release was 
classified as administrative release, absent without leave (AWOL), escape, 
transfer, or release on appeal or death (Beck and Shipley, 1989). 
 The next step involved determining how to deal with missing, incorrectly 
entered or otherwise errant data in the analysis. Data were classified as errant 
under one of three scenarios: 1) the offender’s date of birth and date of release 
from prison had him or her recorded as being released from prison prior to age 13 
(see Beck and Shipley, 1989; Langan and Levin, 2002); 2) the record indicated 
that an offender was released from prison for the current offense prior to the date 
he or she entered prison for the current offense, or 3) the offender’s date of birth 
and date of first arrest had his or her first arrest occurring prior to the age of ten. 
This last exclusion was taken because the youngest person charged as an adult in 
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America in recent history was nine-years-old (see Quindlen, 1990) and the 1983 
and 1994 data files only contain arrest information of juveniles charged as adults 
(Beck and Shipley, 1989; Langan and Levin, 2002). Further, to deal with the issue 
of missing data, cases were also excluded 1) if the offender’s gender was recorded 
as missing, 2) if the offender’s age at first arrest was unknown (either because 
arrest cycle one was blank or because the offender had arrests recorded for all 99 
arrest cycles, meaning he or she had over 99 arrests and making his or her first 
arrest date impossible to determine), 3) if the offender’s race was classified as 
missing, 4) if the offender’s age of release was unknown, 5) if the type of current 
offense was unknown, 6) if the amount of time served on the offender’s current 
sentence was unknown or 7) if the offender’s type of release was calculated as 
missing. Cases where the offender’s type of admission was missing were kept in 
the dataset due to the relatively large number of cases that would have had to be 
eliminated if these cases were taken out. After these steps were taken, the 1994 
dataset contained 32,732 cases representative of 262,530 offenders released from 
prison in 1994 and the 1983 dataset contained 15,223 cases representative of 
99,681 offenders released from prison in 1983. The analysis of recidivism across 
space only involved offenders from this revised 1994 dataset. 
A second file, merging prisoners released from the same 11 states in either 
1983 or 1994, was then created to look at rearrest over time. Before this file was 
created, prisoners released in 1994 from Arizona, Delaware, Maryland and 
Virginia were eliminated, as data from these states were not also collected for 
1983. Following this, the two datasets were merged. The merged file contained 
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42,301 cases representing 342,602 offenders released from 11 states in either 
1983 or 1994. The analysis of recidivism over time proceeded from the merged 
dataset containing these cases. 
The three state level contextual variables used in the examination of 
recidivism across space are: 1) police per 1,000 residents, 2) arrest-offense ratio 
and 3) rate of drug arrests per 100,000 people. Data on police per 1,000 residents 
for the years 1993 to 1996 came from issues of Crime in the United States 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997). Data on arrest-offense 
ratio for 13 of the 15 states came from the Uniform Crime Reporting Program 
Data [United States]: 1975-1997 dataset (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2000). 
This data set is available from the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and 
Social Research (ICPSR) website (http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/). Because 
complete data was not available for this variable for two states, the Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement and the Illinois Criminal Justice Information 
Authority provided additional data for this variable for their respective states. 
Drug arrests per 100,000 residents for the years 1994 to 1997 came from issues of 
Crime in the United States (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1995, 1996, 1997, 
1998). Because complete data was not available for this variable for three states, 
the Delaware State Police, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and the 
Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority provided additional data for this 
variable for their respective states. 
Before proceeding on to the next section, it is important to explain why 
data for police per 1,000 residents came from different volumes of Crime in the 
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United States than data on drug arrests per 100,000 residents. Some researchers 
have found that using police strength as a measurement of crime control is 
potentially problematic. Kane (2006) wrote “because increases in crime rates 
often lead to increases in police deployment, it is often difficult to determine 
whether police deployment reduces crime, or whether crime increases lead to 
elevated levels of police deployment” (pp. 191-192). Kovandzic and Sloan (2002) 
also stated that “it was unlikely that police levels and crime impacted each other 
simultaneously because it took time for governments to hire and train new officers 
when confronted with higher crime rates. It was also reasonable to assume that 
offenders did not immediately respond to increased levels and the potentially 
increased likelihood of apprehension, until word got out that more officers were 
on the street” (p. 70). 
 The number of law enforcement employees reported in Crime in the 
United States allows for a way to address this issue. For each year, a section of the 
report gives totals for the number of full time state and local law enforcement 
employees who were employed on October 31 of that year. Thus, for the Crime in 
the United States, 1993 report (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1994), the 
number of police employees calculated would be the number employed on 
October 31, 1993. Using this date as the first date where police size is measured 
thus produces a minimum two-month lag between when the police are on the 
street and when prisoners from the datasets are released in 1994. While most 
research studies use a one or two year lag between police levels and subsequent 
crime measurement (Kane, 2006), Chamlin, Grasmick, Bursik and Cochran 
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(1992) presented evidence that it may actually take much less time for changes in 
police levels or arrest rates to have a deterrent effect on would be criminals. They 
further argued that using one-year time lags might be too long to uncover 
deterrent effects. On this basis, it is felt that the two month lag between police 
levels that exist on October 31 and the release of prisoners starting on January 1 
of the following year provides enough time to address the concerns raised by prior 
researchers. It is for this reason that data on police per 1,000 residents came from 
the 1993 to 1996 Crime in the United States reports (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997), while data on drug arrests per 100,000 
residents came from the 1994 to 1997 Crime in the United States reports (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998). 
 
2.3: Measures  
There are a total of eight outcome measures used in this dissertation: 1) 
Rearrest for a New Offense, 2) Rearrest for a Violent Offense, 3) Rearrest for a 
Property Offense, 4) Rearrest for a Drug Offense, 5) Rearrest for a Public Order 
Offense (other than a Parole Violation), 6) Reconviction for a New Offense, 7) 
Reimprisonment for a New Offense and 8) Parole Violations. Rearrest for a New 
Offense is defined as whether an offender was arrested for any new offense within 
three years of his or her release from prison in either 1983 or 1994. Rearrest for a 
Violent Offense is defined as whether an offender was arrested for a new violent 
offense within three years of his or her release from prison in either 1983 or 1994. 
Rearrest for a Property Offense is defined as whether an offender was arrested for 
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a new property offense within three years of his or her release from prison in 
either 1983 or 1994. Rearrest for a Drug Offense is defined as whether an 
offender was arrested for a new drug offense within three years of his or her 
release from prison in either 1983 or 1994. Rearrest for a Public Order Offense 
(other than a Parole Violation) is defined as whether an offender was arrested for 
a public order offense, other than a parole violation, within three years of his or 
her release from prison in either 1983 or 1994. Parole Violations were defined 
and analyzed in two separate manners. The first involved analyzing all the 
offenders who were rearrested on a new charge of violating parole within three 
years of their release from prison along with those sent back to prison within three 
years of their release on a technical violation of parole. The second involved 
analyzing those resentenced to prison on a new conviction for a criminal charge 
of parole violation along with those sent back to prison within three years of their 
release on a technical violation of parole. This two-phase analysis helps in 
differentiating the use of parole violations by parole officers compared to 
prosecuting attorneys. 
The regression equations used in this dissertation all include individual level 
variables that have consistently been shown to be associated with offender 
recidivism. These variables include gender, age at release, race, age at first arrest, 
number of prior arrests, time served, current offense type, type of admission and 
type of release. For the first two regression models, state of release is also included 
in the regression equation. For the third regression model, police per 1,000 
residents, arrest-offense ratio and drug arrests per 100,000 residents are entered 
separately into the regression equation. For the fourth regression model, state of 
release and year of release are both included in the regression equation 
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Modifications were made to the model structure for reconvictions and 
reimprisonment for a new offense. The problem that existed with using the same 
formula for reconvictions and reimprisonment as had been used for rearrest has to 
do with the relationship that exists between rearrest for a new offense, 
reconviction for a new offense and reimprisonment for a new offense. Because a 
prerequisite of being reconvicted of a new offense is that one must first be 
rearrested for a new offense and because a prerequisite of being reimprisoned for 
a new conviction is that one must be reconvicted for a new offense, classes of 
offenders with higher rearrest rates will, by default, have higher reconviction rates 
because a prerequisite of being reconvicted is that one must first be rearrested. 
Similarly, classes of offenders with higher reconviction rates will, by default, 
have higher reimprisonment rates because a prerequisite of being reimprisoned for 
a new offense is that one must first be reconvicted for a new offense. Therefore, 
as males, blacks and younger offenders are rearrested at higher rates than females, 
non-blacks and older offenders, these groups would almost certainly have higher 
reconviction rates and higher reimprisonment rates. This would create a problem 
in that the results of the regression model would be biased by arrest rates and 
conviction rates. 
To control for this potential problem, the samples for two of the analyses 
include offenders only if they met specific conditions. First, the between state 
reconviction analyses were limited exclusively to offenders who had been 
rearrested. Second, the between state reimprisonment for a new offense analyses 
were limited exclusively to offenders who had been reconvicted. Limiting the 
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offenders in this way produced reconviction and reimprisonment probability 
results that were more meaningful. The two research questions these areas address 
are, specifically: 1) For rearrested offenders, what is the probability of being 
reconvicted for a new offense and what individual and contextual level factors are 
related to this probability? 2) For reconvicted offenders, what is the probability of 
being reimprisoned for the new conviction and what individual and contextual 
level factors are related to this probability? 
The predictor of primary interest for the first two research questions, 
which deal with recidivism across space, is State of Release – defined as being 
Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, 
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Texas and Virginia. For 
the research question dealing with recidivism over space and whether individual 
level characteristics help explain variations in recidivism across space, there were 
two separate sets of logistic regression models used. One of these models 
compared each state with a single contrast – an approach commonly referred to as 
a “fixed effects” approach (details of this approach are provided in Chapter 4). In 
this model, the state with the lowest recidivism rate for the recidivism measure 
under consideration served as the reference category (except for the recidivism 
measure of reimprisonment probability, which used the state with second lowest 
recidivism rate) and the predictor of State of Release was entered into the analysis 
as a series of dichotomous variables. The second model involved a series of state-
by-state comparisons. For the research question dealing with recidivism over 
space and whether the addition of contextual variables helped explain variations 
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above and beyond individual level characteristics, the predictor of State of 
Release was entered into the analysis as a series of dichotomous variables with 
the state with the lowest recidivism rate for the recidivism measure under 
consideration serving as the reference category (except for the recidivism measure 
of reimprisonment probability, which used the state with second lowest 
recidivism rate). For the research question dealing with recidivism over time, a 
second predictor of primary interest is Year of Release – 1983 or 1994. This 
variable was binary coded with 1983 as the omitted contrast. For the combined 
dataset containing 1983 and 1994 data, State of Release was further modified with 
Arizona, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia removed. 
This analysis also includes important individual-level predictors of 
recidivism. For the purpose of analysis the variables were coded in the following 
manner. Gender was coded as one for males and zero for females. Age at Release 
is the age of the prisoner at the time of release from confinement and is coded as a 
continuous measure. Race consists of three categories: white, black and other. 
Race was entered into the models as a series of dichotomous variables with 
“white” serving as the reference category. 
Age at First Arrest reflects the age of the offender at the time of his or her 
first arrest and was coded as a continuous measure. Number of Prior Arrests 
reflects each released prisoner’s arrest history, not including the arrest leading to 
the current incarceration, and was coded as a continuous measure. Current 
Offense Type consists of five categories of offenders: violent, property, drugs, 
public order or other. Current Offense Type was entered into the models as a 
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series of dichotomous variables with “property offense” serving as the reference 
category. Time Served was coded as a continuous variable representing the 
number of months served in prison during the current incarceration. Type of 
Admission consists of five categories: new court commitment, parole revocation, 
probation revocation, other, and unknown. Type of Admission was entered into the 
models as a series of dichotomous variables with “new court commitment” 
serving as the reference category. Type of Release consists of four categories: 
discretionary parole, mandatory supervised release, expiration of sentence, and 
other. Type of Release was entered into the models as a series of dichotomous 
variables with “discretionary parole” serving as the reference category. A detailed 
description of how each of these measures was created from the merged data is 
described in the Appendix A. 
The state level variables used in this dissertation were entered into 
equations known as multilevel models. Multilevel models are statistical models 
that are structured with variables measured at two or more levels. In such models 
variables in one level are nested within another level. Examples of multilevel 
models include: students nested within classes, patients nested within hospitals 
and, in the current analysis, individuals released from prison nested within 
individual states. In the current model, the impact of the state-level variables is 
tempered by the effect of the individual-level variables. In such situations the 
latter variables are referred to as level-one variables and they are nested in larger 
groups referred to as level-two variables (Raudensush and Bryk, 2002). 
To estimate the effect of the state level variables on various forms of 
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recidivism, three multilevel models were created. In each of these models, the 
level-one data consisted of the nine individual level variables previously 
described. The state level variable of Police per 1,000 Residents was entered into 
the first multilevel model as a rate per capita derived by taking the 1993 to 1996 
average for the number of law enforcement personnel employed by a state divided 
by the four year average of each state’s population for the same time period and 
multiplying this result by 1,000. The state level variable of Arrest-Offense Ratio 
was entered into a separate multilevel model as a proportion derived by taking the 
1994 to 1997 year average of arrests for Index I crimes (murder, rape, robbery, 
aggravated assault, burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft) for each state 
divided by the four year average of Index I crimes for each state for the same time 
period. The state level variable of Drug Arrests per 100,000 Residents was 
entered into a third multilevel model as a rate per capita derived by taking the 
1994 to 1997 year average of the number of drug arrests in a state divided by the 
four year average of each state’s population for the same time period and 
multiplying this result by 100,000.  
 
2.4: Analytic Strategy 
As the outcome measures are all dichotomous (rearrested/not rearrested, 
reconvicted/not reconvicted, etc.), logistic regressions were used in each of the 
multivariate analyses. In the dissertation, there are three separate sets of analyses. 
The first set of analyses explores the differences in recidivism probabilities that 
exist between individual states for the 1994 cohort and the extent to which the 
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inclusion of individual level characteristics helps explain these differences. The 
second set of analyses uses Hierarchical Linear Modeling to help determine if and 
to what degree the addition of the three state level contextual factors to the models 
of individual level factors helps explain differences across states in various forms 
of recidivism. The third set of analyses explores the differences in rearrest 
probabilities that exist over time (between the 1983 and 1994 cohorts) and to what 
extent the inclusion of individual level characteristics helps explain these 
differences. The first and third sets of models in this dissertation were estimated 
using STATA, version 10.0 (StataCorp, 2007) or 11.0 (StataCorp, 2009) and the 
second set of models was estimated using HLM 6.0 (Raudenbush, Bryk and 
Congdon, 2004). 
In the first set of analyses, logistic regressions were run for each 
combination of states from the 1994 cohort. These involved two separate sets of 
analysis. The first involved a model with a single contrast state omitted. The 
second involved a series of state-by-state logistic regressions comparing the 
recidivism probabilities of those released, for example, from California in 1994 
with those released from Florida in 1994. For the second model, this process was 
repeated until every possible state by state combination had been estimated. After 
these initial regressions were computed, a second set of models was run which 
added the nine individual level characteristics to the models. Both models were 
repeated for 1) rearrest for any offense, 2) rearrest for a violent offense, 3) rearrest 
for a property offense, 4) rearrest for a drug offense, 5) rearrest for a public order 
offense (other than a parole violation), 6) reconviction for a new offense for 
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rearrested offenders, 7) reimprisonment following conviction for a new offense, 
and 8) violation of parole. The results present preliminary evidence as to what 
extent individual level characteristics help explain variation in rearrest, 
reconviction, reimprisonment and parole violation probabilities across space. 
In the second set of analyses, Hierarchical Linear Modeling was 
conducted, with the individual level factors entered in as Level 1 predictors and 
the state level contextual factors entered in as Level 2 predictors This process was 
repeated for 1) rearrest for a new offense, 2) rearrest for a violent offense, 3) 
rearrest for a property offense, 4) rearrest for a drug offense, 5) rearrest for a 
public order offense (other than a parole violation), 6) reconviction for a new 
offense for rearrested offenders and 7) reimprisonment following conviction for a 
new offense. Because of the limited degrees of freedom that resulted from the 
sample consisting of only 15 states, models were constructed using only one of 
the three contextual variables at a time. The results of these models indicate if the 
three contextual variables help explain variation in recidivism across space. 
In the third set of analyses, a preliminary regression was first run with year 
of release the only variable entered into the model. Following this, a second 
regression was run adding all of the individual level characteristics to the first 
model. The resulting coefficients and odds ratios present preliminary evidence as 
to what extent individual level characteristics help explain variation in rearrest 
probabilities over time. A final regression was then run with state of release added 
to the equation. The third set of analyses concludes with a discussion of 
contextual factors that may have contributed to the findings. 
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CHAPTER 3  
EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF INDIVIDUAL LEVEL COVARIATES 
 
3.1: Introduction 
To accurately compare prevalence of recidivism over time and across 
space, it is first necessary to control for individual-level variables that have been 
shown to have an influence on both the likelihood of offending and likelihood of 
recidivism. Research has found that certain groups of individuals are more likely 
to be involved in crime than others and, to accurately compare recidivism rates 
between different groups, these differences need to be taken into account. For the 
purpose of this research, nine individual-level factors are examined: 1) gender, 2) 
age at release, 3) race, 4) age at first arrest, 5) number of prior arrests, 6) current 
offense type, 7) time served, 8) type of admission, and 9) type of release. 
To provide a better understanding of why these nine variables were chosen 
for use in this research and why they might be expected to have an influence on 
prevalence of rearrest, what follows is a review of the literature for each variable. 
When possible, this review also includes theoretical explanations about why each 
variable might have the effect it does on recidivism. Following each review, 
logistic regressions testing for significance are run on 32,732 cases representing 
262,530 offenders from the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset. These logistic 
regressions include models for overall rearrests, violent rearrests, property 
rearrests, drug rearrests and public order rearrests. 
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Models are not estimated for reconvictions or reimprisonments in this 
chapter because those analyses must await the results of the rearrest models.  
Because certain groups of offenders are more likely to be rearrested than others, 
this fact will, by default, make certain types of offenders more likely to 
reconvicted and reimprisoned simply because they are more likely to be 
rearrested. The appropriate line of questioning for reconviction is: What are the 
chances of a certain group being reconvicted provided the analysis consists solely 
of those who have been rearrested? Similarly, a more appropriate line of 
questioning for reimprisonment is: What are the chances of a certain group being 
reimprisoned provided the analysis consists solely of those who have been 
reconvicted. Because the dataset must be modified to correctly conduct these 
analyses, these outcomes are addressed in chapter 5. 
These regressions allow tests for statistical significance to be conducted 
for each of the individual level variables, both individually and when all nine 
variables are included in the model. Table 1 at the end of the chapter lists the 
models for the outcomes of rearrest for any offense, rearrest for a violent offense, 
rearrest for a property offense, rearrest for a drug offense and rearrest for a public 
order offense with all the individual level characteristics entered into the models. 
The measures reported for each outcome include the odds ratio, standard error and 
level of significance for each variable in each of the five models. The end of the 
chapter also includes a discussion of a correlation matrix of the nine predictors to 
help detect for potential problems with multicollinearity. 
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3.2: Gender 
 One universally accepted fact in criminology is that males are more likely 
than females to commit acts which are defined as criminal and subject to 
imprisonment. This is evident in government reports highlighting that over 90 
percent of people in prison in the United States are male (Sabol et al., 2009), that 
over 70 percent of people on probation in the United States are male (Glaze and 
Bonczar, 2009) and that over 70 percent of people arrested in the United States 
are male (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009). It is also evident in several self-
report studies in which males admit to higher rates of criminal behavior than 
females (Graham and Bowling, 1995; Flood-Page, Campbell, Harrington, and 
Miller, 2000; Ferguson and Horwood, 2002) as well as in the National Crime 
Victimization Survey (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2008) in which the majority of 
crime victims report that the perpetrator was male. 
 Another widely reported fact is that for males and females who have 
begun engaging in criminal behavior, males are statistically more likely to 
continue offending, even if they have been caught and subject to sanctions. This 
was the finding in reports by Beck and Shipley (1989) (which analyzed data from 
the Prisoners Released in 1983 dataset), by Langan and Levin (2002) and 
Rosenfeld et al. (2005) (both which analyzed data from the Prisoners Released in 
1994 dataset) and by a meta-analysis of 131 studies by Gendreau, Little and 
Goggin (1996). While the vast majority of evidence has found that males are more 
likely to recidivate than females, a few studies have found that no sex difference 
in the likelihood of reoffending. One such finding came from a report issued by 
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Harer (1994). Examining the recidivism rates of offenders released from federal 
prisons in 1987 (with recidivism being defined as being rearrested for a new 
offense or having parole revoked), Harer found that there was no statistical 
difference in the recidivism rates of male (40.9 percent) and female (39.7 percent) 
offenders. Unfortunately, Harer was unable to provide any explanation for why, 
unlike other studies, gender was not a significant predictor of recidivism in his 
research. 
 One theoretical explanation of why males have higher recidivism rates 
than females is differential association (Sutherland, 1947). This theory locates the 
source of criminal behavior as existing within the intimate social networks of 
individuals and further states that those who are exposed to social networks that 
include delinquent associates are themselves likely to become delinquent. In 
support of this theoretical explanation, Steffensmeier (1983) pointed out that the 
criminal underworld is a highly segregated arena, which is almost exclusively 
controlled by men and largely excludes women. In her study of male and female 
heroin users, Covington (1985) found that while female users were often shunned 
by male criminals and were more likely to commit offenses such as prostitution, 
drug dealing or theft independent of other people, male users who were 
differentially associated with other criminals tended to have higher crime rates. 
Steffensmeier and Allan (1996) additionally pointed out that case studies and 
interviews of female offenders reveal that, even among serious female offenders, 
there exists no strong commitment to criminal behavior. “This,” they added, 
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“stands in sharp contrast to the commitment and self-identification with crime and 
the criminal lifestyle that is often found among male offenders” (p. 464). 
Logistic regressions confirm that male offenders in the sample have 
statistically higher prevalence of rearrest than female offenders. While 68.70 
percent of male offenders released in 1994 were rearrested for a new crime within 
three years of their release, only 57.53 percent of female offenders were 
rearrested. This difference is statistically significant both alone (O.R.=1.620, 
p<.001) and when the other eight individual level characteristics are included in 
the model (O.R.=1.601, p<.001). 
Interestingly, however, while male offenders in the sample are 
significantly more likely to be rearrested for a violent offense (O.R.=2.474, 
p<.001), a property offense (O.R.=1.183, p<.05) and a public order offense 
(O.R.=1.389, p<.001), they are not more likely to be rearrested for a drug offense 
(O.R.=1.121, n.s.). This would appear to offer some support to the ideas that 
police efforts to crack down on drug offenses in the mid 1990s were gender 
neutral and that, unlike other crimes, female offenders were more likely to 
become involved in either possession or sales of drugs. When the other eight 
individual level characteristics are included in the model, however, while males 
remain significantly more likely to be rearrested for a violent offense 
(O.R.=2.170, p<.001), a property offense (O.R.=1.189, p<.05) and a public order 
offense (O.R.=1.290, p<.01), they also become significantly more likely to be 
rearrested for a drug offense (O.R.=1.196, p<.05). This significant finding (with 
the other eight characteristics held constant) may be because female offenders, as 
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a whole, possess fewer characteristics associated with increased odds of 
recidivism than male offenders. 
It is also worth noting that the odds ratio is quite a bit larger for violent 
rearrests than for other types of rearrests when comparing male and female 
offenders. This finding is in line with previous research, which has found that 
female offenders’ contribution to violent crime is minor compared to males 
(Steffensmeier and Allan, 1996; Chesney-Lind and Pasko, 2004). 
 
3.3: Age at First Arrest 
 A second variable which research has found to be related to recidivism 
risk is age at first arrest, with offenders who experience their first arrest at a 
younger age more at risk for future offending than those who are first arrested at 
an older age. In a review of seventy-one studies involving 177 independent 
samples of offenders, Pritchard (1979) found that offenders who had a first arrest 
prior to age 18 had an increased risk of recidivism and those whose first arrest 
didn’t occur until at least age 22 were consistently found to have a decreased risk 
of recidivism. Similarly, in Beck and Shipley’s (1989) report on prisoners 
released in 1983, they found that the “age at which a released prisoner was first 
arrested and charged as an adult was inversely related to recidivism: the younger 
the age at first arrest, the higher the rate of recidivism” (p. 8, Table 15). 
 Theoretically, there are several possible explanations for why age at first 
arrest would be a risk factor for future criminal behavior. One set of theories is the 
“state dependence interpretation” which states that “past criminal involvement 
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reduces internal inhibitions or external constraints to future crime or increases the 
motivation to commit crime” (Nagino and Farrington, 1992, p. 503). This 
explanation is consistent with social learning (Akers, 1985), social bonding and 
control (Hirschi, 1969) and differential association (Sutherland, 1947) theories. 
Such theories hold that some children learn to engage in delinquent behavior 
because of their early relationships with family members who are involved in 
crime. Under these theories, if such learning takes place at a very young age (i.e., 
prior to age ten), such behavior is more likely to persist because there exist few 
learned inhibitions or constraints to prevent future involvement in crime. A 
second theory that can be used is that put forth by Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) 
that postulates that early onset of criminal behavioral is the result of low self-
control, which develops in some children at an early age and persists into 
adulthood. 
 In the present analysis, age at first arrest is found to be a significant 
predictor of rearrest for any offense by itself (O.R.=0.935, p<.001) as well as a 
significant predictor of rearrest for a violent offense (O.R.=0.919, p<.001), 
rearrest for a property offense (O.R.=0.950, p<.001), rearrest for a drug offense 
(O.R.=0.960, p<.001) and rearrest for a public order offense (O.R.=0.943, 
p<.001). When the other eight individual level factors are included in the model, it 
is no longer a significant predictor for rearrest for any offense (O.R.=1.006, n.s.), 
rearrest for a property offense (O.R.=1.003, n.s.), rearrest for a drug offense 
(O.R.=1.000, n.s.) and rearrest for a public order offense (O.R.=0.991, n.s.), 
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although it remains a significant predictor for violent rearrest (O.R.=0.965, 
p<.001). 
It is also worth noting that the odds ratio is quite a bit smaller for violent 
rearrests than for other types of rearrests when looking at the age of first arrest. 
This finding suggests that violent offenders begin engaging in criminal behavior 
that results in adult arrests at a younger age than other types of offenders. There 
are at least two possible explanations for this finding. The first is that since 
society views violent crime as more serious than non-violent crime, those who 
have a history of committing violent offenses will be handled by the adult court 
system at a younger age, even though there is no actual age difference between 
when violent and non-violent offenders first begin offending. The second possible 
explanation is that violent offenders begin their criminal careers at a younger age 
than non-violent offenders. 
 
3.4: Race 
 A third common finding in criminology in the United States is that African 
Americans are more likely to be involved as defendants in the criminal justice 
system than whites. While the actual number of white inmates is nearly identical 
to the number of inmates who are African American, the rate of incarceration is 
six and a half times greater for African American males compared to white males 
and three times greater for African American females compared to white females 
(Sabol et al., 2009). Similarly, while whites represented 56 percent of 
probationers in 2008, compared with 29 percent for African Americans (Glaze 
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and Bonzcar, 2009), the 2000 Census reported that 75.1 percent of the U.S. 
population was white while only 12.3 percent was black (United States Census 
Bureau, 2000). This indicates that blacks are also overrepresented compared to 
whites among those found guilty of committing crimes and sentenced to 
probation. In addition to their being overrepresented in the criminal justice 
system, the evidence is consistent in finding that African Americans have higher 
recidivism rates than whites (Beck and Shipley, 1989; Gendreau et al., 1996; 
Harer, 1994; Kubrin and Stewart, 2006; Langan and Levin, 2002; Rosenfeld et al., 
2005). 
One theory that may be able to explain why African Americans have 
higher recidivism rates than whites is the social disorganization theory first 
proposed by Shaw and McKay (1969 [1942]) and later modified by Kornhauser 
(1978), Stark (1987), Bursik (1988), Sampson and Groves (1989), and Bursik and 
Grasmick (1993). Research by Harer (1994) found that poverty is associated with 
recidivism and more recent research by Kubrin and Stewart (2006) found that 
individuals “who return to disadvantaged neighborhoods recidivate at a greater 
rate while those who return to resource rich or affluent communities recidivate at 
a lesser rate” (p. 165). As the United States Census Bureau (n.d.) reports that U.S. 
citizens who are African American have much higher poverty rates than whites, it 
is quite plausible that one reason why African Americans recidivate at higher 
rates than whites has to do with the poverty levels and lack of resources in 
communities to which African American offenders released from prison return. 
  
35 
In the present analysis, African American offenders had a three-year 
prevalence of rearrest for any offense (73.04%) that was 10.24 percentage points 
higher than that of white offenders (62.80%). Logistic regressions performed on 
the dataset reveal that, when no other characteristics are included in the model, 
African Americans have a significantly higher prevalence of rearrest than whites 
for all offenses (O.R.=1.605, p<.001), for violent offenses (O.R.=1.664, p<.001), 
for property offenses (O.R.=1.248, p<.001) and for drug offenses (O.R.=1.454, 
p<.001) but not for public order offenses (O.R.=1.065, n.s.). When the other eight 
individual level characteristics are included in the model, African Americans 
continue to exhibit a significantly higher prevalence of rearrest than whites for all 
offenses (O.R.=1.657, p<.001), for violent offenses (O.R.=1.678, p<.001), for 
property offenses (O.R.=1.346, p<.001) and for drug offenses (O.R.=1.364, 
p<.001) but the difference remains non-significant for public order offenses 
(O.R.=1.008, n.s.). 
 
3.5: Age at Release 
 A fourth common finding of criminology is that street crime is a young 
person’s activity and that, following adolescence, the older a person gets, the less 
likely he or she is to be involved in crime. While there have been many who have 
agreed with this assessment wholeheartedly (Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1983; 
Gove, 1985), others have pointed out that the age-crime curve is not necessarily 
as invariant as once thought, as criminals who get older may become involved in 
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different types of crime that are less likely to be reported to the authorities (Cline, 
1980; Steffensmeier, Allan, Harer, and Streifal, 1989). 
 Despite the debate over whether offenders desist as they age or simply 
change the crimes they commit, studies reflecting crime and recidivism are 
unanimous that the older an offender is when released from prison, the less likely 
he or she is to be rearrested (Beck and Shipley, 1989; Gendreau et al., 1996; 
Harer, 1994; Langan and Levin, 2002; Rosenfeld et al., 2005). Farrington (1986) 
points out that a variety of theoretical perspectives help explain the relationship 
between age and crime. One theoretical explanation is biological in nature with 
offending related to physical factors, such as the levels of testosterone in males 
and physical agility for both males and females (both of which peak during 
adolescence and decline with age). A second set of theories which help explain 
the age crime curve are differential association (Sutherland, 1947) and social 
bonding and control (Hirschi, 1969). Under the theory of differential association, 
adolescents become involved in offending (and continue offending during their 
teen years) because they break away from the protective influence of parents and 
begin bonding, instead, with delinquent peers. As a person reaches his or her 20s 
and 30s, however, offending declines as the bonding shifts away from peers and is 
replaced by family (or, more specifically, spouses and/or children). Another 
important social bond in the desistance process that occurs when a person reaches 
adulthood is steady employment. 
Logistic regressions performed on the dataset confirm that age at release is 
one of the strongest predictors of recidivism, and that the younger an offender is 
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when released, the more likely he or she is to be rearrested. Age at release is a 
highly significant predictor of rearrest for any offense by itself (O.R.=0.959, 
p<.001) as well as a significant predictor of rearrest for a violent offense 
(O.R.=0.959, p<.001), rearrest for a property offense (O.R.=0.981, p<.001), 
rearrest for a drug offense (O.R.=0.982, p<.001) and rearrest for a public order 
offense (O.R.=0.964, p<.001). When the other eight individual level 
characteristics are included in the model, age at release remains a highly 
significant predictor of rearrest for any offense (O.R.=0.938, p<.001) as well as a 
significant predictor of rearrest for a violent offense (O.R.=0.957, p<.001), 
rearrest for a property offense (O.R.=0.961, p<.001), rearrest for a drug offense 
(O.R.=0.964, p<.001) and rearrest for a public order offense (O.R.=0.950, 
p<.001). 
 
3.6: Number of Prior Arrests 
 One of the strongest predictors of future criminal behavior is past criminal 
behavior. In other words, a person who has been arrested more frequently in the 
past is more likely to be arrested again in the future. This result was found in 
research conducted by Beck and Shipley (1989), Gendreau et al. (1996), Kubrin 
and Stewart (2006), Langan and Levin (2002) and Rosenfeld et al. (2005). 
 Theoretically, two reasons that might help explain why those with more 
prior arrests are more likely to be rearrested are differential association 
(Sutherland, 1947) – defined previously in the discussion on gender – and social 
learning theory (Akers, 1985). Social learning theory assumes that criminal 
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behavior is a learned behavior with some people learning how to be delinquent by 
associating with and imitating the actions of the peers they associate with. Under 
these theories, offenders with more prior arrests would be more likely to revert 
back to crime because, by being deeply involved within antisocial groups, this 
association would increase the likelihood of returning to crime. Similarly, since 
offenders with many prior arrests may only know how to survive financially 
through criminal behavior and may, in fact, have developed a form of self-
identification related to crime (Steffensmeier and Allan, 1996), they are much 
more likely to return to crime than those with few arrests. 
Logistic regressions performed on the dataset confirm that the number of 
prior arrests is one of the strongest predictors of recidivism, and that offenders 
with more prior arrests are more likely to be rearrested. Number of prior arrests is 
a highly significant predictor of rearrest for any offense by itself (O.R.=1.075, 
p<.001) as well as a significant predictor of rearrest for a violent offense 
(O.R.=1.023, p<.001), rearrest for a property offense (O.R.=1.052, p<.001), 
rearrest for a drug offense (O.R.=1.044, p<.001) and rearrest for a public order 
offense (O.R.=1.028, p<.001). When the other eight individual level 
characteristics are included in the model, number of prior arrests remains a highly 
significant predictor of rearrest for any offense (O.R.=1.086, p<.001) as well as a 
significant predictor of rearrest for a violent offense (O.R.=1.028, p<.001), 
rearrest for a property offense (O.R.=1.058, p<.001), rearrest for a drug offense 
(O.R.=1.051, p<.001) and rearrest for a public order offense (O.R.=1.041, 
p<.001). 
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It is also worth noting that the odds ratio is quite a bit smaller for violent 
rearrests than for other types of rearrests when looking at the number of prior 
arrests. There are two plausible explanations for this finding. The first explanation 
is that the finding may indicate that violent recidivism is less likely than other 
forms of crime for offenders who have heavy previous involvement in the 
criminal justice system because chronic offenders are rational beings (Cornish and 
Clarke, 1986) who realize the risks inherent in engaging in acts of criminal 
violence. The second explanation is that chronic offenders who are prone to use 
violence are better screened for release and more closely monitored after release 
than chronic offenders who are not prone to use violence. 
 
3.7: Current Offense Type 
Both Beck and Shipley (1989) and Langan and Levin (2002) found that 
property offenders were more likely to be rearrested for a new crime within three 
years of their release from prison than violent offenders, drug offenders and 
public order offenders. In the present analysis, property offenders had a three-year 
prevalence of rearrest (74.04%) that was at least seven percentage points higher 
than that of drug offenders (66.77%), violent offenders (62.12%) and public order 
offenders (62.15%). 
Logistic regressions on the dataset confirm that violent offenders 
(O.R.=0.616, p<.001), drug offenders (O.R.=0.734, p<.001) and public order 
offenders (O.R.=0.572, p<.001) all had significantly lower prevalence of rearrest 
than property offenders when type of offense was examined individually. When 
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the other eight individual level characteristics were controlled, violent offenders 
(O.R.=0.710, p<.001), drug offenders (O.R.=0.751, p<.001) and public order 
offenders (O.R.=0.762, p<.001) remained significantly less likely to be rearrested 
when compared to property offenders. 
This finding did not persist when examining arrests for specific offenses, 
however. Based on the idea of offense specialization – namely that an offender 
who commits one type of offense is more likely to be rearrested for that same type 
of offense than is one who has committed a different type of offense – the 
standard regression model with property offenders serving as the omitted contrast 
variable were not run. Instead, the omitted contrast used in the model matched the 
rearrest offense type under examination. For rearrests for violent offenses, the 
omitted contrast was violent offender; for rearrests for property offenses, the 
omitted contrast was property offender; for rearrests for drug offenses, the omitted 
contrast was drug offender; and for rearrests for public order offenses, the omitted 
contrast was public order offender. This method allowed the models to clearly 
show if offenders who had been released for a specific offense type were more 
likely to be rearrested for the same offense type than other types of offenders.  
The results of these regressions reveal evidence in support of offense 
specialization. These equations revealed that violent offenders were significantly 
more likely to be rearrested for a violent offense than property offenders 
(O.R.=0.723, p<.001), drug offenders (O.R.=0.585, p<.001) or public order 
offenders (O.R.=0.585, p<.001); that property offenders were significantly more 
likely to be rearrested for a property offense than violent offenders (O.R.=0.398, 
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p<.001), drug offenders (O.R.=0.363, p<.001) or public order offenders 
(O.R.=0.345, p<.001); that drug offenders were significantly more likely to be 
rearrested for a drug offense than violent offenders (O.R.=0.420, p<.001), 
property offenders (O.R.=0.535, p<.001) or public order offenders (O.R.=0.405, 
p<.001); and that public order offenders were significantly more likely to be 
rearrested for a public order offense than either violent offenders (O.R.=0.810, 
p<.01) or drug offenders (O.R.=0.826, p<.001). The only non-significant finding 
is that public order offenders were not significantly more likely to be rearrested 
for a public order offense than property offenders (O.R.=0.885, n.s.). 
When the other eight individual level characteristics are included in the 
model, violent offenders remained significantly more likely to be rearrested for a 
violent offense than property offenders (O.R.=0.658, p<.001), drug offenders 
(O.R.=0.543, p<.001) and public order offenders (O.R.=0.636, p<.001); property 
offenders remained significantly more likely to be rearrested for a property 
offense than violent offenders (O.R.=0.460, p<.001), drug offenders (O.R.=0.366, 
p<.001) and public order offenders (O.R.=0.396, p<.001); drug offenders 
remained significantly more likely to be rearrested for a drug offense than violent 
offenders (O.R.=0.459, p<.001), property offenders (O.R.=0.481, p<.001) and 
public order offenders (O.R.=0.441, p<.001); and public order offenders remained 
significantly more likely to be rearrested for a public order offense than either 
violent offenders (O.R.=0.750, p<.001) or drug offenders (O.R.=0.736, p<.001). 
Additionally, with the other variables entered into the model public order 
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offenders became significantly more likely to be rearrested for a public order 
offense than property offenders (O.R.=0.720, p<.001). 
 
3.8: Time Served 
 The findings regarding whether or not the amount of time an offender 
serves in prison affects recidivism are mixed. In one study, Gendreau, Goggin and 
Cullen (1999) looked at 50 studies to see if prison vs. probation and if more time 
vs. less time increased or decreased recidivism rates. Among the studies analyzed, 
23 studies involving 68,248 offenders looked at whether people who spent more 
time or less time in prison had higher recidivism rates. They found that offenders 
who spent more time in prison had the equivalent of a three percent increase in 
recidivism and they stated that on “the basis of the results, we can put forth one 
conclusion with a good deal of confidence. None of the analyses conducted 
produced any evidence that prison sentences reduce recidivism” (p. 18). 
 Evidence by Beck and Shipley (1989) and by Langan and Levin (2002) 
does not support the conclusion of Gendreau et al. (1999). Instead, both studies 
found that the amount of time served was not associated with an increased rate of 
recidivism for offenders who served 60 months or less in prison. Additionally, 
both studies found that offenders who served 61 months or more had significantly 
lower recidivism rates than those who served 60 months or less. 
 While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to do a detailed analysis 
exploring the differences in findings, there is one highly plausible explanation for 
the differences in findings between Gendreau et al.’s (1999) study and the others. 
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This difference relates to the time period when the offenders involved in the 
studies were released from prison. While Beck and Shipley’s (1989) study related 
to prisoners released in 1983 and Langan and Levin’s (2002) study related to 
prisoners released in the 1994, Gendreau et al. (1999) noted that 86 percent of the 
studies they analyzed (related to the effect the amount of time spent in prison had 
on recidivism) were conducted in the 1970s. The differences in what time period 
the offenders served their sentences may have had an impact on what the 
characteristics of inmates who served longer sentences were like. This is 
particularly relevant given the implementation of many tough-on-crime policies in 
America that took place in the 1980s and 1990s. With both parole board and 
judicial discretion more widely used in the 1970s than in the 1980s or 1990s, it is 
quite likely that these factors allowed lower risk offenders to be released more 
quickly in the 1970s than in the 1980s or 1990s. If this was, in fact, the case -- and 
it again needs to be emphasized that it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to 
do an in depth analysis of the validity of this hypothesis -- then this could very 
well explain the conflicting findings. 
 Theoretically, the finding that increased prison length is associated with 
lower recidivism rates is rooted in the simple specific deterrence theory 
(Andenaes, 1968). This theory holds that, in most cases, when individuals 
experience a more severe sanction, they are more likely to have a future reduction 
in criminal activity. The reasoning behind this is that as punishment increases, the 
costs associated with crime increase and a rational being would be less likely to 
repeat the behavior that led to the unpleasant result. 
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 According to Gendreau et al. (1999) the belief that incarceration is related 
to higher recidivism rates (the belief that prisons are “schools of crime”) also has 
theoretical support. Two theoretical rationales that can be used to explain this 
result are differential association (Sutherland, 1947) and social learning theory 
(Akers, 1985). These theories state that if an offender is given a longer sentence 
he would end up associating with a group of fellow criminals for a longer period 
of time and would be more likely to learn criminal behavior from his peers, 
thereby strengthening criminal tendencies. 
Logistic regressions performed on the dataset present some findings that 
contrast with the prior research by Gendreau et al. (1999). More specifically, 
these results indicate that those who serve longer terms in prison have a 
significantly lower prevalence of rearrest for any offense (O.R.=0.993, p<.001) as 
well as a significantly lower prevalence of rearrest for a property offense 
(O.R.=0.995, p<.001), rearrest for a drug offense (O.R.=0.991, p<.001) and 
rearrest for a public order offense (O.R.=0.996, p<.001). While time served is also 
related to a lower prevalence of rearrest for a violent offense, this result is not 
statistically significant (O.R.=0.999, n.s.). 
When the other eight individual level characteristics are included in the 
models, those who serve longer terms in prison continue to exhibit a significantly 
lower prevalence of rearrest for any offense (O.R.=0.998, p<.01) as well as a 
significantly a lower prevalence of rearrest for a property offense (O.R.=0.998, 
p<.05) and rearrest for a drug offense (O.R.=0.996, p<.001). Interestingly, when 
the eight other characteristics are added to the model, the result related to a lower 
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prevalence of rearrest for a violent offense becomes statistically significant 
(O.R.=0.998, p<.05) while the result related to a lower prevalence of rearrest for a 
public order offense becomes non-significant (O.R.=0.999, n.s.). 
 
3.9: Type of Admission 
Recent research has found that the type of admission to prison is related to 
the risk that an individual will reoffend. Specifically, Rosenfeld et al. (2005) 
found that individuals who had entered prison as the result of parole violation 
were more likely to be rearrested than those who entered as the result of a new 
court commitment. They pointed out that this finding was somewhat interesting in 
that it persisted even controlling for age and prior arrests. 
Recent research has found partial support that parole failure may be 
related to recidivism via the theory of low self-control as postulated by 
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990). Langton (2006) followed 4,116 juvenile 
offenders paroled by the California Youth Authority in 1964 and 1965 and found 
that low self-control was significantly and positively related to parole failure 
controlling for both static (e.g., offender’s age at time of sentencing, race, offense 
type) and dynamic factors (e.g., alcohol use, drug use, delinquent associates). This 
finding provides evidence that offenders who have previously failed parole would 
be more likely to either fail again or commit a new crime because of their overall 
lower levels of self-control. 
In the present analysis, those who entered prison on a parole revocation 
had a three-year prevalence of rearrest (76.07%) that was 11.78 percentage points 
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higher than those who entered prison as a new court commitment (64.28%). 
Logistic regressions performed on the dataset reveal that this finding is significant 
both alone (O.R.=1.691, p<.001) and when the other eight individual level 
characteristics are included in the model (O.R.=1.457, p<.001). The models 
further reveal that, when admission type is entered into the model by itself, those 
who entered prison on a parole revocation are significantly more likely than those 
admitted via a new court commitment to be rearrested for a violent offense 
(O.R.=1.340, p<.001), for a property offense (O.R.=1.478, p<.001) and for a drug 
offense (O.R.=1.483, p<.001), but not for a public order offense (O.R.=1.051, 
n.s.). When the other eight individual level characteristics are included in the 
models, the findings remain the same: those admitted via parole violation remain 
more likely to be rearrested for a violent offense (O.R.=1.306, p<.001), for a 
property offense (O.R.=1.213, p<.001) or for a drug offense (O.R.=1.253, 
p<.001), but not for a public order offense (O.R.=1.091, n.s.). 
 
3.10: Type of Release 
 The few studies that have looked into whether type of release from prison 
is significantly related to recidivism have produced mixed findings. Solomon, 
Kachnowski and Bhati (2005) conducted an analysis of the Prisoners Released in 
1994 dataset and found no differences in the two-year prevalence of rearrest of 
those released unconditionally and those released via mandatory supervised 
release. Additionally, although those released via discretionary parole had 
prevalence of rearrest four percentage points lower than the other types of 
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offenders, the authors deemed that this was not a very significant finding and 
wrote, “while post prison supervision may have modest effects on recidivism in 
some cases, it does not appear to improve prevalence of rearrest for the largest 
subsets of released prisoners.” (p. 15) 
 These findings stand in contrast to a book chapter written by Rosenfeld et 
al. (2005). While their findings were similar to Solomon et al.’s (2005) in that 
they did not find statistically significant lower prevalence of rearrest when 
comparing those released via mandatory supervised release and those released 
unconditionally, their findings regarding those released on discretionary parole 
were markedly different. They wrote: “Discretionary parole release has a 
consistent and strong effect on the incidence of rearrest in our sample, especially 
for violent and property offenses. Prisoners released on discretionary parole 
accumulate 36% fewer arrests for violent crime than those released 
unconditionally with no supervision in the community (the contrast category)” 
(pp. 95-96). 
 Few other studies have looked at type of release. Schlager and Robins 
(2008) published the only other study located for use in this dissertation. They 
utilized a random sample of 500 inmates taken from the 14,780 offenders released 
from prison in New Jersey in the 2001 calendar year. They compared the 
recidivism rates of those released by discretionary parole versus those released 
unconditionally. Their findings were in line with those of Rosenfeld et al. (2005). 
“Overall, offenders who maxed out were rearrested and reconvicted at statistically 
significant rates greater than parolees. Seventy percent of max outs were 
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rearrested, and 44% of max outs were reconvicted compared with 60% of 
parolees who were rearrested and 34% who were reconvicted up to 4 years after 
release” (p. 242). 
In the present analysis, those released via discretionary parole had a three-
year prevalence of rearrest (59.65%) that is at least ten percentage points less than 
those who were released via mandatory supervised release (70.14%) and 
expiration of sentence (71.11%). Logistic regressions performed on the dataset 
reveal that offenders released via mandatory supervised release have higher 
recidivism rates than those released via discretionary parole and that this finding 
is significant both alone (O.R.=1.589, p<.001) and when the other eight individual 
level characteristics are included in the model (O.R.=1.364, p<.001). Those 
released via mandatory supervised release further are significantly more likely to 
be rearrested for a violent offense (O.R.=1.391, p<.001), for a property offense 
(O.R.=1.295, p<.001), for a drug offense (O.R.=1.518, p<.001) and for a public 
order offense (O.R.=1.306, p<.001). When the eight other individual level factors 
are added to the models, those released via mandatory supervised release remain 
significantly more likely to be rearrested for a violent offense (O.R.=1.313, 
p<.001), for a drug offense (O.R.=1.314, p<.001) and for a public order offense 
(O.R.=1.162, p<.01). The difference in the likelihood of being rearrested for a 
property offense, however, becomes non-significant when other factors are added 
to the model (O.R.=1.078. n.s.). 
Similar significant findings result when comparing those released via 
expiration of sentence with those released via discretionary parole. This finding is 
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significant both alone (O.R.=1.665, p<.001) and when the eight individual level 
characteristics are included in the model (O.R.=1.527, p<.001). Those released 
via expiration of sentence are also significantly more likely to be rearrested for a 
violent offense (O.R.=2.037, p<.001), for a property offense (O.R.=1.463, 
p<.001), for a drug offense (O.R.=1.380, p<.001) and for a public order offense 
(O.R.=1.875, p<.001). When the eight other individual level factors are added to 
the models, those released via expiration of sentence remain significantly more 
likely to be rearrested for a violent offense (O.R.=1.937, p<.001), for a property 
offense (O.R.=1.346, p<.001), for a drug offense (O.R.=1.282, p<.01) and for a 
public order offense (O.R.=1.777, p<.01). 
It is also worth noting that the odds ratio is quite a bit higher for those 
released via expiration of sentence for both violent rearrests and public order 
rearrests than for those released via discretionary parole. A possible explanation 
for this finding is that those who have problems with either violence or obeying 
the rules of public order were made to serve their entire sentence as a result of 
institutional behavior involving these types of misconduct. As a result, since 
offenders who are prone to these types of behavioral problems are more likely to 
serve their full prison sentences, without parole or supervised release, such 
offenders are also more likely to be rearrested for these types of offenses. 
 
3.11: Relationships among the Individual Predictors  
 Tables 2a and 2b provide a correlation matrix of the individual level 
variables. Based on Cohen’s (1988) interpretation of effect sizes, this matrix 
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reveals that the only variables that have a strong relationship between each other 
are age at first arrest and age at release with an effect size of .527. While Cohen 
determined that a correlation of at least .300 but less than .500 was required to 
have a moderate relationship, and while no other relationships reach this 
threshold, it is nevertheless noteworthy to point out that there are four additional 
correlations greater than .250. The correlation between age at first arrest and 
number of prior arrests is -.264; the correlation between age at release and number 
of prior arrests is .256; the correlation between serving time for a violent offense 
and time served is .277; and the correlation between being admitted for a parole 
violation and being released via mandatory supervised release is .283. 
 Although there were an additional 27 comparisons with small 
relationships (that is, a correlation of at least .100 but no greater than .250), it is 
important to take into consideration that there were a total of 202 comparisons in 
the correlations. This means that only approximately 0.5 percent of the 
comparisons had a strong relationship, only approximately 2.0 percent had close 
to a moderate relationship and only approximately 13.5 percent had a small 
relationship. What this says is that not only does there exist no association 
between predictors in approximately 84 percent of comparisons, but there further 
only exists a moderate to strong relationship in 2.5 percent of comparisons. These 
results indicate that the independent effects of the predictors entered into the 
model are not unduly influenced by correlations with other variables. 
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3.12: Discussion 
 While the preceding sections helped highlight the findings of prior 
research in relation to the nine individual-level recidivism predictors to be 
included in the upcoming chapters, the preliminary logistic regressions revealed 
some interesting findings and how they relate to rearrest risks for specific 
offenses. One finding of interest concerns offense specialization. In all but one of 
the comparisons, an offender released from prison for a specific offense category 
was statistically more likely to be rearrested for the same type of crime when 
compared to other offense categories. Another notable finding is how several of 
the factors had a noticeably different impact on rearrest for a violent offense as 
opposed to overall risk for rearrest for any offense. The odds ratios were 
noticeably different in relation to gender, age at first arrest, number of prior 
arrests, and release via expiration of sentence for those rearrested for a violent 
rearrest compared to those rearrested for any offense. These findings suggest that 
the predictors for violent offending may be somewhat different than the predictors 
of non-violent offending. Specifically, gender is a more influential predictor of 
violent recidivism than non-violent recidivism, people who enter the adult 
criminal justice system at a younger age are at an increased risk of violent 
recidivism, and offenders who max-out their sentences are at an increased risk of 
violent recidivism. The findings also suggest that having a lengthy criminal record 
does not increase the risk of future violent offending. These findings are 
important from a policy perspective as they suggest that males who enter the adult 
criminal justice at a young age and who have behavior problems while 
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incarcerated, and therefore serve their entire sentence in prison, are at an 
increased risk of violent recidivism. As such, it would appear that society would 
benefit if such offenders were more closely monitored upon their release (i.e., 
intensive parole supervision). Officials also should consider providing such 
inmates more intensive end-of-sentence programming to reduce their risk of 
violent recidivism. 
Overall, the findings indicate that the nine individual-level predictors help 
to explain variation in recidivism. But how useful are they in explaining 
differences in rearrest rates across the states?  In other words, does one state have 
a higher recidivism rate than another solely because it has a more “recidivism 
prone” population of released prisoners? And are the nine individual-level 
predictors equally effective at predicting differences in rearrests for specific forms 
of crime – violent, property, drug and public order offenses – or are the predictors 
better able to explain variations in certain types of offending compared to others? 
 These questions are explored in more detail in the next chapter. The forms 
of recidivism to be addressed are rearrest for any offense, rearrest for a violent 
offense, rearrest for a property offense, rearrest for a drug offense and rearrest for 
a public order offense other than a parole violation (additional forms of recidivism 
will be examined in Chapter 5). The findings presented in the next chapter show 
that the nine individual-level predictors help explain some of the variation across 
states for rearrest for any offense, rearrest for a property offense, rearrest for a 
drug offense and rearrest for a public order offense. The findings regarding 
rearrest for violent offending, however, are mixed. 
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Table 1: Logistic Regression Models for All Individual Level Characteristics  
 Any Offense Violent Property Drug  Public Order 
 Odds Ratio 
Std. Err. 
Odds Ratio 
Std. Err. 
Odds Ratio 
Std. Err. 
Odds Ratio 
Std. Err. 
Odds Ratio 
Std. Err. 
Gender 1.601*** 2.170*** 1.189* 1.196* 1.290** 
  0.121 0.237 0.100 0.100 0.109 
Age at First Arrest 1.006 0.965*** 1.003 1.000 0.991 
  0.005 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Black 1.657*** 1.678*** 1.346*** 1.364*** 1.008 
  0.070 0.082 0.06 0.062 0.044 
Other Race 0.672* 1.293 0.801 0.586* 0.970 
  0.134 0.268 0.158 0.138 0.188 
Age at Release 0.938*** 0.957*** 0.961*** 0.964*** 0.950*** 
  0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Prior Arrests 1.086** 1.028*** 1.058*** 1.051*** 1.041*** 
  0.006 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 
Violent Offense 0.710*** Omitted 0.460*** 0.459*** 0.750*** 
  0.038   0.024 0.026 0.057 
Property Offense Omitted 0.658*** Omitted 0.481*** 0.720*** 
    0.038   0.027 0.054 
Drug Offense 0.751*** 0.543*** 0.366*** Omitted 0.736*** 
  0.042 0.034 0.02   0.057 
Public Order Offense 0.762*** 0.636*** 0.396*** 0.441*** Omitted 
  0.057 0.055 0.031 0.037   
Other Offense 0.690*** 0.568 0.549* 0.662 0.483* 
  0.176 0.186 0.158 0.163 0.148 
Time Served 0.998** 0.998* 0.998* 0.996*** 0.999 
  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Parole Violation 1.457*** 1.306*** 1.213*** 1.253*** 1.091 
  0.083 0.076 0.066 0.069 0.06 
Probation Violation 1.386** 1.443** 1.673*** 1.096 2.307*** 
  0.147 0.154 0.167 0.122 0.22 
Other Admission 0.810 0.741 0.940 0.694 0.806 
Type  0.124 0.139 0.147 0.134 0.136 
Unknown Admission 0.509*** 0.451 0.559*** 0.554*** 0.240*** 
Type 0.067 0.067 0.073 0.082 0.034 
Mandatory Supervised 1.364*** 1.313*** 1.078 1.314*** 1.162** 
Release  0.063 0.072 0.052 0.067 0.06 
Expiration of Sentence 1.528*** 1.937*** 1.346*** 1.282** 1.777*** 
  0.12 0.162 0.105 0.105 0.137 
Other Release Type 1.497*** 1.353*** 0.924 0.900 2.214*** 
  1.497 0.095 0.059 0.06 0.133 
Model Statistics 
Observations 32,732 32,732 32.732 32,732 32.732 
Pseudo R2 0.1100 0.0692 0.0863 0.0745 0.0553 
Log Pseudolikelihood -146985.23 -127522 -150385.06 -149246.06 -146070.57 
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001 
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Table 2A: Correlation Matrix of Individual Level Characteristics (Part 1) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 1 -.097** .011** -.011** 0 -.037** -.007** .072** -.018** -.067** .039** 
2 -.097** 1 .079** -.078** -.006** .527** -.264** -0.003 -.079** .043** .053** 
3 .011** .079** 1 -.980** -.102** .048** -.053** -.026** .087** -.121** .065** 
4 -.011** -.078** -.980** 1 -.099** -.042** .057** .022** -.088** .127** -.069** 
5 0 -.006** -.102** -.099** 1 -.027** -.018** .018** .005* -.032** .020** 
6 -.037** .527** .048** -.042** -.027** 1 .256** -.010** -.025** -.004* .057** 
7 -.007** -.264** -.053** .057** -.018** .256** 1 -.118** .132** -.016** -.028** 
8 .072** -0.003 -.026** .022** .018** -.010** -.118** 1 -.384** -.370** -.176** 
9 -.018** -.079** .087** -.088** .005* -.025** .132** -.384** 1 -.494** -.235** 
10 -.067** .043** -.121** .127** -.032** -.004* -.016** -.370** -.494** 1 -.226** 
11 .039** .053** .065** -.069** .020** .057** -.028** -.176** -.235** -.226** 1 
12 -.013** .023** .050** -.049** -.005** .008** .022** -.073** -.097** -.094** -.045** 
13 .076** -.030** -.069** .072** -.014** .134** -.046** .277** -.084** -.098** -.079** 
14 -.009** .015** -.027** .033** -.033** -.059** -.120** .075** -.101** .050** -.007** 
15 .030** -.037** .017** -.020** .013** .083** .186** -.047** .073** -.028** -.019** 
16 -.056** .020** -.024** .015** .046** -.064** -.101** -.051** .045** -.030** .059** 
17 -0.004 .009** .015** -.023** .042** .009** -.014** -.019** -.012** -.035** .107** 
18 -.060** .020** -.051** .044** .035** -.069** -.109** -.055** .049** -.028** .053** 
19 -.025** -.013** -.112** .118** -.030** -.014** -.118** .017** -.040** .024** .024** 
20 .018** .022** .138** -.146** .037** .028** .103** -.026** .034** -.027** -.014** 
21 .019** -.019** -.043** .047** -.021** .012** 0.003 .034** -0.003 -.008** -.019** 
22 -.007** -0.003 -.031** .032** -0.001 -.032** -0.001 -.007** .004* .014** 0.003 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
  1 – GENDER       8 - VIOLENT OFFENSE   16 - PROBATION VIOLATION 
  2 - AGE AT FIRST ARREST     9 – PROPERTY OFFENSE    17 - OTHER ADMISSION TYPE 
  3 - RACE – WHITE    10 – DRUG OFFENSE    18 – UNKNOWN ADMISSION TYPE 
  4 - RACE – BLACK    11 – PUBLIC ORDER OFFENSE   19 - DISCRETIONARY PAROLE  
  5 - RACE – OTHER    12 - OFFENSE - OTHER    20 - MANDATORY SUPERVISED RELEASED 
  6 - AGE AT RELEASE    13 - TIME SERVED     21 - EXPIRATION OF SENTENCE 
  7 - PRIOR ARRESTS    14 - NEW COURT COMMITMENT  22 – OTHER RELEASE TYPE 
15 - PAROLE VIOLATION   
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Table 2B: Correlation Matrix of Individual Level Characteristics (Part 2) 
 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1 -.013** .076** -.009** .030** -.056** -0.004 -.060** -.025** .018** .019** -.007** 
2 .023** -.030** .015** -.037** .020** .009** .020** -.013** .022** -.019** -0.003 
3 .050** -.069** -.027** .017** -.024** .015** -.051** -.112** .138** -.043** -.031** 
4 -.049** .072** .033** -.020** .015** -.023** .044** .118** -.146** .047** .032** 
5 -.005** -.014** -.033** .013** .046** .042** .035** -.030** .037** -.021** -0.001 
6 .008** .134** -.059** .083** -.064** .009** -.069** -.014** .028** .012** -.032** 
7 .022** -.046** -.120** .186** -.101** -.014** -.109** -.118** .103** 0.003 -0.001 
8 -.073** .277** .075** -.047** -.051** -.019** -.055** .017** -.026** .034** -.007** 
9 -.097** -.084** -.101** .073** .045** -.012** .049** -.040** .034** -0.003 .004* 
10 -.094** -.098** .050** -.028** -.030** -.035** -.028** .024** -.027** -.008** .014** 
11 -.045** -.079** -.007** -.019** .059** .107** .053** .024** -.014** -.019** 0.003 
12 1 -.046** -.036** .026** -.026** -.012** -.023** -.047** .083** -.022** -.046** 
13 -.046** 1 .149** -.109** -.075** .023** -.082** .214** -.205** .080** -.028** 
14 -.036** .149** 1 -.695** -.271** -.101** -.242** .086** -.177** -.030** .174** 
15 .026** -.109** -.695** 1 -.145** -.054** -.130** -.146** .283** -.059** -.192** 
16 -.026** -.075** -.271** -.145** 1 -.021** .895** .147** -.087** -.047** -.030** 
17 -.012** .023** -.101** -.054** -.021** 1 -.019** .013** -.060** -.007** .077** 
18 -.023** -.082** -.242** -.130** .895** -.019** 1 .145** -.053** -.044** -.079** 
19 -.047** .214** .086** -.146** .147** .013** .145** 1 -.665** -.139** -.217** 
20 .083** -.205** -.177** .283** -.087** -.060** -.053** -.665** 1 -.279** -.436** 
21 -.022** .080** -.030** -.059** -.047** -.007** -.044** -.139** -.279** 1 -.091** 
22 -.046** -.028** .174** -.192** -.030** .077** -.079** -.217** -.436** -.091** 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
  1 – GENDER       8 - VIOLENT OFFENSE   16 - PROBATION VIOLATION 
  2 - AGE AT FIRST ARREST     9 – PROPERTY OFFENSE    17 - OTHER ADMISSION TYPE 
  3 - RACE – WHITE    10 – DRUG OFFENSE    18 – UNKNOWN ADMISSION TYPE 
  4 - RACE – BLACK    11 – PUBLIC ORDER OFFENSE   19 - DISCRETIONARY PAROLE  
  5 - RACE – OTHER    12 - OFFENSE - OTHER    20 - MANDATORY SUPERVISED RELEASED 
  6 - AGE AT RELEASE    13 - TIME SERVED     21 - EXPIRATION OF SENTENCE 
  7 - PRIOR ARRESTS    14 - NEW COURT COMMITMENT  22 – OTHER RELEASE TYPE 
15 - PAROLE VIOLATION 
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CHAPTER 4 - EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
CHARACTERISTICS ON TYPES OF REARREST 
 
4.1: Introduction 
While Langan and Levin’s (2002) publication detailing the individual 
level characteristics of offenders released from prison in 15 states in 1994 
provided invaluable information about a majority of prisoners released in the 
United States for that year, one thing it neglected to do was break down the 
released prisoners by state of release. Table 3 on the following page shows that a 
great deal of between state variation exists in the cumulative individual level 
characteristics of those who were released. One characteristic that differs widely 
among states that would also be expected to influence recidivism rates is the 
average number of prior arrests for released prisoners, with a low of 4.59 in 
Michigan and a high of 14.20 in Delaware. Given the strong relationship which 
has been shown to exist between prior arrests and recidivism, states that release 
prisoners with a higher average number of prior arrests would also be expected to 
have higher recidivism rates. Similarly, the percentage of prisoners released via 
discretionary parole runs the complete spectrum from 0 percent in California, 
Delaware, Florida and Illinois to 100 percent in Michigan. Although the previous 
chapter revealed that release type had a more modest impact than number of prior 
arrests, the variation in the number of prisoners released via discretionary parole 
would also be expected to have an influence on the recidivism rates of offenders 
released from different states. 
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Table 3: Individual Level Characteristics  of 1994 Release Cohort by State of R elease 
Demographic Characteristic Mean St. Dev. AZ CA DE FL IL MD MI MN NJ NY NC OH OR TX VI 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
 
91.13% 
8.87% 
 
28.40% 
28.40% 
 
90.93% 
9.07% 
 
91.15% 
8.85% 
 
92.50% 
7.50% 
 
89.96% 
10.04% 
 
93.49% 
6.51% 
 
93.54% 
6.46% 
 
92.94% 
7.06% 
 
93.42% 
6.58% 
 
92.21% 
7.79% 
 
91.64% 
8.36% 
 
87.40% 
12.60% 
 
89.79% 
10.21% 
 
92.73% 
7.27% 
 
91.97% 
8.03% 
 
91.32% 
8.68% 
Average Age at First Arrest 21.60 6.45 22.33 22.06 18.10 20.94 19.59 21.71 21.08 21.75 20.81 20.74 22.16 22.19 22.37 21.89 21.88 
Race 
White 
Black 
Other 
 
50.34% 
48.64% 
1.02% 
 
50.00% 
50.00% 
  10.10% 
 
77.29% 
17.02% 
5.69% 
 
65.33% 
33.17% 
1.50% 
 
31.88% 
68.13% 
0.00% 
 
42.71% 
57.15% 
0.14% 
 
28.17% 
71.75% 
0.08% 
 
22.31% 
77.69% 
0.00% 
 
45.19% 
54.17% 
0.64% 
 
60.09% 
30.97% 
8.94% 
 
31.01% 
68.86% 
0.13% 
 
35.73% 
64.04% 
0.23% 
 
35.40% 
62.86% 
1.74% 
 
46.08% 
53.67% 
0.24% 
 
81.67% 
15.57% 
2.76% 
 
51.68% 
48.24% 
0.08% 
 
35.24% 
64.52% 
0.05% 
Average Age at Release 32.30 8.47 33.66 33.04 31.26 32.26 29.64 31.95 32.88 31.15 31.28 31.87 30.86 31.55 34.35 33.14 32.25 
Average Prior Arrests 8.78    8.59 6.95 10.41 14.20 10.89 8.66 7.56 4.59 6.03 7.27 9.56 5.81 5.02 14.06 5.86 6.79 
Current Offense 
Violent 
Property 
Drugs 
Public Order 
Other 
 
22.35% 
33.84% 
32.28% 
9.71% 
1.81% 
 
41.70% 
47.30% 
46.80% 
29.60% 
13.30% 
 
16.54% 
32.64% 
23.94% 
26.08% 
0.79% 
 
20.68% 
33.81% 
32.65% 
8.91% 
3.95% 
 
29.53% 
13.75% 
38.91% 
17.81% 
0.00% 
 
24.32% 
36.54% 
32.35% 
6.79% 
0.00% 
 
24.96% 
38.55% 
28.66% 
7.76% 
0.07% 
 
27.44% 
17.58% 
23.73% 
31.18% 
0.07% 
 
28.52% 
37.08% 
23.79% 
10.48% 
0.12% 
 
43.58% 
39.17% 
14.59% 
2.67% 
0.00% 
 
26.39% 
21.12% 
45.57% 
5.16% 
1.77% 
 
26.73% 
21.39% 
45.23% 
6.30% 
0.36% 
 
14.08% 
42.87% 
26.28% 
16.41% 
0.37% 
 
25.55% 
39.56% 
27.86% 
5.45% 
1.58% 
 
38.42% 
32.06% 
21.03% 
7.93% 
0.56% 
 
19.38% 
41.52% 
30.00% 
9.10% 
0.00% 
 
21.96% 
43.92% 
28.90% 
4.92% 
0/29% 
Average Time Served - Months 18.72 24.13 20.88 11.67 30.47 22.71 18.22 33.09 45.00 20.55 21.78 32.87 7.62 29.97 18.49 19.95 24.08 
Type of Prison Admission* 
New Court Commitment 
Parole Revocation 
Probation Revocation 
Other Admission Type 
 
59.10% 
28.29% 
10.58% 
0.81% 
 
48.30% 
45.90% 
23.60% 
    9.30% 
 
32.82% 
17.27% 
34.54% 
15.38% 
 
48.25% 
51.75% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
 
85.16% 
3.13% 
11.72% 
0.00% 
 
99.42% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.58% 
 
80.99% 
17.78% 
0.00% 
1.22% 
 
80.63% 
17.19% 
0.00% 
2.18% 
 
67.57% 
7.51% 
19.57% 
5.35% 
 
92.80% 
7.20% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
 
67.73% 
30.69% 
1.38% 
0.20% 
 
90.21% 
9.32% 
0.00% 
0.47% 
 
35.50% 
20.38% 
43.47% 
0.64% 
 
** 
** 
** 
** 
 
35.82% 
33.48% 
27.82% 
2.87% 
 
66.55% 
32.40% 
1.05% 
   0.00% 
 
81.40% 
18.60% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
Type of Prison Release 
Discretionary Parole 
Mandatory Supervised Release 
Expiration of Sentence 
Other 
 
23.53% 
57.75% 
5.70% 
10.29% 
 
43.20% 
49.95% 
22.80% 
33.00% 
 
35.69% 
0.85% 
4.32% 
59.14% 
 
0.00% 
100.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
 
0.00% 
0.00% 
8.59% 
91.41% 
 
0.00% 
0.71% 
20.84% 
78.45% 
 
0.00% 
98.08% 
1.53% 
0.39% 
 
42.20% 
49.00% 
2.44% 
6.36% 
 
100.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
 
0.12% 
76.66% 
0.74% 
22.47% 
 
77.79% 
0.00% 
20.23% 
1.87% 
 
71.02% 
11.06% 
4.45% 
13.47% 
 
38.07% 
59.41% 
2.46% 
0.06% 
 
35.01% 
0.00% 
39.56% 
25.43% 
 
52.10% 
34.99% 
0.41% 
12.50% 
 
43.82% 
33.48% 
1.97% 
20.72% 
 
41.80% 
51.45% 
2.76% 
3.99% 
* Percentages of Type of Admission are calculated excluding those with unknown admission types. These cases are included in calculating percentages for other individual level characteristics. 
** Data on Admission Type was not provided for any offender released in 1994 from prison in Ohio. 
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This chapter looks at the differences in recidivism across states for several, 
separate forms of rearrest. These include rates of rearrest for any offense, rearrest 
for a violent offense, rearrest for a property offense, rearrest for a drug offense, 
and rearrest for a public order offense (other than parole violation). In exploring 
these different forms of rearrest, the chapter evaluates the extent to which 
variation between states in rates of each rearrest type can be explained by 
differences in the individual level characteristics of the release cohorts from each 
state. 
Differences between states are examined in two separate ways. The first of 
these methods is often referred to as a “fixed effects” approach. It involves 
estimating three models. The first is a model for each form of rearrest with state 
of release entered into the model (one of the states will serve as the omitted 
contrast). The second is a model for each form of rearrest with the nine individual 
level characteristics added. This model is similar to that shown at the conclusion 
of Chapter 3. The third is a model for each form of rearrest with both the nine 
individual level characteristics and the state of release entered into the model. 
After these three models are estimated, changes in the odds ratio for each of the 
states is examined to evaluate the impact that the nine individual level 
characteristics have on recidivism measures. 
A second way to examine state differences in the effect of individual level 
characteristics on recidivism is to do a state-by-state comparison. In this 
approach, two sets of models are estimated for each possible state-by-state 
combination. Rather than odds ratios, these models estimate regression 
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coefficients. In the first model, the only variables entered into the regression 
equation are the outcome variable (i.e., type of rearrest) and the contrast state. In 
the second model, the nine individual level characteristics are added.  
To help understand what this approach involves, an example follows, 
comparing the states of Illinois and Minnesota using the recidivism measure of 
rearrest for any offense. These two states were chosen because they have quite 
different rearrest rates. For offenders from Illinois released in 1994, 77.80 percent 
were rearrested for a new offense within three years of their release. This is 
markedly higher than Minnesota where only 59.84 percent of offenders released 
in 1994 were rearrested for a new offense within three years of their release. 
When the nine individual level characteristics are entered into the model, 
however, the difference in recidivism rates is accounted for by differences in the 
characteristics of the prisoners released in the two states. Comparing rearrest rates 
between Illinois and Minnesota using the states only model, the regression results 
are as follows: 
Table 4: Logistic Regression comparing Rearrests for Prisoners Released 
from Illinois and Minnesota 
REARRD Coefficient Std. Error 
Illinois 0.8552387*** 0.0815106  
Model Statistics 
Observations Pseudo R2 Log Pseudolikelihood 
3724 0.0128 -8968.4084 
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001 
 
When the rearrest rates of prisoners released from Illinois are compared 
with the rearrest rates of those from Minnesota (the contrast in the model), the 
coefficient is 0.855 (p<.001). This is a statistically significant finding that 
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indicates that an offender released from prison in Illinois is more likely to be 
rearrested within three years of release than an offender released from Minnesota. 
This finding reflects the difference in the Illinois and Minnesota rearrest 
percentages previously noted.  
The next question is whether differences in individual level characteristics 
of offenders from these two states can explain the difference in recidivism rates. 
To address this question, a second logistic regression model is estimated with the 
nine individual recidivism predictors added to the model. The logistic regression 
for this model is shown below. The results show that when the nine individual 
level characteristics are added, the coefficient for Illinois drops to 0.105 and is not 
significant.  
Table 5: Logistic Regression comparing Rearrests for Prisoners Released 
from Illinois and Minnesota with Individual Level Characteristics Added to 
the Model 
REARRD Coefficient Std. Error 
Illinois 0.1050407 0.1163472 
Gender 0.1973337 0.2463144 
Age of First Arrest -0.0186078 0.0194669 
Black 1.020112 0.1380382 
Other Race 0.5150573 0.2262295 
Age at Release -0.0930937 0.0118599 
Prior Arrests 0.1331583 0.0190814 
Property Offense -0.1390874 0.1578478 
Drug Offense -0.1708313 0.1797831 
Public Order Offense -0.2104811 0.3362968 
Other Offense -1.42732 1.032146 
Time Served -0.0056398 0.0028321 
Parole Violation 0.7893901 0.2433061 
Probation Violation (omitted)  
Other Admission Type 2.637833 0.5731931 
Unknown Admission Type (omitted)  
Mandatory Supervised Release 4.118075 1.077437 
Expiration of Sentence 5.928235 1.179949 
Other Release Type 3.850888 1.098412 
_cons -1.498496 1.197659 
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Model Statistics 
Observations Pseudo R2 Log Pseudolikelihood 
3724 0.2143 - 7137.6965   
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001 
 
To help explain why this change occurred, it is useful to compare the 
differences in the characteristics of prisoners released from Illinois and 
Minnesota. Looking at the state comparisons in Table 3, we might expect 
offenders released from Illinois to have a higher rearrest rate than offenders 
released from Minnesota, given the differences in the individual recidivism 
indicators between the two states. Compared with the prisoners released from 
Minnesota, those released in Illinois are more likely to be black, are younger at 
the age of release, and have more prior arrests – all predictors of elevated 
recidivism rates. These three factors alone explain nearly half of the difference in 
rearrest rates between Illinois and Minnesota (b=0.233, p<.05). 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to discuss modifications that were made 
to the logistic regressions to deal with the problem of multicollinearity, which 
resulted because some states do not vary in their type of admission or release.  For 
example, in California 100 percent of the offenders were released by mandatory 
supervised release, while in Michigan, 100 percent of the offenders were released 
by discretionary parole.  In such instances, the statistical program either dropped 
one of the variables from the model or the estimation produced an unrealistically 
large coefficient on one of these variables (which was defined as an odds ratio of 
10 or above).  In total, multicollinearity was a problem in 14 of the 210 cases. To 
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deal with the problem, either admission type or release type was dropped from the 
regression equation for these estimations 
 
4.2: Exploring the Differences in Rearrest Probabilities across States 
While Figure 1 in Chapter 1 showed that a wide degree of variation exists 
in three-year rearrest rates for offenders released from prison in 1994, with a low 
of 43.74 percent in Michigan and a high of 86.25 percent in Delaware, it is not 
known to what extent variation across states in individual level characteristics of 
released prisoners can account for these differences. To begin exploring this 
possibility, the three regression models described in the previous section are 
estimated. The results provide strong, consistent evidence that the individual level 
predictors help explain some, but not all, of the variation in rearrest rates between 
states. In the model without the individual level recidivism predictors, every state 
has a significantly higher odds ratio of rearrest than Michigan, the contrast, with 
the values ranging from a low of O.R.=1.720 (p<.001) for Texas to a high  of 
OR=8.068 (p<.001) for Delaware. When the nine individual level factors are 
added to the model, every state continues to have a significantly higher odds ratio 
of rearrest than Michigan. The magnitude of the state effect is reduced in every 
case, however, in some cases substantially.  For example, the odds ratio is 
reduced by 50.15 percent for Illinois, 45.38 percent for Delaware, and 41.14 
percent for California. The average reduction in the magnitude of the state effects 
on recidivism after the individual recidivism predictors are added to the model is 
35%.  In other words, state differences in the characteristics of released prisoners 
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explains on average about 35% of the state differences in rates of rearrest for any 
offense. 
Table 6: Logistic Regression Results for Three Models for Rearrest for Any 
Offense 
 State of 
Release 
Model 
Individual Level 
Characteristics 
Model 
Combined 
Model 
Rearrest (Any Offense) Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio 
Gender   1.601*** 1.630*** 
Age of First Arrest   1.006 1.003 
Black   1.657*** 1.665*** 
Other Race   0.672* 0.676 
Age at Release   0.938*** 0.940*** 
Prior Arrests   1.086*** 1.079*** 
Violent Offense   0.710*** 0.683*** 
Drug Offense   0.751*** 0.731*** 
Public Order Offense   0.762*** 0.733*** 
Other Offense   0.690 0.670 
Time Served   0.998** 0.997*** 
Parole Violation   1.457*** 1.517*** 
Probation Violation   1,386** 1.182 
Other Admission Type   0.810 0.860 
Unknown Admission Type   0.509*** 0.730* 
Mandatory Supervised Release   1.364*** 1.123 
Expiration of Sentence   1.528*** 1.223* 
Other Release Type  1.497*** 0.892 
Arizona 2.141***  2.100*** 
California 3.121***  1.837*** 
Delaware 8.068***  4.407*** 
Florida 4.917***  3.068*** 
Illinois 4.507***  2.247*** 
Maryland 3.139***  2.108*** 
Minnesota 1.916***  1.560*** 
New Jersey 2.122***  1.310*** 
New York 2.730***  1.845*** 
North Carolina 2.007***  1.364*** 
Ohio 1.724***  1.399*** 
Oregon 3.415***  2.141*** 
Texas 1.720***  1.321*** 
Virginia 2.272***  1.518*** 
Model Statistics 
Observations (Unweighted) 32,732 32,732 32,732 
Pseudo R2 0.0203 0.1100 0.1161 
Log Pseudolikelihood -161791.42 -146985.23 -145970.99 
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001 
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These results are based on comparing each state with a single contrast, 
Michigan, which has a comparatively low rate of rearrest for any offense.  The 
second approach relaxes this restriction by comparing each state with every other 
state.  The results are consistent with those from the former analysis.   Without the 
individual level characteristics added to the models, the regression results show 
that slightly less than 20 percent of the state-by-state comparisons yield 
statistically similar odds of rearrest (refer to Table A1 in Appendix B).  
Specifically, of 105 state-by-state comparisons, 20 combinations (19.05 
percent) produce a non-significant difference in the rearrest rates of the two states. 
When the individual level characteristics are added to the models (refer to Table 
A2 in Appendix B), the number of state-by-state comparisons with similar rearrest 
rates increases to 50 (47.62 percent).  
Not only do these results provide additional evidence regarding the impact 
of differences in release cohorts on state differences in rearrest rates, this second 
approach can be used to explore these effects for any state (for which the data are 
available) with any other state. The effect on the coefficient size adding the 
individual level characteristics varies greatly. Comparing California and North 
Carolina, for example, the regression coefficient is 0.442 and significant in the 
model without the individual characteristics of released prisoners. When the 
individual level characteristics are added this changes only slightly to 0.447 and 
remains significant. This differs sharply from the comparison of Delaware and 
New York. With only the states entered into the model, the coefficient for these 
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two states is 1.099. This is significant and indicates that offenders from Delaware 
are more likely to be rearrested than offenders from New York. When the 
individual level characteristics are added to the model, however, the coefficient 
drops to a non-significant -0.122. Not only does the size of the coefficient drop by 
88 percent, but the result goes from highly significant to non-significant. This tool 
may prove useful to state policymakers who may want to compare recidivism in 
their own state with that in only selected other states.   
 
4.3: Exploring the Differences in Rearrest Probabilities across States by Type 
of Rearrest 
The previous section highlights that differences in individual level 
characteristics can help to explain differences that exist in rearrest rates between 
states. Such a finding is not particularly surprising given that it is largely in line 
with the literature previously discussed in the introduction on the impact of 
individual level covariates. An additional question that this dissertation seeks to 
answer is the extent to which differences in individual level characteristics of 
release cohorts can be used to explain differences in rearrest for specific types of 
offenses. More specifically, can differences in the individual level predictors help 
explain variations in rearrest rates between states for violent offenses, property 
offenses, drug offenses and public order offenses excluding parole violations?1 
Langan and Levin’s (2002) analysis of prisoners released in 1994 provides 
mixed evidence on whether the type of offense for which an offender was serving 
                                                
1 An analysis of parole violations is presented in Chapter 5. 
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time is related to the type of offense for which the offender was rearrested after 
release from prison. They found that certain categories of criminals were likely to 
be rearrested for the same offense for which they had been incarcerated.  
Specifically, 41.2 percent of released drug dealers, 33.9 percent of released 
larcenists, and 23.4 percent of released burglars were rearrested for the same type 
of offense.  Other offenders, however, were unlikely to be rearrested for the same 
offense – only 2.5 percent of rapists and 1.2 percent of homicide offenders were 
rearrested for those offenses. These findings are similar to those reported by Beck 
and Shipley (1989) in their analysis of prisoners released in 1983. In their study, 
while 33.5 percent of released larcenists were rearrested for another larceny, 31.9 
percent of released burglars were rearrested for another burglary and 24.8 percent 
of drug dealers were rearrested for another drug offense, only 7.7 percent of 
rapists were rearrested for another rape and 6.6 percent of released homicide 
offenders were rearrested for another homicide offense. 
Table 7 - State by Whether Type of Rearrest is Known 
State # Type of Rearrest 
Known 
# Type of Rearrest Not 
Known 
Pct. Known 
California 179,161 18 99.99% 
New York 54,234 35 99.94% 
Oregon 10,912 20 99.81% 
Florida 51,495 199 99.61% 
Arizona 9,872 55 99.44% 
Illinois 43,199 334 99.23% 
Delaware 2,396 28 98.84% 
Virginia 8,556 110 98.73% 
Ohio 15,415 280 98.21% 
New Jersey 18,862 399 97.93% 
Michigan 4,364 141 96.87% 
Texas 20,733 1245 94.33% 
Minnesota 2,475 177 93.33% 
North Carolina 26,291 7365 78.12% 
Maryland 2,374 15412 13.35% 
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Because of unclassified offense-of-rearrest data in the Prisoners Released 
in 1994 dataset, a state-by-state analysis of this information was conducted.  
Table 7 presents the numbers and percentages of the most serious rearrest 
offenses by state. Because less than 90 percent of rearrest offenses are known in 
North Carolina and Maryland, these two states were excluded from the analyses 
on rearrest by type of offense. 
 
4.4: Exploring the Differences in Violent Rearrest Probabilities across States 
 
Unlike the figure on general rearrest rates, Figure 2 indicates less between-
state variation in three-year violent rearrest rates for offenders released from 
prison in 1994. While Michigan and Texas are on the low end of violent rearrest 
rates with 13.18 percent and 14.51 percent, respectively, and while Delaware and 
  
68 
Illinois are on the high end of violent rearrest rates with 35.90 percent and 34.74 
percent, respectively, the remaining nine states have relatively similar rearrest 
probabilities, all within about six percentage points of each other.  
Table 8: Logistic Regression Results for Three Models for Rearrest for A New 
Violent Offense 
 State of 
Release 
Model 
Individual Level 
Characteristics 
Model 
Combined 
Model 
Rearrest (Violent Offense) Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio 
Gender  2.208*** 2.209*** 
Age of First Arrest  0.967*** 0.967*** 
Black  1.800*** 1.750*** 
Other Race  1.302 1.277 
Age at Release  0.958*** 0.960*** 
Prior Arrests  1.026*** 1.023*** 
Property Offense  0.666*** 0.670*** 
Drug Offense  0.543*** 0.544*** 
Public Order Offense  0.726** 0.715*** 
Other Offense  0.538 0.562 
Time Served  0.998* 0.997** 
Parole Violation  1.271*** 1.372*** 
Probation Violation  1.385** 0.905 
Other Admission Type  0.799 0.647* 
Unknown Admission Type  0.524** 1.048 
Mandatory Supervised Release  1.350*** 1.460*** 
Expiration of Sentence  1.864*** 1.645*** 
Other Release Type  1.284*** 1.045 
Arizona 1.973***  2.350*** 
California 1.903***  1.095 
Delaware 3.717***  2.216*** 
Florida 2.424***  1.777*** 
Illinois 3.492***  1.559** 
Minnesota 2.025***  1.281 
New Jersey 1.709***  1.123 
New York 2.160***  1.585*** 
Ohio 1.787***  1.411* 
Oregon 2.132***  1.720*** 
Texas 1.113  0.876 
Virginia 2.116***  1.441** 
Model Statistics 
Observations (Unweighted) 29,128 29,128 29,128 
Pseudo R2 0.0110 0.0683 0.0733 
Log Pseudolikelihood -123554.81 -116391.84 -115769.01 
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001 
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Using Michigan as the contrast state, the logistic regressions for the fixed 
effects model provide fairly strong support that the individual level characteristics 
help explain variation in violent rearrest rates between states. Without the 
individual level characteristics added to the model, the only state with a violent 
rearrest rate similar to Michigan is Texas (O.R.=1.113, n.s.). When the nine 
individual level characteristics are added to the model, however, not only does the 
difference between Michigan and Texas remain non-significant (O.R.=0.876, 
n.s.), but the findings also become non-significant for California (O.R.=1.095, 
n.s.), Minnesota (O.R.=1.281, n.s.) and New Jersey (O.R.=1.123, n.s.). 
Additionally, there is a noticeable reduction in the size of the odds ratio (all 
decreasing and becoming closer to one) in every state except for Arizona. 
Although the odds ratio increases for Arizona when all the variables are used (at 
which point O.R.=2.350, p<.001), this is a suppression effect which disappears 
when the variable race is removed from the model (at which point O.R.=1.881, 
p<.001). The average reduction in the magnitude of the state effects on violent 
recidivism after the individual recidivism predictors are added to the model is 
31%. In other words, state differences in the characteristics of released prisoners 
explains on average about 31% of the state differences in rates of rearrest for a 
new violent offense.  Thus, even though violent rearrest rates are not as variable 
across states as general rearrest rates, the individual recidivism predictors explain 
almost as much of the variation in rearrest for violent crimes as for rearrests for 
all crime types. 
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The results differ, however, using the second approach of comparing state-
by-state regression models.  Without the individual level characteristics added, the 
initial regression results show that of the 78 state-by-state comparisons, 30 
combinations (38.46 percent) have statistically similar violent rearrest rates (refer 
to Table B1 in Appendix B). When individual level characteristics are added to 
the model (refer to Table B2 in Appendix B), only 33 combinations (42.31 
percent) have statistically similar violent rearrest rates. This is only a small 
increase in the proportion of state-by-state comparisons for violent rearrest rates 
with the individual level characteristics added to the model. This approach 
indicates that very little variation of violent rearrest between states for the 1994 
cohort can be explained by the inclusion of the individual level characteristics. 
The findings, then, are mixed.  The results of the regression model using a 
single state (Michigan) as the omitted contrast suggest that the individual 
recidivism predictors explain roughly a third of the variation between states in 
violent arrests. Using a state-by-state comparison approach, on the other hand, 
suggests that only a small portion of variation between states can be explained by 
the individual level characteristics. This leads to the question of why the two 
approaches yield contrasting results and, specifically, why the individual 
predictors account for so little of the variation in violent rearrests based on the 
state-by-state comparisons.   
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4.4.1:  Reasons Why the Individual Covariates May Not Explain Variation in 
Violent Rearrest Rates across States 
Based on the information presented up to this point, along with a review of 
the literature on violent reoffending, there appear to be two possible explanations 
for why the findings are mixed. The first is that because there is relatively little 
variation in violent rearrest rates between most of the states in the 1994 cohort, 
the addition of individual level characteristics does little to improve on the 
explanation when used in the state-by-state model; but does help explain variation 
in the fixed effects model due to the fact that the contrast state has a violent 
rearrest rate that is at least 35 percent less than all but one of the remaining 12 
states. The second is that adding the nine individual level characteristics to the 
state-by-state model does not help explain much of the variation between states 
because other individual level factors not considered in this analysis have a 
stronger effect on violent recidivism than do the predictors under consideration. 
There are several reasons to suspect that the lack of an effect using state-
by-state models may have to do with the similarity of violent rearrest rates 
between states. This is a possibility because, as stated at the beginning of this 
section, for nine of the thirteen states, there is not much difference in the rates of 
rearrests for violent offenses. Without much variation, two things would be likely. 
First, one would expect that there would be more states with statistically similar 
violent rearrest rates without any individual level characteristics in the model. 
This is, in fact, the case when one compares rearrest for any offense and rearrest 
for a violent offense. With rearrest for any offense, there are only 20 statistically 
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similar comparisons in the states only models, compared to 30 for violent 
rearrests. Second, since there is less variation in the percentages between states 
for violent offenses than general offenses, one would also expect that the 
inclusion of individual level characteristics would have less of an impact. And 
this is what occurs. When the nine individual level factors are added to the 
models, the number of statistically similar states increases by 30 for rearrest for 
any offense, but only by three for violent rearrest rates. 
The second possible explanation is that there are different factors related 
to violent rearrests than related to general rearrests. In chapter three, it was shown 
that individual level factors might affect the risk of violent offending differently 
than general offending. Examining regressions for the entire 1994 cohort revealed 
that gender, age at first arrest, number of prior arrests and release type had odds 
ratios that were quite different for those who were rearrested for violent offenses 
compared to those who were rearrested for nonviolent offenses. Along the same 
lines, prior research has found that there are several individual level 
characteristics linked to violent crime other than the nine used in this dissertation. 
While pointing out that three childhood behavior problems – enuresis, fire 
setting and cruelty to animals – had been known to be predictive of violence in 
adulthood since at least 1960, Justice, Justice and Kraft (1974) further found that 
childhood fighting, temper tantrums, school problems and truancy also served as 
warning signs related to future violent behavior. Lefkowitz, Eron, Walder and 
Huesmann (1977) similarly reported that aggressive behavior exhibited in third 
grade was the best predictor of aggression at age 19. Hare (1999) reported that 
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offenders who suffered from psychopathy had much higher rates of violent 
offending than other offenders.  Hanson and Bussière’s (1998) meta-analysis of 
sex offenders also found that antisocial personality was a relatively reliable 
predictor of sexual offense recidivism. Additionally, while this dissertation has 
pointed out research findings indicating that the number of prior arrests was 
positively correlated with rearrest rates, Shah (1978) and Hall (1982) found that 
increased risk of violent recidivism was related to the number of prior acts of 
violent crime, as opposed to crime in general.  
These findings highlight that predictors other than the nine used in this 
dissertation are related to violent recidivism. Additional evidence that these nine 
individual level characteristics are far from exhaustive in predicting violent 
recidivism comes from examining existing instruments used to predict violence. 
The VRAG (Harris, Rice, and Quinsey, 1993), for example, was judged to be an 
effective violence prediction instrument in a meta-analytic comparison of 
instruments used to predict violence conducted by Campbell, French and 
Gendreau (2009). That instrument includes very few of the individual level 
characteristics used in the present analysis. 
The fact that instruments used to predict future violence make very little 
use of the nine individual level characteristics gathered from the Prisoners 
Released in 1994 dataset, along with the relationship that exists between violent 
behavior and childhood behavioral problems, prior aggression, psychopathy, 
antisocial personality and deviant sexual arousal, are important in helping to 
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understand why the nine individual level characteristics previously described may 
not necessarily do a good job explaining violent rearrest rates across states. 
 
4.5: Exploring the Differences in Property Rearrest Probabilities across 
States 
 
Figure 4.5 on property rearrest rates by state reveals a greater degree of 
variation than observed for violent rearrest rates, with a low property rearrest rate 
of 19.82 percent in Michigan and a high of 46.56 percent in Illinois.  
Table 9: Logistic Regression Results for Three Models for Rearrest for A New 
Property Offense 
 State of 
Release 
Model 
Individual Level 
Characteristics 
Model 
Combined 
Model 
Rearrest (Property Offense) Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio 
Gender  1.226* 1.221* 
Age of First Arrest  1.006 1.006 
Black  1.447*** 1.377*** 
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Other Race  0.772 0.758 
Age at Release  0.959*** 0.962*** 
Prior Arrests  1.057*** 1.054*** 
Violent Offense  0.467*** 0.450*** 
Drug Offense  0.366*** 0.351*** 
Public Order Offense  0.464*** 0.445*** 
Other Offense  0.541* 0.547* 
Time Served  0.999 0.998* 
Parole Violation  1.182** 1.288*** 
Probation Violation  1.624*** 1.329* 
Other Admission Type  0.958 0.876 
Unknown Admission Type  0.565** 1.057 
Mandatory Supervised Release  1.096 1.231* 
Expiration of Sentence  1.325* 1.290** 
Other Release Type  0.891 0.892 
Arizona 1.895***  2.028*** 
California 2.048***  1.287 
Delaware 2.573***  2.093*** 
Florida 1.980***  1.590*** 
Illinois 3.515***  2.124*** 
Minnesota 2.049***  1.720*** 
New Jersey 1.736***  1.537*** 
New York 2.466***  2.326*** 
Ohio 1.783***  1.661*** 
Oregon 2.422***  1.607*** 
Texas 1.121  0.949 
Virginia 1.693***  1.235 
Model Statistics 
Observations (Unweighted) 29,128 29,128 29,128 
Pseudo R2 0.0117 0.0844 0.0926 
Log Pseudolikelihood -145575.28 -134869.11 -133668.18 
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001 
 
Using Michigan as the contrast state, the logistic regressions for the fixed 
effects model provide fairly strong support that the individual level characteristics 
help explain variation in property rearrest rates between states. Without the 
individual level characteristics added to the model, the only state with a property 
rearrest rate similar to Michigan is Texas (O.R.=1.121, n.s.). When the nine 
individual level characteristics are added to the model, however, not only does the 
difference between Michigan and Texas remain non-significant (O.R.=0.949, 
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n.s.), but the findings also become non-significant for California (O.R.=1.287, 
n.s.) and Virginia (O.R.=1.235, n.s.). Additionally, there is a noticeable reduction 
in the size of the odds ratio (all decreasing and becoming closer to one) in every 
state except for Arizona. While the odds ratio increases for Arizona with the full 
model (from O.R.=1.895, p<.001 for the state effects model to O.R.=2.028, 
p<.001 for the full model), this is a suppression effect which disappears when the 
variable race is removed from the model (at which point O.R.=1.762, p<.001). 
The average reduction in the magnitude of the state effects on property offense 
recidivism after the individual recidivism predictors are added to the model is 
20%. In other words, state differences in the characteristics of released prisoners 
explains on average about 20% of the state differences in rates of rearrest for a 
new property offense. 
Using the second approach of comparing state-by-state regression models 
provides additional support for these results. Without the individual level 
characteristics added, the initial state-by-state results show that of 78 state-by-
state comparisons, there are 21 combinations (26.92 percent) that have 
statistically similar property rearrest rates (refer to Table C1 in Appendix B). 
When individual level characteristics are added to the model (refer to Table C2 in 
Appendix B), this number more than doubles. With individual level 
characteristics added to the model, there are 43 combinations (55.13 percent) that 
have statistically similar property rearrest rates. This second approach, thus, 
provides more evidence that the variation in the prevalence of property rearrests 
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between states for the 1994 cohort can be explained, in part, by differences in the 
characteristics of release cohorts across the states. 
 
4.6: Exploring the Differences in Drug Rearrest Probabilities across States 
 
 Similar to the results on overall statewide rearrest rates, Figure 4 reveals a 
wide degree of variation in three-year drug rearrest rates for offenders released 
from prison in 1994, with a low of 8.38 percent in Michigan and a high of 38.60 
percent in New York. Part of the reason for the wide variation in rearrest rates 
probably has to do with the amount of emphasis states and individual level police 
departments within states placed on seeking to arrest drug users and/or sellers. 
While arrests for violent and property crimes usually result after a victim reports 
the crime to the police, this is not the case for drug arrests. Instead, arrests for 
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drug crimes often result when police take a proactive approach towards this 
crime. Such approaches are often the result of a policy decision made by state or 
local police. Therefore, even though drug arrests may vary considerably across 
states, the number of drug arrests which occur in a given state or municipality 
likely has more to do with drug enforcement policies than with the actual use and 
sale of drugs in a given area (Zimring and Hawkins, 1994). 
Table 10: Logistic Regression Results for Three Models for Rearrest for A New 
Drug Offense 
 State of 
Release 
Model 
Individual Level 
Characteristics 
Model 
Combined 
Model 
Rearrest (Property Offense) Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio 
Gender  1.225* 1.229* 
Age of First Arrest  1.002 0.998 
Black  1.445*** 1.511*** 
Other Race  0.581* 0.573* 
Age at Release  0.963*** 0.966*** 
Prior Arrests  1.050*** 1.043*** 
Violent Offense  0.458*** 0.459*** 
Property Offense  0.488*** 0.531*** 
Public Order Offense  0.503*** 0.523*** 
Other Offense  0.631 0.601* 
Time Served  0.996** 0.997* 
Parole Violation  1.243* 1.197** 
Probation Violation  1.051 1.073 
Other Admission Type  0.697 0.811 
Unknown Admission Type  0.330*** 0.680 
Mandatory Supervised Release  1.337*** 1.132 
Expiration of Sentence  1.243* 1.346** 
Other Release Type  0.854* 0.919 
Arizona 2.822***  2.840*** 
California 6.682***  4.080*** 
Delaware 2.866***  1.483* 
Florida 4.645***  3.052*** 
Illinois 5.368***  2.886*** 
Minnesota 1.289*  1.142 
New Jersey 6.460***  3.810*** 
New York 6.861***  4.336*** 
Ohio 2.572***  1.945*** 
Oregon 4.948***  3.583*** 
Texas 2.299***  1.795*** 
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Virginia 2.671***  1.830*** 
Model Statistics 
Observations (Unweighted) 29,128 29,128 29,128 
Pseudo R2 0.0306 0.0745 0.0875 
Log Pseudolikelihood -141388.01 -134990.05 -133092.67 
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001 
 
Using Michigan as the contrast state, the logistic regressions for the fixed 
effects model provide fairly strong support that the individual level characteristics 
help explain variation in drug rearrest rates between states. Without the individual 
level characteristics added to the model, every state has a significantly higher 
rearrest rate for drug offenses than Michigan. When the nine individual level 
characteristics are added to the model, however, the difference between Michigan 
and Minnesota becomes non-significant (O.R.=1.142, n.s.). Additionally, there is 
a noticeable reduction in the size of the odds ratio (all decreasing and becoming 
closer to one) in every state except for Arizona, where the increase is negligible. 
The average reduction in the magnitude of the state effects on drug offense 
recidivism after the individual recidivism predictors are added to the model is 
34%. In other words, state differences in the characteristics of released prisoners 
explains on average about 34% of the state differences in rates of rearrest for a 
new drug offense. 
Using the second approach of comparing state-by-state regression models 
provides additional support for the conclusions found using the fixed effect 
model. Without individual level characteristics added, the initial state-by-state 
results show that of 78 state-by-state comparisons, 16 combinations (20.51 
percent) have statistically similar drug rearrest rates (refer to Table D1 in 
Appendix B). When individual level characteristics are added to the model  (refer 
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to Table D2 in Appendix B), this number increases by 81 percent. With individual 
level characteristics added to the model, 29 combinations (37.18 percent) have 
statistically similar drug rearrest rates. Both approaches provide evidence that a 
sizable fraction of the variation in the prevalence of drug rearrests between states 
for the 1994 cohort can be explained by the inclusion of individual level 
characteristics. 
 
4.7: Exploring the Differences in Public Order Rearrest Probabilities across 
States2 
 
Similar to the figures on overall statewide rearrest rates and on drug 
rearrest rates, Figure 5 shows a wide degree of variation in three-year public order 
rearrest rates for offenders released from prison in 1994, with a low of 12.50 
                                                
2 This section excludes rearrests for parole violations. 
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percent in Michigan and a high of 77.81 percent in Delaware. One reason for the 
wide degree of variation is differences in state laws, with some states mandating 
that certain offenses be recorded as an arrest while others issue citations, which do 
not count as arrests. Beyond that, arrest rates for public order offenses are also 
influenced by the amount of emphasis states and local jurisdictions place on 
seeking arrests for these offenses. 
 
Table 11: Logistic Regression Results for Three Models for Rearrest for A New 
Public Order Offense 
 State of 
Release 
Model 
Individual Level 
Characteristics 
Model 
Combined 
Model 
Rearrest (Property Offense) Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio 
Gender    1.304**   1.336** 
Age of First Arrest    0.992   0.994 
Black    1.088   1.047 
Other Race    0.968   0.982 
Age at Release    0.947***   0.947*** 
Prior Arrests    1.039***   1.035*** 
Violent Offense    0.669***   0.673*** 
Property Offense    0.648***   0.653*** 
Drug Offense    0.647***   0.667*** 
Other Offense    0.411**   0.470* 
Time Served    0.999   0.997** 
Parole Violation    1.081   1.214* 
Probation Violation    2.232***   1.114 
Other Admission Type    0.822   0.647* 
Unknown Admission Type    0.303***   0.958 
Mandatory Supervised Release    1.174**   1.483*** 
Expiration of Sentence    1.728***   1.236** 
Other Release Type    2.110***   0.955 
Arizona   5.539***    5.260*** 
California   2.454***    1.215 
Delaware 24.083***  17.618*** 
Florida   8.004***    6.543*** 
Illinois   4.493***    2.128*** 
Minnesota   2.660***    1.703*** 
New Jersey   2.134***    1.606*** 
New York   2.731***    2.079*** 
Ohio   1.397**    1.208 
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Oregon   6.171***    4.090*** 
Texas   2.093***    1.653*** 
Virginia   3.571***    2.570*** 
Model Statistics 
Observations (Unweighted) 29,128 29,128 29,128 
Pseudo R2 0.0387 0.0745 0.0790 
Log Pseudolikelihood -135110.65 -149246.06 -129453.57 
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001 
 
Using Michigan as the contrast state, the logistic regressions for the fixed 
effects model provide fairly strong support that the individual level characteristics 
help explain variation in public order rearrest rates between states. Without the 
individual level characteristics added to the model, every state has a significantly 
higher rearrest rate for public order offenses than Michigan. When the individual 
level characteristics are added to the model, however, the difference between 
Michigan and California (O.R.=1.215, n.s.) and Michigan and Ohio (O.R.=1.208, 
n.s.) become non-significant. Additionally, there is a reduction in the size of the 
odds ratio (all decreasing and becoming closer to one) in every state when the 
individual level factors are added to the model. The average reduction in the 
magnitude of the state effects on public order offense recidivism after the 
individual recidivism predictors are added to the model is 27%. In other words, 
state differences in the characteristics of released prisoners explains on average 
about 27% of the state differences in rates of rearrest for a new public order 
offense. 
Similar results are obtained using the second approach of comparing state-
by-state regression models. Without the individual level characteristics added, the 
initial state-by-state results show that of 78 state-by-state comparisons, there are 
only 6 combinations (7.69 percent) that have statistically similar public order 
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rearrest rates (refer to Table E1 in Appendix B). As was the case with drug 
arrests, this largely reflects the great variation in public order arrest rates between 
states. When individual level characteristics are added to the model (refer to Table 
E2 in Appendix B), this number more than triples. With individual level 
characteristics added to the model, 22 combinations (28.21 percent) have 
statistically similar public order rearrest rates.  
 
4.7.1: Explaining the Wide Degree of Variation in Public Order Rearrests 
Across States 
 While it has already been stated that differences in state laws are one 
reason that explains differences in public order rearrest rates, the large state 
variation in public order rearrests – especially the extremely high rearrest rate in  
Delaware -- makes a more detailed analysis of public order offenses helpful in 
understanding these differences. Table 12 partitions the public order rearrests by 
specific charge definitions and shows the percentage of released offenders from 
each of the thirteen states who were arrested on each of 25 separate public order 
offenses (including attempt to commit and conspiracy to commit offenses). 
 Examining these individual offense arrests, it becomes clear that one 
reason public order rearrests were so much greater in Delaware than in any other 
state is the large difference between Delaware and almost every other state for 
three specific offenses.  In Delaware, 48.91 percent of released offenders were 
rearrested for a minor traffic violation, 34.22 percent were rearrested for a 
probation violation, and 33.91 percent were rearrested for contempt of court. 
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Looking at two of the charges – probation violations and minor traffic offenses –
shows how state laws differ, with some requiring an arrest for an infraction while 
others do not. In Delaware, Florida and Oregon, over 14 percent of the offenders 
were rearrested for a probation violation, compared with less than 1 percent 
rearrested for such a charge in Arizona, California, Michigan, Minnesota, New 
York and Texas (in fact no offenders were rearrested for a probation violation in 
New York and only one offender--out of over 20,000 released--was rearrested for 
a probation violation in Texas). These wide variations in percentages do not 
indicate that probation violations are common in some states and rare in others. 
Instead, they indicate that in some states probation violations are initiated with a 
formal arrest while in other states this is a rare practice. 
Another example involves minor traffic violation arrests in Delaware and 
in California. As shown in Table 12, 48.91 percent of released offenders from 
Delaware (313 out of 640 released offenders) were rearrested for a minor traffic 
violation, yet only 0.21 percent of released offenders from California (220 out of 
103,325 released offenders) were rearrested for a minor traffic violation. The 
explanation for this huge difference comes from the different way traffic 
offenders are dealt with in each state. In Delaware, it appears that all traffic 
offenses are counted as arrests, while in California they are almost always dealt 
with as traffic violation citations and not as arrests. 
While the explanation above helps explain the wide degree of variation in 
public order rearrests between states, it also points out a potential limitation of the 
Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset. Although the dataset is very clear about  
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Table 12 - Public Order Rearrests by Specific Charges 
  AZ CA DE FL IL MI MN NJ NY OH OR TX VI TOTAL 
OBSTRUCTION-JUSTICE 12.68% 9.86% 11.88% 18.27% 9.21% 1.90% 8.13% 8.86% 9.66% 4.79% 11.43% 6.02% 4.72% 9.65% 
WEAPON-OFFENSE 5.63% 7.40% 7.19% 6.47% 10.59% 2.02% 4.10% 7.84% 10.88% 3.75% 9.05% 3.27% 7.08% 7.18% 
PROBATION-VIOLATION 0.39% 0.11% 34.22% 26.55% 1.22% 0.09% 0.56% 0.24% 0.00% 3.92% 14.19% 0.00% 2.49% 3.10% 
MINOR-TRAFFIC-OFFENSE 15.07% 0.21% 48.91% 6.71% 5.18% 6.47% 5.65% 0.76% 4.76% 0.26% 16.95% 4.37% 0.68% 2.96% 
DRUNK-VAGRANT-DISORDERLY 8.92% 1.45% 8.75% 6.58% 11.64% 0.67% 0.93% 1.14% 2.89% 0.48% 2.41% 0.36% 1.67% 2.75% 
COURT-OFFENSE 17.06% 0.81% 1.56% 9.68% 5.84% 0.07% 1.55% 0.69% 0.63% 1.64% 16.51% 0.55% 0.70% 2.51% 
FLIGHT-TO-AVOID 1.59% 1.73% 3.28% 0.94% 1.46% 0.87% 5.40% 0.98% 0.00% 0.51% 5.26% 4.97% 1.23% 1.68% 
CONTEMPT-OF-COURT 1.31% 0.83% 33.91% 2.56% 1.27% 0.00% 0.00% 2.35% 2.32% 0.16% 3.73% 0.00% 14.39% 1.58% 
IMMIGRATION-OFFENSE 0.00% 3.49% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.55% 
INVASION-OF-PRIVACY 0.39% 0.50% 0.78% 5.84% 1.07% 0.19% 0.87% 1.78% 2.63% 0.97% 3.35% 0.22% 1.70% 1.38% 
COMMERCIALIZED-VICE 1.59% 1.36% 0.94% 1.65% 2.26% 0.30% 0.31% 0.51% 1.77% 1.21% 0.63% 1.41% 0.26% 1.37% 
OTHER-PUBLIC-ORDER 2.16% 1.57% 3.44% 1.16% 0.28% 0.39% 1.74% 1.01% 1.43% 0.17% 2.07% 0.18% 0.22% 1.17% 
DUI 8.66% 1.05% 8.28% 1.01% 0.67% 0.36% 0.74% 0.47% 0.00% 0.26% 1.54% 0.31% 0.60% 0.94% 
DWI 1.35% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7.45% 0.00% 0.00% 0.19% 6.14% 7.79% 0.09% 0.87% 
ESCAPE 1.16% 0.45% 7.34% 1.38% 0.68% 0.00% 1.24% 0.53% 0.31% 1.07% 3.82% 0.42% 1.23% 0.66% 
MORALS-OFFENSE 0.33% 0.80% 0.63% 0.56% 0.23% 0.21% 0.25% 0.11% 0.59% 0.24% 0.72% 0.54% 0.40% 0.59% 
FAMILY-RELATED-OFFENSE 0.81% 0.13% 1.41% 1.03% 0.00% 0.43% 0.25% 0.49% 1.72% 0.30% 0.41% 0.00% 0.33% 0.43% 
RIOT 0.06% 0.06% 0.16% 0.09% 3.17% 0.00% 0.06% 0.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.13% 0.02% 0.00% 0.25% 
ATTEMPTED OFFENSE 0.06% 0.00% 0.31% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.78% 0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.28% 0.16% 
LIQUOR-LAW-VIOLATION 1.38% 0.10% 2.66% 0.00% 0.18% 0.16% 0.25% 0.00% 0.07% 0.00% 0.34% 0.18% 0.09% 0.13% 
CONTRIBUTING-TO-DELINQUENCY 0.37% 0.10% 0.16% 0.06% 0.56% 0.00% 0.19% 0.24% 0.00% 0.01% 0.25% 0.03% 0.42% 0.13% 
HABITUAL-OFFENDER 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.53% 0.08% 
BRIBERY 0.07% 0.02% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.11% 0.00% 0.07% 0.13% 0.03% 0.02% 0.03% 
CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT 0.00% 0.07% 0.00% 0.00% 0.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 
DUI-DRUGS 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.16% 0.00% 0.00% 0.06% 0.09% 0.00% 0.00% 0.19% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 
TOTAL 44.20% 25.96% 77.50% 53.02% 39.05% 12.51% 27.56% 23.27% 28.09% 16.30% 46.62% 23.13% 33.80% 29.28% 
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collecting data related to rearrests, it does not take into account how certain 
offenses (almost exclusively of a public order nature) are counted as arrests in one 
state but not another. This means some caution must be used when looking at the 
results between states for public order offenses. Due to differences in state laws, 
one offender who commits a public order violation may be caught and arrested in 
one state and end up counted as a recidivist, while another offender in another 
state may commit the exact same public order violation and be caught but issued a 
citation instead of an arrest and, as a result, may not be counted as a recidivist. 
 
4.8: Discussion 
 Using two separate analytical approaches, the findings from the preceding 
sections provide fairly strong evidence that variation in the previously described 
characteristics of prison release cohorts explains roughly a fifth to a third of the 
variation between states in rearrests for any offense, rearrests for property 
offenses, rearrests for drug offenses and rearrests for public order offenses. The 
evidence related to rearrests for violent offenses was mixed, with the state-by-
state comparisons showing much weaker effects of the individual recidivism 
predictors than shown by the standard regression approach using a single omitted 
contrast state. The reason for the mixed findings is likely due to one of two 
possibilities. The first is that there was little variation between most of the states 
in the cohort, but there was nevertheless a fair amount of variation in violent 
rearrest rates between the contrast state and all but one of the other states. This 
combination would produce a small amount of variation explained using a state-
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by-state comparison, yet would not produce a small variation using a single 
omitted contrast state. The second possibility is that other individual level factors 
not considered in this analysis have a stronger effect on violent recidivism than do 
the predictors under consideration. In the next chapter, three additional forms of 
recidivism are explored: reconviction, reimprisonment and parole violations. 
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CHAPTER 5 - EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
CHARACTERISTICS ON RECONVICTION, RECONFINEMENT AND 
PAROLE VIOLATIONS 
 
5.1: Introduction 
While the prior chapter showed that the nine individual level 
characteristics help to explain the variation between states for rearrest for any 
offense, rearrest for a property offense, rearrest for a drug offense and rearrest for 
a public order offense, this fact does not mean that the characteristics will also be 
good predictors of variations between states for reconviction probabilities, 
reconfinement probabilities or parole violations. One reason for this is that not all 
of the individual level characteristics are likely to influence reconviction or 
reimprisonment probability. For example, the specific type of admission to prison 
for the last offense by itself probably matters little to a court in deciding whether 
to convict a defendant. Similarly, the amount of time served on the last sentence 
should not matter in determining whether to drop the charges or proceed for a 
prosecutor and whether to convict or acquit for a judge or jury. Beyond this, a 
second reason why individual level characteristics may have different influences 
depending on the measure of recidivism is because prior research has shown that 
the theoretical reasons that help explain why the variables have an impact are 
different for different measures of recidivism. One example of an individual level 
characteristic that would possibly increase the likelihood of reconviction and 
reimprisonment, but would do so for different reasons than for rearrests, is the 
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number of prior arrests. In chapter three, the number of prior arrests was shown to 
be strongly associated with increased odds of rearrest based on differential 
association and social learning theory. These theories do not, however, explain 
why these offenders are more likely to be reconvicted or reimprisoned. Instead, 
the reason why the number of prior arrests would lead to an increased conviction 
rate is because prosecutors would be more willing to devote time and resources 
towards a defendant with a lengthy criminal record (Kingsnorth, MacIntosh, and 
Sutherland, 2002). Judges, similarly, would be more willing to imprison those 
with more prior arrests because they are viewed as more blameworthy and more 
of a threat to society. The rationale behind why judges are more likely to imprison 
offenders with lengthy arrest records is based on the focal concerns theory 
(Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998). According to this perspective, there 
are three concerns that judges take into consideration when sentencing defendants 
– blameworthiness and degree of harm caused, protection of the community, and 
practical constraints and consequences. 
Although the study was published before Steffensmier et al.’s (1998) 
work, a good example of how judges’ decision making is influenced by focal 
concerns and a further example of why one group of offenders is more likely to be 
sentenced leniently than another comes from a study published by Steffensmeier, 
Kramer and Streifal (1993). They analyzed over 60,000 cases from Pennsylvania 
that occurred between 1985 and 1987 and found that female defendants were 
about 12 percent less likely to be imprisoned than similarly situated male 
defendants. They further explored cases involving “judicial departures” – where 
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judges sentenced defendants to a lesser term than was prescribed statutorily – and 
noted that female defendants were more likely than male defendants to receive a 
judicial departure (29% of female defendants vs. 15% of male defendants). In 
these cases, judges were required to provide a written explanation outlining the 
reasons for their departure. Reading through these reasons, the authors concluded 
that there were five primary reasons judges commonly gave and that these reasons 
were in line with the focal concerns that female defendants were less of a threat 
and had more ties to or responsibilities in the community. The five primary 
justifications given for sentencing both male and female defendants leniently (p. 
433) were: 
1. defendant has a nonviolent prior record (e.g., a high prior 
record score that consists solely of property offending), 
2. defendant has mental or health problems (e.g., jailing would 
overburden the jail staff and would harm rather help the 
defendant), 
3. defendant is caring for dependents or is pregnant (e.g., jailing 
would not protect the community in the long term and would 
be inhumane, risky, and possibly costly), 
4. defendant played a minor role in the crime or was only an 
accomplice, and 
5. defendant showed remorse (e.g., “felt bad about what he/she 
had done”). 
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A second example of focal concerns influencing sentencing decisions 
comes from comparing the sentences received by young black defendants 
compared to similarly situated white defendants. Spohn and Holleran (2000) 
studied sentencing patterns of defendants from three jurisdictions – Chicago, 
Miami and Kansas City – and found evidence of a “penalty price” paid at 
sentencing for young male defendants who were either black or Hispanic. Viewed 
by judges as more culpable than their white counterparts, such defendants were 
sentenced more harshly. This sentencing disparity was even more amplified for 
young, male minority defendants who were unemployed. This finding is in line 
with Steffensmeier and Demuth’s (2000) observation that, faced with incomplete 
information on criminal defendants, judges often revert to sentencing based on the 
stereotypical viewpoints they held that black offenders were more culpable than 
white offenders. 
Thus, research has found that males and blacks are sentenced more harshly 
than females and whites because of focal concerns. An additional theoretical 
perspective that predicts females will be sentenced more leniently than male 
defendants is the chivalry/paternalism hypothesis, which suggests “women are 
awarded leniency in sentencing as a result of their inherent biological weaknesses 
and consequently, their need to be coddled both as offenders and as victims” 
(Franklin and Fearn, 2008, p. 279). Similarly, another theoretical rationale used to 
explain why blacks are more likely to be incarcerated than whites is the racial 
threat hypothesis (Blalock, 1967). This theory states that blacks are more likely to 
be imprisoned because they have been stereotyped in many segments of America 
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as being a more dangerous or threatening form of criminal than white offenders. 
Crawford, Chiricos and Kleck (1998) wrote that trends in sentencing African 
Americans were becoming more punitive over time because African American 
criminal defendants were being seen more and more in terms of being a crime 
specific “racial threat” to the white status quo. 
What is noteworthy about the focal concerns, chivalry/paternalism, and 
racial threat perspectives is that while they help explain research which has found 
that white and female defendants are less likely to be imprisoned than black and 
male defendants, (Rodriguez, Curry, and Lee, 2006; Daly, 1994; Crawford et al., 
1998; Mitchell, 2005; Steffensmeier et al., 1993), these are not the same 
theoretical perspectives which predict that males and blacks will be more likely to 
be rearrested. Instead, differential association has been offered as an explanation 
for why men offend more than women and blacks are thought to be involved in 
crime more than whites because of social disorganization theory. Specifically, 
prior research has found that black offenders often live in or return to 
communities which contain factors such as residential instability, racial-ethnic 
heterogeneity, family disruption, resource deprivation and racial inequality 
(Harer, 1994; Anderson, 1999; Kubrin and Stewart, 2006; Reisig, Bales, Hay, and 
Wang, 2007; Mears, Wang, Hay, and Bales, 2008). These factors inhibit the 
development of protective, prosocial networks and, in turn, increase the risk of 
offending for persons who live in these neighborhoods. 
Thus before proceeding on to the analyses, it is important to understand 
that the nine individual level factors may not have the same effect on different 
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measures of recidivism. One reason for this is that some of the factors that have 
been found to have an influence on likelihood of rearrest may have no influence 
on the probability of reconviction or reimprisonment. A second reason is that 
while some of the factors may influence all forms of recidivism, the basis for their 
influence may be qualitatively different depending on the type of recidivism 
under consideration. 
 
5.2: Exploring the Differences in Reconviction Probabilities across States 
 
 Figure 6 provides the reconviction proportions for those released offenders 
who are rearrested within three years of their release. This figure shows a 
moderate amount of variation, with a low of 55.99 percent of rearrested offenders 
being reconvicted in Texas and a high of 85.17 percent of rearrested offenders 
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being reconvicted in New York. It should be noted that these percentages were 
based on a sample that was limited exclusively to those released offenders who 
had been rearrested for a new crime. As previously explained, this was done to 
prevent bias that would result because some individual level characteristics are 
associated with increased probability of arrest. Also, because data on reconviction 
were not provided for offenders released in Ohio, that state was dropped from the 
model. 
Table 13: Logistic Regression Results for Three Models of Reconviction for a New 
Offense (for Rearrested Offenders) 
 State of 
Release 
Model 
Individual Level 
Characteristics 
Model 
Combined 
Model 
Rearrest (Property Offense) Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio 
Gender  1.073 1.047 
Age of First Arrest  1.001 0.999 
Black  1.061 1.054 
Other Race  0.778 0.714 
Age at Release  0.988** 0.989* 
Prior Arrests  1.020*** 1.016*** 
Violent Offense  0.750*** 0.700*** 
Drug Offense  0.937 0.870* 
Public Order Offense  0.848 0.789* 
Other Offense  0.724 0.681 
Time Served  0.998 0.996*** 
Parole Violation  1.130* 1.129 
Probation Violation  1.038 1.125 
Other Admission Type  0.851 0.799 
Unknown Admission Type  1.162 0.732 
Mandatory Supervised Release  0.797*** 1.105 
Expiration of Sentence  0.929 1.859*** 
Other Release Type  0.637*** 1.466** 
Arizona 1.128  1.033 
California 1.789***  1.678*** 
Delaware 4.346***  3.310*** 
Florida 1.024  0.737* 
Illinois 1.155  1.089 
Maryland 2.100***  2.423*** 
Michigan 2.197***  3.121*** 
Minnesota 1.858***  1.923*** 
New Jersey 1.673***  1.658*** 
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New York 4.479***  4.884*** 
North Carolina 2.670***  2.855*** 
Oregon 3.220***  3.168*** 
Virginia 1.641***  1.703*** 
Model Statistics 
Observations (Unweighted) 18,521 18,521 18,521 
Pseudo R2 0.0273 0.0121 0.0390 
Log Pseudolikelihood -102998.38 -104612.78 -101761.05 
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001 
 
Because Texas had the lowest probability of reconviction, it was used as 
the contrast state for the fixed effects model. The logistic regressions for these 
models indicate that the individual level characteristics explain little of the 
variation in reconviction probabilities between states. Without the individual level 
characteristics added to the model, the three states that have similar reconviction 
proportions to Texas are Arizona (O.R.=1.128, n.s), Florida (O.R.=1.024, n.s) and 
Illinois (O.R.=1.155, n.s). When the nine individual level characteristics are added 
to the model, although Arizona (O.R.=1.033, n.s.) and Illinois (O.R.=1.089, n.s.) 
continue to have statistically similar reconviction proportions as Texas, the 
difference between Florida and Texas becomes significant (O.R.=0.737, p<.05). 
Further, while there are no changes in the significance levels of the ten remaining 
states, a decrease in the size of the odds ratio occurs in only four of these states 
(California, Delaware, New Jersey and Oregon). The change from non-significant 
to significant in Florida and the increase in the size of the odds ratio for Maryland, 
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina and Virginia are all suppression 
effects that disappear when particular variables are dropped from the models. The 
decrease in the size of the odds ratio for these states without all the variables in 
the model is not large in any case. In summary, the average reduction in the 
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magnitude of the state effects on reconviction probabilities after the individual 
recidivism predictors are added to the model is negligible. 
Using the second approach of comparing state-by-state regression models 
produces some support for the proposition that variations in individual level 
characteristics can help explain differences in reconviction proportion across 
states. Without individual level characteristics added, the initial state-by-state 
results show that of 91 state-by-state comparisons, 19 combinations (20.88 
percent) have statistically similar reconviction probabilities for offenders who 
were rearrested within three years of their release from prison (refer to Table F1 
in Appendix B). When individual level characteristics are added to the model 
(refer to Table F2 in Appendix B), 29 combinations (31.89 percent) have 
statistically similar reconviction probabilities. This increase of 53 percent thus 
provides some evidence that the variation in the proportion of rearrested offenders 
between states can be explained by individual level characteristics.  
When each of the individual level characteristics is added separately to the 
state-by-state regressions, release type is found to be the variable with the greatest 
effect, as the number of states with statistically similar reconviction probabilities 
increases from 19 to 25 when this variable is added. Looking at the odds ratios for 
the release type variables in the individual level characteristics model and the 
combined model, it can be seen why release type has the greatest impact in a 
state-by-state comparison. In the individual level characteristics model, 
mandatory supervised released, expiration of sentence and other release type all 
have an odds ratio lower than one when compared to those released via 
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discretionary parole, a difference which is statistically significant for mandatory 
supervised release and other release type. When state of release is added to the 
model, however, it becomes very clear that it was the specific release 
characteristics of individual states that drove these low odd ratios as all three 
release types increase to above one and as those released via expiration of 
sentence and other release type become significantly more likely to be 
reconvicted than those released via discretionary parole. Although type of release 
from prison is considered an “individual” characteristic in this analysis, it is quite 
different of course than characteristics such as sex, age, or race.  Type of release 
is largely a matter of state policy, which explains why the inclusion of the state 
effects in the analysis has such an important effect on the results. 
The findings, then, are mixed. The results of the regression model using a 
single state (Texas) as the omitted contrast suggest that the individual level 
characteristics are not useful in explaining variation between states in 
reconviction probabilities of rearrested offenders. Using a state-by-state 
comparison approach, on the other hand, provides some evidence that the 
variation in reconviction can be explained by individual level characteristics. This 
leads to the question of why the two approaches yield contrasting results and, 
specifically, why the individual predictors account for virtually none of the 
variation in reconviction proportions based on the fixed effects model. 
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5.2.1: Reasons Why the Individual Covariates May Not Explain Variation in 
Reconviction Probabilities across States 
 One very important reason why individual level factors may not affect the 
likelihood of a conviction stems from the nature of the American judicial system 
and the legal concept of reasonable doubt. In America, justice is supposed to be 
blind and the decision to seek a conviction along with having a judge or jury find 
a defendant guilty is supposed to result from the strength of the evidence and the 
State’s ability to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. To the extent that this 
is actually true, it is not supposed to matter if a former prisoner is male or female, 
black or white, 20 or 40, or a former property offender or a former drug offender 
in determining whether an offender will be reconvicted. What is supposed to 
matter, instead, is whether the evidence can prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  
A second reason why the individual level factors may not have an impact 
is because they may not be the right factors to look at. One factor that might 
explain some of the variation between states is the desire prosecutors in some 
states have for high conviction rates. Since over 95 percent of chief prosecutors in 
office in 1994 were elected locally (DeFrances, Smith, and van der Does, 1996), 
some might have been influenced to select the most winnable cases, especially if 
their term of office was short or political competition was high (Rasmussen, 
Raghav, and Ramseyer, 2009). While such a strategy would undoubtedly increase 
conviction rates, it would also result in a lower arrest-conviction ratio, since 
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weaker cases would not even be prosecuted. Under this scenario, one factor that 
would have more of an influence would be political motivation. 
In addition to political motivation, research has also found that the amount 
of monetary resources a prosecutor’s office has influences the number of cases it 
will prosecute. More resources would result in a higher arrest-conviction ratio, 
since an increase in the percentage of cases prosecuted should result in an 
increase in the number of convictions that result (even if the conviction rate 
declines). Support for this hypothesis comes from two papers. Rasmussen et al. 
(2009) examined data from over 2,000 county prosecutors’ offices using the 2001 
National Prosecutor’s Survey administered by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
They found “that higher budgets are associated with both higher amounts of 
prosecution and higher conviction rates conditioning on the amount of 
prosecution” (p. 26). A second report by Blaine, Entwistle, Nystrom and Weaver 
(2010) looked at prosecution spending for individual counties within Oregon. 
They found “a strong positive correlation between the amount of money spent 
prosecuting a crime versus the number of overall convictions” (p. 8). 
The fact that criminal justice convictions are supposed to be based on the 
strength of the evidence along with the likelihood that prosecutorial decisions 
may be influenced by both politics and financial considerations provide fairly 
good explanations as to why the nine individual level factors would not be useful 
in explaining between state variations in reconviction probabilities. These 
reasons, however, do not explain why there was an increase in the number of 
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states with similar reconviction probabilities in the state-by-state model when 
individual level characteristics were included. 
Part of the reason for this increase may be that prosecutors have discretion 
in determining which cases to prosecute and individual level factors may 
influence these decisions. The one individual level factor that will almost 
certainly have an impact on a prosecutor’s decision is a defendant’s prior record, 
as almost any prosecutor would choose to prosecute a defendant with 20 prior 
arrests as opposed to one with just two. Further, although justice is supposed to be 
blind, in some states or jurisdictions, prosecutors may be influenced to proceed 
with cases and juries may be swayed to convict based partly on an offender’s age, 
gender and/or race. Thus, if individual level factors did, in fact, have an influence 
on the decision to prosecute and/or convict in some jurisdictions, this may explain 
why these factors influenced reconviction probabilities in certain state-by-state 
comparisons, even though this effect was not seen in the fixed effects model. 
 
5.2.2: Individual Level Factors Related to Increased Probability of Reconviction 
The results from the individual level characteristics model and combined 
model reveal that among offenders released from prison who are rearrested for a 
new crime, that those who are younger at the age of release are more likely to be 
reconvicted, those who have more prior arrests are more likely to be reconvicted, 
and those who are released for a violent offense are less likely to be reconvicted 
than property offenders. While not significant in the combined model, in the 
individual level characteristics model, those who entered prison via parole 
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violation are more likely to be reconvicted than those who entered prison via a 
new court conviction. Additionally, while not significant in the individual level 
characteristics model, in the combined model those who served less time were 
more likely to be reconvicted and both those who had been released for a drug 
offense and those who had been released for a public order offense were less 
likely to be reconvicted than those released for a property offense. 
The reason why those who have more arrests are more likely to be 
convicted goes back to the idea that prosecutors would be more willing to devote 
time and resources towards a defendant with a lengthy criminal record 
(Kingsnorth et al., 2002). Regarding the finding that older offenders are less likely 
to be reconvicted, one possible explanation is that, as offenders age, they become 
better at the crimes they do commit. Evidence for this comes partly from research 
that points out that older people who remain criminally active are more likely to 
start specializing in one specific crime (Farrington, 1986; Blumstein, Cohen, Das 
and Moitra, 1988). The reason they specialize is they begin to realize what crimes 
they are good at and, as a result, know how to commit these crimes without 
leaving enough evidence to lead to a conviction. 
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5.3: Exploring the Differences in Reimprisonment Probabilities across States 
Figure 7 provides the reimprisonment probabilities for those released 
offenders who are reconvicted of an offense resulting from an arrest that occurred 
within three years of their release. This figure shows a wide degree of variation in 
reimprisonment rates, with a low of 20.09 percent of reconvicted offenders being 
reimprisoned in Delaware and a high of 71.87 percent of reconvicted offenders 
being reimprisoned in North Carolina. One notable observation that can be made 
looking at Figure 7 is that, although Delaware has the highest proportion of 
released offenders who are rearrested and the second highest reconviction rate of 
rearrested offenders, it has the lowest rate of giving reconvicted prisoners new 
prison sentences. While this fact is at least partly due to the high number of 
rearrests for minor public order offenses in Delaware, this observation also 
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highlights that different state court systems deal with convicted offenders in 
different manners. 
Before the regression models were estimated for this section, the sample 
was modified to only include a sample of released offenders who had been 
reconvicted of a new crime. As previously explained, this was done to prevent 
bias that would result because some individual level characteristics are associated 
with increased probability of arrest. Also, because data on reimprisonment were 
not provided for offenders released in Ohio or Virginia, these states were dropped 
from the model. 
Table 14: Logistic Regression Results for Three Models for Reimprisonment  for a 
New Offense (for Reconvicted Offenders) 
 State of 
Release 
Model 
Individual Level 
Characteristics 
Model 
Combined 
Model 
Rearrest (Property Offense) Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio 
Gender  1.673*** 1.672*** 
Age of First Arrest  1.018* 1.021** 
Black  1.258*** 1.132 
Other Race  0.524* 0.488* 
Age at Release  0.980*** 0.980*** 
Prior Arrests  1.004 1.009 
Violent Offense  0.757*** 0.771** 
Drug Offense  0.831* 0.880 
Public Order Offense  0.800* 0.791* 
Other Offense  0.643 0.675 
Time Served  1.002 1.006*** 
Parole Violation  1.072 1.024 
Probation Violation  0.612*** 0.791 
Other Admission Type  1.321 1.278 
Unknown Admission Type  2.713*** 1.055 
Mandatory Supervised Release  1.405*** 1.000 
Expiration of Sentence  1.099 1.130 
Other Release Type  1.126 1.631*** 
Arizona 1.622***  1.347 
California 2.336***  2.404*** 
Delaware 0.481***  0.284*** 
Florida 1.842***  1.150 
Illinois 4.407***  4.050*** 
  
104 
Maryland 2.610***  2.317*** 
Michigan 1.406**  1.253 
Minnesota 3.008***  2.907*** 
New Jersey 2.975***  2.744*** 
New York 1.600***  1.317* 
North Carolina 4.890***  5.274*** 
Texas 1.704***  1.449* 
Model Statistics 
Observations (Unweighted) 11,405 11,405 11,405 
Pseudo R2 0.0154 0.0335 0.0390 
Log Pseudolikelihood -102998.38 -104612.78 -101761.05 
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001 
 
While this study has generally opted to use the state with the lowest rate or 
proportion of offenders who recidivate as the contrast state in the regression 
analyses, in this case a decision was made to use the state with the second lowest 
proportion of reimprisoned offenders as the contrast state. The reason for this had 
to do with the difficulty of explaining the findings that occurred when models 
were estimated using Delaware as the contrast state. When the individual level 
characteristics were added to the state of release model, the odds ratio increased 
for every state in the model. While the exact reasons for this are not totally clear, 
with this finding, along with the fact that Delaware had the highest rearrest rate 
and the second highest reconviction proportion yet a much lower reimprisonment 
proportion than any other state, it seemed likely that Delaware’s sentencing laws 
relating to incarceration were not comparable to other states and that it would be 
inappropriate, for this reason, to use Delaware as the contrast state. As a result, 
Oregon was chosen as the contrast state as it had the second lowest proportion of 
reconvicted offenders who were resentenced to prison. 
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Using Oregon as the contrast state, the logistic regressions for the fixed 
effect models provide fairly strong support that the individual level characteristics 
help explain variation in reimprisonment probabilities between states for 
reconvicted offenders. Without the individual level characteristics added to the 
model, there are no states with reimprisonment proportions similar to Oregon. 
When the nine individual level characteristics are added to the model, however, 
the findings become non-significant comparing Oregon and Arizona (O.R.=1.347, 
n.s), Florida (O.R.=1.150, n.s.) and Michigan (O.R.=1.253, n.s.). Additionally, 
using all individual level characteristics in the model brings the odds ratio closer 
to one for Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York and Texas. The 
odds ratio also becomes closer to one for California and North Carolina when the 
variable prior arrests is dropped from the model and the odds ratio for Delaware 
becomes closer to one when the model is run with the variable offense type as the 
only individual level characteristic in the model. The average reduction in the 
magnitude of the state effects on reimprisonment probabilities after the individual 
level characteristics are added to the model is 9%. In other words, state 
differences in the characteristics of released prisoners explain on average 9% of 
the state differences in the reimprisonment rates of reconvicted offenders. 
Using the second approach of comparing state-by-state regression models 
provides additional support for the conclusions found using the fixed effect 
models. Without individual level characteristics added, the initial state-by-state 
results show that of 78 state-by-state comparisons, 14 combinations (17.95 
percent) have statistically similar reimprisonment probabilities for offenders who 
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were reconvicted within three years of their release from prison (refer to Table G1 
in Appendix B). When individual level characteristics are added to the model 
(refer to Table G2 in Appendix B), 27 combinations (34.62 percent) have 
statistically similar reimprisonment probabilities for offenders who were 
reconvicted within three years of their release from prison. Using this second 
approach thus provides more evidence that the variation in the reimprisonment 
probabilities between states can be explained, at least in part, by the inclusion of 
individual level characteristics. 
 
5.3.1: Individual Level Factors Related to Increased Probability of 
Reimprisonment 
 The results from the individual level characteristics model and combined 
model reveal that, among offenders released from prison who are reconvicted of a 
new crime, males are more likely to be resentenced to prison than females, that 
those who were first arrested or who were released at a younger age are more 
likely to be resentenced to prison than those first arrested or released at an older 
age, that ethnic minorities are less likely to be resentenced to prison than whites, 
and that those released from prison for a property offense are more likely to be 
resentenced to prison than those released for a violent offense or a public order 
offense. While the results were not significant in the full model, in the individual 
level characteristics models, blacks were more likely to be resentenced to prison 
than whites, those released for a property offense were more likely to resentenced 
to prison than those released for a drug offense, those released for a probation 
  
107 
violation were less likely to be resentenced to prison than those sentenced to 
prison as a new court commitment and those released via mandatory supervised 
release were more likely to be resentenced to prison than those released via 
discretionary parole. Finally, although the results were not significant in the 
individual level characteristics model, using the full model, those who had served 
a longer prison term were more likely to be resentenced to prison as were those 
who had been released via other release type. 
Many of the theoretical reasons for these sentencing patterns go back to 
the focal concerns theory discussed at the beginning of the chapter. While 
research has already been discussed about why females and whites are less likely 
to be resentenced to prison than males and blacks (Steffensmeier, et al., 1993; 
Spohn and Holleran, 2000; Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2000), research has also 
found that older offenders are treated more leniently than younger offenders 
because judges view them as less of a threat. Steffensmeier, Kramer and Ulmer 
(1995), for example, hypothesized that older offenders would be sentenced more 
leniently due to the fact that 1) doing time is harder for older offenders, 2) it costs 
more to incarcerate older offenders, 3) older offenders are seen as less 
blameworthy and 4) older offenders are seen as less dangerous. This theory could 
also apply to those with longer arrest records (Kingsnorth et al., 2002). 
Table 15: Release Type and Most Serious Reconviction Type 
Type of Offender Proportion 
Whose Most 
Serious 
Reconviction is 
for a Violent 
Offense 
Proportion 
Whose Most 
Serious 
Reconviction is 
for a Violent or 
Property Offense 
Proportion Whose 
Most Serious 
Reconviction is for a 
Violent, Property or 
Drug Trafficking 
Offense 
Violent Offender 17.97% 39.57% 45.20% 
Property Offender 7.40% 45.22% 49.80% 
Drug Offender 6.95% 19.61% 34.09% 
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Public Order Offender 8.78% 26.97% 33.22% 
 
 While prior research does not predict that those who were released from 
prison for a property offense would be more likely to be resentenced to prison if 
reconvicted than those released for a violent, drug or public order offense, a closer 
analysis of the reconviction charges of released offenders from the 1994 dataset 
may help provide clarification. Table 15 displays the most serious charge of 
reconviction for violent offenders, property offenders, drug offenders and public 
order offenders based solely on those who are reconvicted of a new offense. 
While the table does indeed show that violent offenders are more likely to be 
reconvicted for a violent offense than any other offense type, the table also shows 
that persons released from prison for a property offense had the highest proportion 
of reconvictions for a violent or property offense as well as the highest proportion 
of reconvictions for a violent, property or drug trafficking offense. The higher 
proportion of released property offenders reconvicted on new violent, property or 
drug trafficking offenses could explain why they are more likely to be resentenced 
to prison for their reconvictions. Judges, it would seem, would be most influenced 
by the current conviction when deciding to resentence an offender to prison.  The 
fact that property offenders, as a group, have both the highest rate of being 
reconvicted for either a violent or property offense as well the highest rate of 
being reconvicted for a violent, property or drug trafficking offense could explain 
why they are more likely to be resentenced to prison.  This finding would also 
help explain why property offenders are more likely to be reconvicted than other 
types of offenders. In line with this, Kingsnorth et al. (2002) noted that one of the 
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factors that most influenced prosecutors’ decisions whether to proceed or drop a 
case was the seriousness of the offense. 
 
5.3.2: Discussing an Unexpected Non-Finding 
 While the preceding section provided fairly consistent evidence that 
variations in the individual level characteristics were useful in explaining some of 
the between state variation in reimprisonment probabilities for reconvicted 
offenders, one finding in particular merits further exploration: prior arrests. In the 
individual level characteristics model, the number of prior arrests an offender has 
is not related to imprisonment probability and this variable only becomes 
marginally significant (p<.10) when state of release is added. This finding appears 
quite unexpected given the literature that finds prior arrest record positively 
related to imprisonment (Clarke and Koch, 1976; Vigorita, 2001). Regarding this 
unexpected non-finding, estimating a new logistic regression model for 
reimprisonment probability including the entire population of rearrested 
defendants (as opposed to just those who have been reconvicted) helps provide a 
highly plausible explanation.  
 
Table 16: Logistic Regression Model for Reimprisonment Probability of Rearrested 
Offenders using All Nine Individual Level Characteristics 
Variable Odds Ratio Std. Err. 
Gender 0.6489519*** 0.1052541 
Age of First Arrest 1.0133490* 0.0064385 
Black 1.2098880*** 0.0515438 
Other Race 0.5732732* 0.2570719 
Age at Release 0.9791914*** 0.0047756 
Prior Arrests 1.0129670** 0.0037080 
Violent Offense 0.7096509*** 0.0628794 
Drug Offense 0.8301898** 0.0631884 
Public Order Offense 0.7771931** 0.0900310 
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Other Offense 0.6110805 0.3238287 
Time Served 0.9997242 0.0010622 
Parole Violation 1.0824950 0.0598605 
Probation Violation 0.6730711** 0.1257715 
Other Admission Type 1.1030460 0.1884507 
Unknown Admission Type 2.168336*** 0.1610055 
Mandatory Supervised Release 1.0400430 0.0562749 
Expiration of Sentence 1.0288640 0.1004250 
Other Release Type 0.6489519*** 0.0760803 
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001 
 
Table 16 shows that people who are rearrested and have more prior arrests 
are more likely to be reimprisoned. Previously, it was shown that people with 
more arrests were more likely to be reconvicted. This sets up a hypothesis that 
would explain the non-finding. Under this hypothesis, prosecutors are more 
willing to pursue legally weak cases against defendants with lengthy records, and 
settle for a plea that does not involve a new prison term. In similarly situated 
cases involving defendants without lengthy arrest records, prosecutors would be 
more likely to drop the charges. Because some of the cases against defendants 
with lengthy records are legally weak, prosecutors may be more willing to plea 
bargain some of the weaker non-violent cases, offering probation or a short jail 
term in exchange for a guilty plea, as opposed to dropping the charges or going to 
trial and risking acquittal. Under this scenario, offenders with lengthy criminal 
records who commit crimes which would have been dropped had the defendant 
not had a lengthy criminal record end up being offered plea bargains which don’t 
involve a new prison sentence. While this hypothesis cannot be tested with the 
current dataset, it nevertheless is quite plausible and would explain why prior 
arrest record is not a significant predictor of reimprisonment for those reconvicted 
of a new crime.  
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5.4: Exploring the Differences in Parole Violation Rearrests and 
Reimprisonment on Parole Revocations across States 
Analyzing the differences that exist across states for both parole violation 
arrests and for reimprisonment for parole violations is not quite as straightforward 
as the rearrest, reconviction and reimprisonment analyses. While data are 
available from 13 states regarding rearrests that take place for parole violations, 
looking at these data alone can be misleading because of wide variations in state 
law. Oregon Statute 144.350, for example, reads: 
(1)(a) The Department of Corrections or other 
supervisory authority may order the arrest and detention of any 
person then under the supervision, custody or control of the 
department or other supervisory authority upon being informed and 
having reasonable grounds to believe that such person has: 
(A) Violated the conditions of parole, post-prison 
supervision, probation, conditional pardon or other conditional 
release from custody; 
This statute explains that the procedure for dealing with parole violators in 
the state of Oregon involves issuing a warrant for the offender’s arrest. 
Presumably as a result of the wording of this statute, 1,127 of the 3,192 offenders 
released from prison in Oregon in 1994 were rearrested on charges of violating 
parole. Most states, however, do not mandate that parole violators be arrested for 
technical violations of parole. This can clearly be seen in looking at Table 17, 
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which shows that the percentage of offenders rearrested on charges of violating 
parole ranges from less than one tenth of one percent in Michigan and New York 
to over 35 percent in Oregon. The rarity of arrests for parole violations in all but a 
few states also makes a state-by-state analysis of rearrests for parole violations an 
unwise proposition. While such an analysis could be conducted, the results would 
not be meaningful given the rarity of the event in many states. 
Table 17: Offenders Rearrested for Parole Violations by State 
State Offenders Released Rearrest for Parole Violation Percent Rearrested 
Oregon 3192 1127 35.29% 
Florida 21035 2086 9.92% 
Ohio 11497 627 5.45% 
Illinois 14890 262 1.76% 
Delaware 640 8 1.25% 
Minnesota 1611 13 0.81% 
Virginia 5464 41 0.75% 
Arizona 5416 21 0.38% 
Texas 20507 45 0.22% 
California 103325 145 0.14% 
New Jersey 12275 14 0.11% 
Michigan 6696 5 0.08% 
New York 25709 6 0.02% 
 
To adequately explore this issue, arrests for parole violations will have to 
be analyzed alongside data on technical violations for parole resulting in 
reimprisonment. Although data on technical violations are only available for nine 
of the 15 states in the sample, Table 18 provides the number of offenders who 
were sent back to prison on technical violations. The percentages from this table 
are very different from the percentages in Table 16. California, for example, 
revoked the parole of 38.65 percent of offenders even though only 0.14 percent of 
offenders were rearrested for a parole violation offense. Due to these differences, 
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both technical violations of parole and parole violations that resulted in new 
arrests were analyzed. 
Table 18: Offenders Returned to Prison for Parole Violations by State 
State Offenders Released 
Returned to Prison 
for Technical 
Violation 
Percent Returned to 
Prison for Technical 
Violation 
California 103325 39933 38.65% 
New York 25709 7693 29.92% 
Oregon 3192 860 26.94% 
Florida 21035 5427 25.80% 
Michigan 6696 1299 19.40% 
North Carolina 22208 3199 14.40% 
Minnesota 1611 177 10.99% 
Texas 20507 2113 10.30% 
Illinois 14890 929 6.24% 
 
To explore the extent to which between-state variation in parole violation 
rearrests and reimprisonment on parole revocations across states can be explained 
by differences in individual level risk factors across states, two separate sets of 
analysis were run. Both of these were limited to the nine states where information 
on revocations for technical parole violations exists. The first of these analyses 
involved estimating models that combine parole violation rearrests and technical 
violations of parole resulting in revocation. The second of these analyses involved 
estimating models that combined parole violation rearrests resulting in 
reincarceration and technical violations of parole resulting in reimprisonment. 
Though similar in many respects, these two sets of analyses provide a more in 
depth understanding of how parole violation arrest and parole revocation rates 
vary across states and the influence that individual level risk factors have on each 
of them. 
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5.4.1: Offenders Rearrested for Parole Violations or Reimprisoned for 
Technical Violations 
Table 19: Offenders Rearrested for Parole Violations or Reimprisoned for Technical 
Violations by State 
State Offenders Released 
Rearrested for 
Parole Violation or 
Returned to Prison 
for Technical 
Violation 
Percent Rearrested for 
Parole Violation or 
Returned to Prison for 
Technical Violation 
Oregon 3192 1357 42.51% 
California 103325 40004 38.72% 
New York 25709 7698 29.94% 
Florida 21035 6180 29.38% 
Michigan 6696 1303 19.46% 
North Carolina 22208 3292 14.82% 
Minnesota 1611 187 11.61% 
Texas 20507 2147 10.47% 
Illinois 14890 1143 7.68% 
 
Table 19 displays the number of offenders from Oregon, California, New 
York, Florida, Michigan, North Carolina, Minnesota, Texas and Illinois who were 
either rearrested on a parole violation charge or who were returned to prison for a 
technical violation. Not included are offenders who were charged with a technical 
violation of parole but not returned to prison. Table 19 highlights a wide degree of 
variation in combined rates for parole violation rearrests and technical violations 
resulting in a return to prison with a low of 7.68 percent of offenders in Illinois 
and a high of 42.51 percent in Oregon. 
To explore whether individual level characteristics have an influence on 
variation in rearrests for parole violations and reimprisonments for technical 
violations between states, estimates were obtained from the three models used in 
the fixed effects model approach described in previous sections. Because Illinois 
had the lowest rate of offenders with parole violations used in the analysis, it was 
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chosen as the contrast state. The logistic regressions for the fixed effect models do 
not provide much evidence in support of the hypothesis that the individual level 
characteristics help explain variation in parole violations between states. 
Table 20: Logistic Regression Results for Three Models for Rearrests for Parole 
Violations and Reimprisonment for Technical Violations 
 State of 
Release 
Model 
Individual Level 
Characteristics 
Model 
Combined 
Model 
Rearrest (Property Offense) Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio 
Gender  1.183 1.205 
Age of First Arrest  1.002 0.992 
Black  1.030 1.286*** 
Other Race  1.414 1.349 
Age at Release  0.998 1.002 
Prior Arrests  1.023*** 1.013** 
Violent Offense  1.192** 1.048 
Drug Offense  0.993 0.857* 
Public Order Offense  1.106 1.065 
Other Offense  1.965* 1.435 
Time Served  1.003* 1.003* 
Parole Violation  1.242*** 1.108 
Probation Violation  1.219 0.504*** 
Other Admission Type  0.417*** 0.533** 
Unknown Admission Type  0.508*** 2.234*** 
Mandatory Supervised Release  1.690*** 1.555*** 
Expiration of Sentence  0.521*** 0.973 
Other Release Type  2.067*** 5.361*** 
California 7.596***  8.204*** 
Florida 5.003***  1.971*** 
Michigan 2.906***  4.636*** 
Minnesota 1.579***  1.204 
New York 5.139***  7.640*** 
North Carolina 2.092***  2.602*** 
Oregon 8.889***  12.064*** 
Texas 1.406*  1.767*** 
Model Statistics 
Observations (Unweighted) 23,269 23,269 23,269 
Pseudo R2 0.0613 0.0310 0.0788 
Log Pseudolikelihood -123677.75 -127662.42 -121367.45 
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001 
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With the fixed effects model, there are no states that are statistically non-
significant compared to Illinois. When all nine individual level characteristics are 
added to the model, Minnesota (O.R.=1.204, n.s.) becomes statistically non-
significant and there is a very large decrease in the size of the odds ratio for 
Florida (which goes from O.R.=5.003, p<.001 in the fixed effects model to 
O.R.=1.971, p<.001 in the full model). Aside from these two states, however, the 
odds ratio increases in size for all of the remaining states. Thus, the evidence that 
individual level characteristics can be used to explain variations between states in 
the number of offenders rearrested for parole violations or reimprisoned for 
technical violations is relatively weak using this approach. 
Conversely, using the second approach of comparing state-by-state 
regression models produces some support for the proposition that variations in 
individual level characteristics can help explain how parole violation arrest and 
parole revocation rates vary across states. Without individual level characteristics 
added, the initial state-by-state results show that of 36 state-by-state 
comparisons3, only two combinations (5.55 percent) have statistically similar 
parole revocation and parole rearrest rates (refer to Table H1 in Appendix B). 
When individual level characteristics are added to the model (refer to Table H2 in 
Appendix B), this number increases to 25 percent. With individual level 
characteristics added to the model, nine combinations have statistically similar 
parole revocation rates. This increase is more than fourfold and thus provides 
evidence that the variation in the revocations for technical violations of parole and 
                                                
3 Three of the 36 state-by-state comparisons were run without the variables admission type or 
release type to deal with multicollinearity which resulted when technical violations and parole 
violation arrests were combined. 
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rearrests for parole violations can be explained, in part, by differences in 
individual level characteristics. 
 
5.4.2: Offenders Reimprisoned for Technical Violations or Parole Violation 
Convictions 
Table 21: Offenders Reimprisoned for Technical Violations or Parole Violation 
Convictions by State 
State Offenders Released 
Returned to Prison 
for Criminal or 
Technical Violation 
of Parole 
Percent Returned to 
Prison for Criminal or 
Technical Violation of 
Parole 
California 103325 39976 38.69% 
Oregon 3192 1172 36.71% 
New York 25709 7693 29.92% 
Florida 21035 6033 28.68% 
Michigan 6696 1303 19.46% 
North Carolina 22208 3210 14.45% 
Minnesota 1611 180 11.17% 
Texas 20507 2113 10.30% 
Illinois 14890 1048 7.04% 
 
While having offenders rearrested on charges of parole violations is a 
relatively rare event, an analysis of those reconvicted and reimprisoned on a 
parole violation criminal (as opposed to technical) charge finds that the event is 
exceedingly rare as it affected only 50 of the over 250,000 offenders in the 
prisoners released dataset. Further, as 27 of these 50 offenders also were sent back 
to prison for a technical violation, and two of the remaining parole violators came 
from Delaware (which was not one of the nine states which provided data on 
technical violations), Table 21 and Table 19 are quite similar. Like Table 19, 
Table 21 again shows that there exists a wide degree of variation in return to 
prison for criminal or technical parole violations for offenders released from 
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prison in 1994, with a low of 7.04 percent in Illinois and a high of 38.69 percent 
in California. 
To explore whether individual level characteristics have an influence on 
variation between states, estimates were obtained from the three models used in 
the fixed effects approach described in previous sections. Similar to the approach 
used with rearrests for parole violations and reimprisonment for technical 
violations, the logistic regressions for the fixed effect models do not provide 
evidence in support of the hypothesis that the individual level characteristics help 
explain variation in parole violations between states. With the fixed effects model, 
there are no states that are statistically non-significant compared to Illinois. When 
all nine individual level characteristics are added to the model, Minnesota 
(O.R.=1.258, n.s.) becomes statistically non-significant and there is a very large 
decrease in the size of the odds ratio for Florida (which goes from O.R.=5.310, 
p<.001 in the fixed effects model to O.R.=2.046, p<.001 in the full model). Aside 
from these two states, however, the odds ratio increases in size for all of the 
remaining states. Thus, the evidence provided that individual level characteristics 
can be used to explain variations between states in the proportion of offenders 
reimprisoned for criminal or technical violations of parole is relatively weak, just 
as it was in the previous analysis that looked at the combination of parole 
violation rearrests and technical violations of parole. 
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Table 22: Logistic Regression Results for Three Models for Rearrests for Parole 
Violations and Reimprisonment for Technical Violations 
 State of 
Release 
Model 
Individual Level 
Characteristics 
Model 
Combined 
Model 
Rearrest (Property Offense) Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio 
Gender  1.176 1.200 
Age of First Arrest  1.001 0.992 
Black  1.031 1.287*** 
Other Race  1.389 1.328 
Age at Release  0.999 1.003 
Prior Arrests  1.023*** 1.012** 
Violent Offense  1.190** 1.048 
Drug Offense  0.992 0.854 
Public Order Offense  1.112 1.071** 
Other Offense  1.984* 1.437 
Time Served  1.003** 1.003*** 
Parole Violation  1.248*** 1.110* 
Probation Violation  0.946 0.493*** 
Other Admission Type  0.422**** 0.558*** 
Unknown Admission Type  0.645** 2.282*** 
Mandatory Supervised Release  1.689*** 1.503*** 
Expiration of Sentence  0.517*** 0.966 
Other Release Type  2.010*** 5.291*** 
California 8.333***  9.024*** 
Florida 5.310***  2.046*** 
Michigan 3.191***  4.897*** 
Minnesota 1.661***  1.258 
New York 5.638***  8.137*** 
North Carolina 2.231***  2.750*** 
Oregon 7.660***  10.046*** 
Texas 1.517**  1.870*** 
Model Statistics 
Observations (Unweighted) 23,269 23,269 23,269 
Pseudo R2 0.0628 0.0310 0.0802 
Log Pseudolikelihood -122976.59 -127662.42 -120698.8 
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001 
  
Using the second approach of comparing state-by-state regression models 
produces some support for the proposition that variations in individual level 
characteristics can help explain differences in reconviction proportions across 
states. Without individual level characteristics added, the initial state-by-state 
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results show that of 36 state-by-state comparisons4, three combinations (8.33 
percent) have statistically similar parole revocation and parole rearrests leading to 
reimprisonment rates (refer to Table I1 in Appendix B). When individual level 
characteristics are added to the model (refer to Table I2 in Appendix B), this 
number increases to eight (22.22 percent). This more than twofold increase 
provides evidence that the variation in the revocations for technical violations of 
parole and rearrests for parole violations that result in reimprisonment can be 
explained, in part, by differences in individual level characteristics. 
 
5.4.3: Individual Level Factors Related to Increased Probability of Parole 
Violations 
 Looking at the models in Tables 20 and 22, we see that there are some 
common individual level characteristics associated with increased odds of 
violating parole. One characteristic that is significant for parole violations in both 
the individual level characteristics model and the full model is prior arrests. The 
reasons why those with more prior arrests would be more likely to violate parole 
goes back to the differential association and social learning theories related to the 
increased probability of rearrest for offenders with more prior arrests. Although a 
technical violation of parole is not the same as an arrest, it is nevertheless a 
violation of rules and those who have more prior arrests would be expected, based 
on these theories, to be more likely to violate parole, just as they would be more 
likely to be rearrested. 
                                                
4 Three of the 36 state-by-state comparisons were run without the variables admission type or 
release type in the model to deal with multicollinearity which resulted when reimprisonment for 
technical violations and parole violation convictions were combined. 
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Both tables also show that those released via mandatory supervised release 
are more likely to have their parole revoked than those released via discretionary 
parole. Part of the explanation for this has to do with the parole revocation 
policies in California and the fact that the state of California accounts for over 40 
percent of parole violators sent back to prison (Travis and Lawrence, 2002). As 
California has the second highest parole failure rate in America (Travis and 
Lawrence, 2002) and as all the offenders released from California are released via 
mandatory supervised release, it should come as no surprise that those released 
via mandatory supervised release would be more likely to have their parole 
revoked in models where state of release was not controlled for. The fact that 
those released via mandatory supervised release had higher parole revocation 
rates even when state of release is added to the model likely has to do with the 
fact that those granted discretionary parole have been screened and represent a 
lower risk as a result. Solomon et al. (2005:2) wrote: 
Prisoners released to supervision via discretionary release have 
been screened by a parole board or other authority to determine 
“readiness” to return to the community. Parole boards, which often 
face substantial pressures to reduce prison overcrowding, 
determine who presents the lowest risk of reoffending and is most 
prepared for release. Among other factors, parole boards consider 
criminal histories, institutional conduct, and positive connections 
to the community such as employment, housing arrangements, and 
ties to family. 
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Similarly, Rosenfeld et al. (2005) found that those released via 
discretionary parole had far fewer rearrests than those released via mandatory 
supervised release. While it again needs to be pointed out that violations of parole 
are not necessarily the same as rearrests, they both result from failure to adhere to 
laws, rules and regulations and the evidence suggests that those released via 
discretionary parole are less likely to violate parole than those released via 
mandatory supervised release because they have been screened by a parole board 
and, thus, are better equipped to abide by the stipulations of parole. 
Petersilia (2003:187-188) also argued that allowing states to maintain the 
option of discretionary parole could enhance the likelihood of success after 
release because it would motivate prisoners to become involved in and participate 
in prison programs, writing: 
We should reinstitute discretionary parole release in the 16 states 
that have abolished it. Eliminating discretionary release reduces 
the incentives for inmates to try to rehabilitate themselves while 
incarcerated. Some inmates may recognize the intrinsic value of 
improving themselves, but more inmates will participate if they 
believe it will reduce their prison stay. Research suggests that, 
regardless of a prisoner's initial motivation to participate in prison 
programs, positive benefits accrue. So what benefits are gained by 
reducing motivation and participation in prison programs? 
Eliminating discretionary release works against our attempts at 
rehabilitation. 
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Another factor related to increased probability of parole revocation that 
can be discussed in some detail is the finding that those who had entered prison 
because of a parole violation are either significantly more likely or marginally 
more likely to violate the conditions of their parole than those who had initially 
entered prison because of a new court commitment. Both Lynch and Sabol (2001) 
and Travis (2005) noted that offenders who cycle back into prison via multiple 
parole violations are at higher risk of offending than other offenders. These 
offenders have difficulty being successfully reintegrated back into society and 
following rules associated with parole. In their study of parolees returning back to 
Sacramento, Hipp and Yates (2009) speculated that the theoretical rationale 
behind previous parole failures being at increased risk of future parole failures 
had to do with the differential association and social learning theories, which were 
previously explained regarding why higher levels of prior arrests were associated 
with increased odds of recidivism. 
In addition to prior arrests, release type and prior failure on parole, the 
other individual level characteristic found to be associated with increased odds of 
parole violations was time served, with those who had served more time in prison 
more likely to be charged with a parole violation. This finding is somewhat 
surprising as it is contrary to the earlier finding that those who had served longer 
time were less likely to be rearrested. Future research should address why this is 
the case. 
 
 
  
124 
5.4.4: Exploring the Different Findings using Different Approaches 
While a detailed analysis exploring the issue is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, there exists a very plausible reason why a fixed effects model would 
show that individual level characteristics have virtually no ability to explain 
differences in statewide parole violation rates, yet a state-by-state model would 
find some effect. This has to do with variations in state laws regarding technical 
parole violation policies resulting in reimprisonments. When the prisoners from 
the nine states which provided data on technical violations for parole were 
released, there were quite likely very different parole violation policies in place in 
different states which impacted who was sent back to prison and why. Many of 
these policies were statewide policies with some specifically recommending that 
offenders only be sent back to prison if their parole violation involved a new 
crime while others allowed technical violations for much less serious violations. 
Such statewide parole policy differences could help explain why Illinois returned 
only one fifth percent as many offenders back to prison for parole violation as 
California. In exploring the concept of parole in America, Travis and Lawrence 
(2002:19) commented on the policy differences that exist between states: 
Examining the phenomenon of successful parole discharges at the 
state level (as defined by BJS) shows enormous variation among 
the states. The percentage of parolees successfully discharged 
ranges from a low of 19 percent in Utah to a high of 83 percent in 
Massachusetts . . . However, following the above discussion on the 
definition of success, this variation is, to some extent, to be 
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expected. It is unlikely that the parolees in Utah and California, the 
two states with the lowest rates of successful completion (under 20 
percent) are so inherently different from the parolees in 
Massachusetts and Mississippi, the two states whose successful 
completion rates exceed 80 percent. More likely, the policies and 
practices of the parole agencies contribute significantly to these 
differences. 
Thus policy differences between states could explain why there was no 
effect using a fixed effects approach. With that limitation pointed out, however, 
there were likely some states that had similar parole revocation policies in place 
during this period of time. For those states that had similar revocation policies in 
place, individual level characteristics would be useful in explaining differences in 
technical violations. This would help clarify why the inclusion of individual level 
characteristics helped explain differences in parole revocation rates in some 
states, but not for the entire sample. 
 
5.5 Goodness of Fit of the Models 
Although the models from the chapters 4 and 5 provide evidence that 
statewide differences in individual level characteristics do help explain some of 
the variation between states for five of the eight forms of recidivism, a closer look 
at the model statistics reveals that there remains a large amount of unexplained 
variation. The Pseudo R2 values of each of these models reveals that, in the 
strongest case (that of rearrest for a new offense), there still remains over 88 
  
126 
percent of variation not explained by the state of release or in combination with 
the nine individual level factors. For the remaining seven measures of recidivism, 
over 90 percent of the variation remains unexplained. What these results indicate 
is that there are many additional individual, contextual, and policy variables that 
need to be added to the model to fully account for between state variations in 
recidivism rates. In addition to the findings related the Pseudo R2 values, the log 
pseudolikelihood values decreases for all forms of recidivism when the individual 
covariates are added, indicating improved fit for all the models. Similar to the 
Pseudo R2 values, the recidivism measure with the greatest decline exhibiting the 
greatest improvement in fit when the individual covariates are added to the model 
is rearrest for any offense. 
 
5.6: Discussion 
 Using two separate analytical approaches, the findings from the preceding 
sections provide fairly strong evidence that variation in the previously described 
characteristics of prison release cohorts explains roughly nine percent of the 
variation between states in reimprisonment rates for reconvicted offenders. The 
evidence related to reconviction probabilities and parole violations (accompanied 
by either an arrest or a technical violation resulting in reimprisonment) was 
mixed, with the standard regression approach using a single omitted contrast state 
showing much weaker effects of the individual recidivism predictors than shown 
by state-by-state comparisons. The reason for the mixed finding related to 
reconviction probabilities has to do with the fact that while other factors, 
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including political motivations and monetary considerations, generally have a 
stronger influence on reconviction probabilities, in some states individual level 
characteristics such as prior record, age, age-at-first-offense, gender and race have 
an influence on both prosecutorial and jury behavior. The reason for the mixed 
finding related to parole violations lies in policy differences in many states 
regarding when a technical violation of parole results in reimprisonment. The 
effects of the individual factors should be stronger for states with similar 
revocation policies. 
 In addition to these findings, looking at the effects of individual level 
characteristics reveals that offenders who were rearrested were more likely to be 
reconvicted if they were younger when released, had more prior arrests or were 
most recently released for a property offense. The factors related to these 
increased odds of reconviction were likely related to prosecutors taking prior 
record into account in deciding which cases to move forward with, the idea that 
older offenders may be less likely to be convicted because they tend to specialize 
in the offenses they commit and the fact that those released for a property charge 
were more likely to be rearrested for a more serious violent, property or drug 
trafficking offense than other offenders. 
For those offenders who were reconvicted of a new offense, the factors 
associated with being more likely to be resentenced to prison were being male, 
being first arrested at a younger age, being released at a younger age and having 
been released from prison for a property offense. One of the factors related to 
these increased odds of reimprisonment was based on focal concerns theory: 
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judges tend to see females and older offenders as less of a threat than males and 
younger offenders. A second factor was based on the seriousness of the charge of 
which certain offenders were reconvicted. Examining the reconviction charges 
from the dataset revealed that, of offenders who were reconvicted of a new 
offense, property offenders had a higher proportion who were reconvicted of a 
more serious violent, property or drug trafficking charge compared to reconvicted 
offenders who had been released from prison for a violent, drug or public order 
offense. One noteworthy non-finding was that prior record was not significantly 
related to odds of reimprisonment. While it was not possible to fully test the 
theory, one hypothesis that might explain the non-finding is that prosecutors are 
willing to offer plea bargains to offenders with lengthy records in weak cases 
while dropping the charges in similar cases where the defendant did not have a 
lengthy record. 
Finally, four factors were related to increased probability of parole 
revocation across all models. The first was prior arrests, with those who had more 
prior arrests more likely to have their parole revoked. A second factor was prior 
admission to prison via parole violation. In both of these cases, the theoretical 
basis for this was differential association and social learning theory. A third 
finding was that those released via mandatory supervised released were more 
likely to have a parole violation than those released via discretionary parole. The 
reason behind this is probably that those released via discretionary parole were 
lower risk offenders specifically chosen for release because of their low risk. An 
unexpected finding was that those who had served longer time in prison were 
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more likely to be revoked than offenders who had served less time. This finding is 
difficult to explain as it contradicts the prior finding that those who had served 
longer in prison were less likely to be rearrested than those who had served less 
time. 
Overall, the results from these two chapters reveal that the individual level 
characteristics associated with increased odds of recidivism differ based upon the 
type of recidivism under consideration. While being male, black, younger at the 
age of release, having more prior arrests, being released from prison for a 
property offense, having previously entered prison on a parole violation and 
having previously been released from prison via expiration of sentence are all 
associated with increased odds of rearrest, these factors do not all relate to other 
forms of recidivism. The following list outlines some of the differences in risk 
factors based on the type of recidivism being measured: 
1) Gender - While males who are reconvicted are more likely to be 
reimprisoned than females, they are not more likely to be reconvicted 
if rearrested and are not more likely to have their parole revoked. 
2) Race – Although being black was found to be related to an increased 
probability of reimprisonment in the individual level characteristics 
model, it was not found to be a predictor of reconviction in either 
model. 
3) Age at Release – While offenders who were younger at the age of 
release were more likely to be reconvicted if rearrested and more 
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likely to be reimprisoned if reconvicted, they were not more likely to 
have their parole revoked. 
4) Prior Arrests – While those with more prior arrests were more likely 
to be reconvicted if rearrested and were more likely to have their 
parole revoked, they were not more likely to be reimprisoned if 
reconvicted. 
5) Offense Type – While property offenders were more likely than other 
types of offenders to be reconvicted if rearrested and to be 
reimprisoned if reconvicted, they were not more like to have their 
parole revoked. 
6) Admission Type – While people who had previously entered prison 
on a parole violation were more likely to have their parole revoked 
compared with those who previously entered on a new prison 
sentence, they were not more likely to be reconvicted if rearrested or 
to be reimprisoned if reconvicted. 
7) Release Type – Although people released via expiration of sentence 
were found to more likely to be reconvicted if rearrested in the full 
model which included state of release, there were no significant 
findings either way regarding the probability of them being 
reimprisoned if reconvicted of a new offense. 
While the proceeding two chapters have looked at whether differences in 
individual level characteristics can help explain variations in eight forms of 
recidivism rates across space, the focus of chapter six will be if the explanation of 
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between state variations in all but one of these forms of recidivism can be further 
enhanced by the addition of three state-level (“contextual”) variables. 
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CHAPTER 6 – DO  CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES EXPLAIN 
RECIDIVISM RATES ACROSS STATES? 
 
6.1: Introduction 
Chapters Four and Five provided evidence that, with a few exceptions, 
nine individual level characteristics explain some of the differences across states 
in rearrest rates for any offense, rearrest rates for property offenses, rearrest rates 
for drug offenses, rearrest rates for public order offenses and new prison 
sentences for reconvicted offenders. This chapter extends the analysis to 
investigate whether the addition of three state-level (“contextual”) variables 
accounts for additional variance in recidivism across states.  The state-level 
contextual variables are: 1) drug arrests per 100,000 residents, 2) police officers 
per 1,000 residents, and 3) arrest-offense ratios. 
Before providing the rationale for the inclusion of these contextual 
variables, it is informative to review the state averages for each of them. Table 23 
shows that there is a fair amount of divergence between states for all three of the 
contextual variables. The average number of drug arrests per 100,000 residents 
for the years 1994 to 1997 ranges from 278.31 per 100,000 residents in Delaware 
to 835.24 per 100,000 residents in New York (mean = 559.6, s.d.=182.4). The 
average number of police officers for this time period ranges from 1.72 officers 
per 1,000 residents in Minnesota to 3.78 per 1,000 residents in New York (mean = 
2.31, s.d.= .536); and the average arrest-offense ratio for this time period5 ranges 
                                                
5 The arrest-offense ratio used for Florida is the two year average for that state from 1994 and 
1995. The reason is that the data were not available though Crime in the United States for those 
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from 17.86 percent in Florida to 41.94 percent in Delaware (mean = 27.3, 
s.d.=6.237127). What these summary statistics do not tell is if they can explain 
variation in recidivism rates beyond the variation explained by the individual 
level characteristics previously examined. 
Table 23 - Contextual Level Variable Averages By State 
 Drug Arrests per 
100,000 
Police per 
1,000 
Arrest-Offense 
Ratio 
Arizona 601.46 2.0249 23.50 
California 843.29 2.0469 26.59 
Delaware 278.31 2.0321 41.94 
Florida 506.22 2.3425 17.86 
Illinois 683.26 2.8910 21.49 
Maryland 809.65 2.5543 31.00 
Michigan 406.01 1.9937 18.28 
Minnesota 316.39 1.7236 27.22 
New Jersey 722.92 2.8851 26.76 
New York 835.24 3.7810 25.78 
North Carolina 485.33 2.2793 27.51 
Ohio 505.50 2.0489 29.77 
Oregon 511.81 1.7909 25.80 
Texas 470.74 2.2184 30.27 
Virginia 418.54 1.9777 36.11 
 
In the multilevel analyses that follow, each of the state level variables is 
added to a hierarchical linear model alongside the nine individual level 
characteristics. Because of the limited degrees of freedom that exist with a sample 
size of 15 states, each of the three state level variables is analyzed separately. In 
each of these models, the individual level variables are entered into the model 
grand mean centered, as literature emphasizes that this is the appropriate approach 
for research questions which have a primary substantive focus on a level two 
predictor variable (Enders and Tofighi, 2007). 
                                                                                                                                
years. Additionally, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement website’s (www.fdle.com) 
record of arrests for 1996 and 1997 excluded juvenile arrests, making the data substantially 
different than for the other states or for 1994 and 1995 for Florida. 
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The multilevel analyses use the software package HLM 6.0 (Raudenbush, 
Bryk, and Congdon, 2004). While the decision to conduct the multilevel analyses 
using HLM was based on several advantages that this program offers over others, 
it is also important to point out that there exists some disagreement among 
researchers as to whether an accurate multilevel analysis can take place using 
HLM with only 15 level two units. While there are 32,732 level one units 
represented within these 15 states, and while Maas and Hox (2005) found that 
large individual level sample sizes can partially compensate for a small number of 
groups, some researchers have found that using HLM with a sample size of less 
than 50 may lead to biased estimates of the second-level standard errors (Maas 
and Hox, 2005; Moineddin, Matheson, and Glazier, 2007). Not all researchers 
have found that a level two sample of between ten and fifteen is inappropriate, 
however. Snijders and Bosker (1999, p. 44) found that multilevel modeling was 
an attractive option when there were ten or more level two groups. Maas and Hox 
(2004) further found that ten groups was an adequate sample size if one was only 
interested in the fixed effects of the model. 
Given the disagreement over what exactly constitutes an appropriate level 
two sample size for multilevel modeling, the following findings should be viewed 
with caution due to the small level two sample size and the possibility of biased 
estimates of the second-level standard errors. It should also be noted that the 
multilevel analyses that follow do not include parole violations as an outcome 
measure. This is because only nine states were able to provide data on technical 
violations of parole and no study has recommended conducting multilevel 
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analysis with a level two sample size smaller than ten. A second note is that, 
because there were only 15 level two units, a decision was made to mark findings 
if they were marginally significant (p<.10). 
 
6.2: The Effect of Statewide Drug Arrest Rates on Recidivism Rates 
One undeniable fact about America’s War on Drugs during the 1980s and 
1990s is that it was one of the primary reasons for the tremendous increase in 
persons incarcerated in the United States. There were also changes to federal and 
state laws during this time that encouraged police departments to focus more on 
combating drug crimes. One such change in law was the passage of the 
Comprehensive Crime Act of 1984, which, among other things, allowed police 
departments to keep a portion of the proceeds of assets forfeited as a result of 
certain drug enforcement activities (Benson, Rasmussen, and Sollars, 1995). For 
federal cases, states were only allowed to share in a portion of the forfeited 
property for relatively large seizures. States did not, however, follow a uniform 
pattern in determining whether police departments profited directly from drug 
seizures: some passed laws allowing the police to retain a large portion of the 
seized property, while others dictated that the proceeds from the seized property 
go to a non-law enforcement agency or to the general fund. Where the money 
went had an effect on how aggressively states pursued drug crimes. Benson 
(2009) pointed out that “drug arrests per 100,000 population in states with 
significant limits on police retention of seizure proceeds averaged 363 during 
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1989, while states where police kept proceeds averaged 606 drug arrests per 
100,000” (p. 52). 
The conventional wisdom among many in law enforcement is that drug 
use causes crime and that stringent enforcement of drug laws is an effective tool 
to combat property and violent crimes. This line of thought is quite reasonable as 
the relationship between drug and alcohol use and criminal conduct seems fairly 
straightforward. Several Bureau of Justice Statistics publications have found that 
over half of the inmates in the correctional system have a history of drug use 
(Beck, 2000; Hughes, Wilson, and Beck, 2001; Mumola 1999). A 1999 Bureau of 
Justice Statistics publication found that in 1997, nearly 1 in 6 admitted to having 
committed the current offense to obtain money for drugs (Mumola, 1999). This 
finding was echoed by a 2001 publication that found that among prisoners 
expected to be released to the community by yearend 1999, 21 percent stated they 
had committed the offense to obtain money for drugs (Hughes et al., 2001). Such 
findings have led many to believe that increasingly targeting drug offenders 
would reduce both property and violent offending rates. Although there has been 
some research indicating that increasing the number of drug offenders in prison 
may lower property and violent crimes through incapacitation (Blumstein and 
Rosenfeld 1998; Kuziemko and Levitt, 2004), a substantial number of research 
studies have concluded that America’s War on Drugs may have actually led to a 
decrease in the likelihood of arrest for property offenses and an increase in the 
levels of violent offending. 
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Benson et al. (1992) examined data from 67 counties in Florida for 1986 
and 1987 to see if there was a relationship between drug arrests and property 
crime. They found that as the number of drug arrests increased, there was a rise in 
the number of property crimes reported. Two years later, Sollars, Benson and 
Rasmussen (1994) looked at data from 296 jurisdictions in Florida in 1987. Their 
findings echoed those from the earlier study. A ten percent increase in the number 
of drug arrests decreased the probability of arrest for a property offense, which, in 
turn, raised the property crime rate by an estimated 1.09 percent. Outside of the 
United States, Mendes (2000) examined a possible drug-property crime 
connection in 274 Portuguese municipalities in 1996. The study found that for a 
ten percent increase in the number of drug arrests, the probability of arrest for 
property crimes declined by about one percent. These studies indicate that there is 
a tradeoff in heightened enforcement of drug laws. Because law enforcement 
resources are relatively scarce, as more money is spent to combat drug crimes, 
less money is available to respond to property crimes. The results from these three 
studies highlight that when less money is available to combat non-drug crimes, 
property crime rates may increase. 
A likely explanation for the findings that increased drug enforcement leads 
to an increase in property crimes lies in the fact that the majority of drug 
offenders are not property offenders (Benson et al., 1992; Sollars et al., 1994). 
Although numerous reports have indicated that a large portion of people in prison 
have used drugs, what this line of logic fails to take into account is that the vast 
majority of people who use drugs do not end up in prison, even if they are 
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arrested. Benson et al. (1992) stated, “the fact that most property criminals use 
drugs does not prove that most drug users commit property crimes” (p. 680).  A 
report by Trager and Clark (1989, as cited by Benson et al., 1992) notes that most 
drug offenders are not also property offenders: 
The history of persons having at least one misdemeanor or felony 
drug arrest in Florida during 1987 indicates that many have few 
previous recorded arrests for property crimes (Trager and Clark, 
1989). Of the 45,906 people arrested for drug possession, over 
80% had never been arrested for burglary and over 90% had never 
been arrested for other property crimes. Of those arrested for sales, 
only slightly more than 25% had prior burglary arrests, and again 
over 90% had no previous arrest for other property crimes (p. 681). 
A second explanation put forth by Benson et al. (1992) is that because an 
increased drug enforcement policy will result in a lower probability of arrest for 
property offenses, some offenders will switch from committing drug crimes to 
property crimes. Under this scenario, the motivation for crime is an economic one 
and when the likelihood of getting arrested for one type of offense increases, an 
offender, being a rational being (Cornish and Clarke, 1986), would switch to a 
less risky form of criminal behavior. Thus, as the chance of being arrested for 
selling heroin increases because of more active enforcement, an offender may 
choose to switch to the less risky crime of daytime burglary. 
As was the case with increased drug enforcement leading to higher levels 
of property offenses, there have also been several studies which have found that 
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increased drug enforcement is related to increased levels of violent crime. The 
evidence that increased drug enforcement leads to higher rates of violent 
offending is not consistent with the crime switching hypothesis seen in the 
relationship between property and drug crimes, though there is some support for 
the notion that diverting law enforcement resources away from non-drug activity 
may lead to higher levels of violent offending. 
Brumm and Cloninger (1995) looked at the relationship between drug 
enforcement activities and homicide rates in 57 cities in 1985. One of the 
hypotheses that they tested was the resource saturation hypothesis, which is 
“consistent with the view that increased drug enforcement activities divert scarce 
policing resources from controlling other offenses, thereby reducing the risk of 
punishment for committing those offenses” (p. 512). They found that homicide 
rates increased, on average, by 0.17 percent for every one percent increase in drug 
enforcement activities. A few years later, Miron (1999) studied homicide trends in 
the United States from 1900 to 1990 in relation to historical prohibition efforts 
against both alcohol and drugs in the United States. He found that the highest 
levels of homicide in America in the 20th century occurred from 1920 to 1933, 
when America was prohibiting alcohol, and from 1970 to 1990, after America 
began its War on Drugs. He stated: “the results show the expenditure for 
enforcement of alcohol and drug prohibition have been positively associated with 
the homicide rate in the U.S., consistent with the view that increased prohibition 
enforcement encourages the substitution of violent for non-violent dispute-
resolution mechanisms” (p. 80). More recently, Shepard and Blackley (2005) 
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estimated a set of models using data for 62 counties in New York State for 1996-
2000 to determine the relationship between drug arrest rates and both violent and 
non-violent crimes. They found that drug arrests did not have a significant 
negative relationship with crime. Instead, they found that increases in arrests for 
hard drugs were associated with higher rates of all crimes, except assault, and 
increases in arrests for marijuana were associated with more larcenies. 
While these studies provide evidence about the effect of increased drug 
enforcement on property and violent offending, they do not provide evidence of 
the effect that increased drug enforcement has on rearrest rates of those recently 
released from prison. Some information on this subject can be gleaned from 
Langan and Levin’s (2002) report on the recidivism rates of drug offenders 
released from prison in 1994. They found that, for those released from prison for a 
drug related offense in 1994, 41.2 percent were rearrested for a similar offense 
within three years of their release. This offense specialization was higher than for 
any other category of offender released in 1994. It is also 60.2 percent higher than 
the number of drug offenders released from prison in 1983 who were rearrested 
for a similar offense within three years of their release (Beck and Shipley, 1989). 
This information confirms that drug offenders were more likely to be rearrested 
for a new drug offense in 1994 than in 1983, although it still does not indicate if 
differences in state-level drug arrest rates could help explain variations in rearrest 
rates between states when the nine individual level characteristics previously 
discussed are controlled.  The following multilevel modeling results address this 
shortcoming. 
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Table 24 lists the beta, standard error and odds ratio for the level two 
effect of drug arrests added to hierarchical linear models controlling for the nine 
individual level factors of gender, age of first arrest, age at release, number of 
prior arrests, time served, race, offense type, admission type and release type. 
This table includes results for the outcome of rearrest for any offense for a 15 
state sample; for rearrest for a violent offense, rearrest for a property offense, 
rearrest for a drug offense and rearrest for a public order offense for a 13 state 
sample; for reconviction for rearrested offenders for a 14 state sample; and for 
reimprisonment for reconvicted offenders for a 13 state sample. Each of these 
seven multilevel models is included in its entirety in Appendix C. For ease of 
interpretation, the findings related to the addition of the contextual variable are 
listed in a single table. 
Table 24 - Multilevel Regressions for Seven Outcomes on Individual Level 
Characteristics and State Level Drug Arrests per 100,000 
Final estimation of fixed effects (Unit specified model): 
Drug Arrests per 100,000 b S.E. Exp(b) 
Any Rearrest 0.000311 0.000497 1.000311 
Rearrest for a Violent Offense 0.000146 0.000417 1.000146 
Rearrest for a Property Offense 0.000812 0.000458 1.000813 
Rearrest for a Drug Offense 0.002088*** 0.000365 1.002090 
Rearrest for a Public Order Offense -0.001033 0.000942 0.998968 
Reconviction 0.000760 0.000841 1.000760 
Reimprisonment -0.000112 0.000845 0.999888 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
The results in Table 24 indicate that the state level characteristic of drug 
arrests per 100,000 is not useful in helping explain variation in various forms of 
recidivism between states when the nine individual level characteristics are 
controlled. While state level drug arrests per 100,000 is found to be a significant 
predictor of rearrest for a drug offense, controlling for the nine individual level 
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factors, this significant finding is neither unexpected nor does it add to the 
explanation of why drug rearrest rates vary across states.  If the likelihood of 
arrest for a drug offense were increased for people in the general population of a 
state, the same increased likelihood would apply to formerly incarcerated 
offenders. Beyond this, however, Rosenfeld et al. (2005) found that prisoners 
released from 13 states in 1994 were 23 times more likely to be arrested for a drug 
related offense between 1994 and 1997 than those from the general population. 
Thus, those states that heavily targeted drug offenders would, by default, have a 
higher proportion of released offenders rearrested for a new drug offense and this 
finding would result in a statistically significant impact, even when individual 
level characteristics are controlled. 
 
6.3: The Effect of Statewide Police Per 1,000 Residents on Recidivism Rates 
Although to date there does not appear to be any research which explores 
the effect of police per 1,000 residents on recidivism rates, a great deal of prior 
research has looked at the effect of police levels on crime rates and can serve as a 
proxy for how different police levels across states may affect the levels of various 
forms of recidivism after controlling for individual level factors. The review of 
studies will be limited to those published in the last 15 years because, as Marvell 
and Moody (1996) found, many early studies may have suffered from the 
specification problems of simultaneity and omitted variable bias, which they 
believed was responsible for many studies finding that increasing police size did 
not have an impact on crime rates. To correct for these specification problems, 
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Marvell and Moody (1996) used lags between police levels and crime rates and 
also tested for casual direction with the Granger test. They further sought to 
“mitigate omitted-variable bias by entering variables that are proxies for the 
unknown factors and unusable variables” (p. 612). Employing these techniques, 
they found “Higher police levels reduce most types of crime, particularly at the 
city level” (p. 640). 
Kovandzic and Sloan (2002) used the same techniques to test the effect of 
increased police levels on crime rates at the county level for fifty-seven counties 
from the state of Florida for the years between 1980 and 1998. Their analysis 
revealed “strong evidence that increased police levels lead to lower crime rates” 
(p. 72). They found evidence that increased police levels had significant impacts 
on the rates of robbery and burglary and further estimated that “a 10 percent 
increase in police levels lowered crime rates by 1.4 percent over time” (p. 73). 
Research on whether police levels impact crime rates has not been limited 
solely to the United States and has not only been analyzed using official police 
data. Vollard and Koning (2009) used data obtained from the Dutch Victimization 
Survey (PMB) for the years 1996 to 2004 to estimate the impact that police force 
size had on victimization rates and on levels of victim precaution measures such 
as avoiding unsafe places and leaving valuables at home to avoid theft. The study 
found that increasing police size had a significant, negative impact on several 
forms of crime, including bicycle theft, theft from cars, littering, harassment, 
youth nuisance, public intoxication and drug nuisance. Negative, but not 
significant, effects were found for both assault and robbery. Increasing police size 
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also resulted in a significant decrease in victim precaution measures. The authors 
summarized the impact of increased police levels by stating, “Our estimates imply 
that the 30 percent increase in police per capita in the Netherlands over the period 
1996-2004 resulted in a decrease in crime and disorder by some 10 percent” (p. 
340). 
More recent research by Worrall and Kovandzic (2010) utilized an 
alternative instrumental variables approach to explore the prospect of a 
simultaneous relationship between policing and crime. Looking at data from 
yearly observations of 5199 cities between 1990 and 2001, the authors calculated 
a series of fixed effect models using the Generalized Method of Moments 
estimator. They found that higher police levels were associated with lower levels 
of homicide, robbery, assault, and burglary, particularly in cities with populations 
in excess of 100,000. 
These findings offer evidence for an inverse relationship between police 
levels and crime rates. Under the deterrence theory (Beccaria, 1963 [1764]; 
Bentham, 1967 [1789]) such findings suggest that increased police presence could 
also lead to lower recidivism rates. If released offenders act as rational beings 
(Cornish and Clarke, 1986) and realize that they are more likely to be caught 
because there are more police on the street, they might decrease their involvement 
in crime, resulting in lower levels of reoffending. 
There is an additional effect of increasing police levels, however, that 
must be addressed before anticipating the effect that increased police levels would 
have on rearrest rates. While deterrence theory would anticipate that more police 
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would reduce the offending levels of those recently released from prison, this 
does not mean that rearrest rates will go down, because some studies have found 
that increasing police levels also increases the probability of arrest (Wilson and 
Boland, 1978; Mosher, 2001). The end result is that, even if increased police 
presence leads to lower reoffense rates by those released from prison, their overall 
rearrest rates may nevertheless increase if a greater proportion of those who 
reoffend are arrested. On this basis, two competing hypotheses exist: 
1) Increased police levels will reduce the level of offending of those 
released from prison through deterrence with the end result being 
lower rearrest rates. 
2) Increased police levels will increase the arrest probability of those 
released from prison with the end result being higher rearrest rates. 
 
Table 25 - Multilevel Regressions for Seven Outcomes on Individual Level 
Characteristics and State Level Police Per 1,000 Residents 
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model): 
Police per 1,000 Residents b S.E. Exp(b) 
Any Rearrest 0.053538 0.145160 1.054998 
Rearrest for a Violent Offense 0.139806 0.101452 1.150050 
Rearrest for a Property Offense 0.341012*** 0.091807 1.406370 
Rearrest for a Drug Offense 0.309174* 0.168984 1.362300 
Rearrest for a Public Order Offense 0.073105 0.264072 1.075843 
Reconviction 0.450621* 0.216014 1.569287 
Reimprisonment -0.145565 0.236350 0.864534 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
Table 25 lists the beta, standard error and odds ratio for the level two 
effect of police per 1,000 residents added to hierarchical linear models controlling 
for the nine individual level factors of gender, age of first arrest, age at release, 
number of prior arrests, time served, race, offense type, admission type and 
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release type. As before, this table includes results for the outcome of rearrest for 
any offense for a 15 state sample; for rearrest for a violent offense, rearrest for a 
property offense, rearrest for a drug offense and rearrest for a public order offense 
for a 13 state sample; for reconviction for rearrested offenders for a 14 state 
sample; and for reimprisonment for reconvicted offenders for a 13 state sample. 
Each of these seven multilevel models is included in its entirety in Appendix C. 
The results of Table 25 suggest that the state level of police per 1,000 
residents is significantly and positively related to probability of rearrest for a 
property offense and positively related, though only at a marginally significant 
level, to probability of rearrest for a drug offense. Thus, even if increased police 
presence does have a deterrent effect on offenders recently released from the 
prison, this decrease in offending is more than offset by an increase in the 
probability of arrest for both drug and property crimes. 
Beyond its effect on the probability of rearrest, the results of the multilevel 
regression model of the statewide level of police officers from 14 states show that 
this contextual variable is marginally significant (p=.056) for the outcome of 
reconviction of offenders who have been rearrested. Although the finding is only 
marginally significant, it nevertheless suggests that states that employ more police 
officers are also more likely to seek to convict the offenders who are rearrested. 
This finding suggests that jurisdictions willing to hire more police officers may 
also encourage prosecutors to seek convictions for those who are arrested. This 
finding provides some support to the hypothesis raised in Chapter Five that 
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contextual, as opposed to individual level, factors help explain variations in 
reconviction probabilities across states. 
 
6.4: The Effect of Statewide Arrest-Offense Ratios on Recidivism Rates 
While researchers have not directly explored how statewide arrest-offense 
ratios affect offender recidivism, several research studies have explored the 
relationship between the certainty of arrest and crime rates. Tittle and Rowe 
(1974) examined 1970 crime and arrest data gathered from the first annual report 
of the Department of Law Enforcement of the State of Florida. They found that 
there appeared to be a relationship whereby increasing arrest levels led to lower 
crime rates, but that this relationship only existed for communities that had an 
arrest-offense ratio of at least 30 percent. They referred to this percentage as a 
tipping point and wrote, “Thus it appears that there is a critical level that certainty 
of punishment much reach before there is a noticeable change in volume of 
crime” (p. 458). 
Brown (1978) explored whether Tittle and Rowe’s (1974) tipping effect 
was a finding peculiar to the dataset used in the earlier study or if it would occur 
in places outside of Florida. In his work, he reanalyzed the two data sets used in 
the previous study along with analyzing 1971 crime and arrest rates in California 
cities with populations over 25,000 and 1973 data related to crime rates and arrest 
clearance rates for California counties. He was unable to identify a general tipping 
effect as had been found in the previous study, but his closer reexamination of the 
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Florida dataset data revealed evidence that the tipping point that had occurred in 
Florida was found only in smaller Florida cities and counties. 
A year later, Greenberg, Kessler and Logan (1979) used a longitudinal 
model approach to see if arrest rates for a 98-city sample for the years 1964 to 
1970 had an effect on crime rates. They developed models that included lags of 
one, two and three years, because “theoretical considerations suggest that lagged 
casual effects may exist” (p. 846). They found that increasing arrest rates (i.e., the 
certainty of arrest) had no appreciable affect on crime rates. While the authors 
stated that the findings from Tittle and Rowe (1974) and Brown (1978) provided 
evidence in support of the deterrence doctrine, the authors were clear that their 
findings did not. They speculated that the reasons for this had to do with the 
analytic method used and that “the correlations interpreted in these studies 
[conducted by other researchers] as evidence of crime deterrence may in fact have 
been spurious” (pp. 649-650). 
Three years after that, Greenburg and Kessler (1982) expanded on the 
earlier research by adding 12 socioeconomic control variables into the 98-city 
sample model. Estimating models with both instantaneous and lagged effects 
(using separate one, two and three year lagged models), they found little evidence 
supporting a crime-prevention effect. Although they were able to find one model 
for both murder and aggravated assault that was statistically significant, the other 
models on these crimes were not significant, leading them to conclude that 
evidence for the existence of a crime prevention effect for either crime was not 
persuasive. Similarly, while their models did find a slight effect for burglary, “the 
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evidence for a crime prevention effect here is ambiguous, and the effect is small 
in any event” (p. 781). Aside from these three findings, the authors found no other 
models for other Index I crimes with statistically significant results. Based on 
these findings, the authors wrote, “Our analysis finds no consistent evidence for 
the proposition that higher arrest clearance rates result in substantially lower 
index crime rates” (p. 784). 
Chamlin (1988) explored whether a lagged relationship between arrest 
rates and crime rates did exist, but could only be seen through something other 
than a yearly lag. He did this by utilizing an autoregressive integrated moving 
average (ARIMA) approach to see if he could find evidence of an arrest-crime 
relationship in Oklahoma City and Tulsa, Oklahoma for the crimes of robbery, 
burglary, grand larceny and auto theft using a monthly (as opposed to yearly) lag. 
Although he found evidence that robbery arrests had a negative effect with a one 
month lag on robbery offenses for both Oklahoma City and Tulsa, he found no 
lagged relationship between arrest rates and crime rates for overall crime or for 
burglary, larceny or auto theft. 
Three years later, Chamlin (1991) used the ARIMA approach to explore 
whether there was evidence in support of a tipping effect (Tittle and Rowe, 1974) 
and if this effect depended on the size of the city under observation (Brown, 
1978). He conducted his analysis using monthly data obtained from the FBI for 
the period between January 1967 and December 1980. He examined four offense 
categories (robbery, burglary, grand larceny and auto theft) for seven 
Pennsylvania cities that had a 1970 population that ranged between 5,990 and 
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2,002,512. His analysis revealed that only five of the 28 arrest-crime relationships 
were statistically significant (which revealed little support for an overall tipping 
effect) but that there was some evidence of a deterrent effect in the smallest city 
for the crimes of robbery and auto theft when the mean clearance rate equaled or 
exceeded 40 percent. 
The six research studies reviewed provide mixed evidence of a 
relationship between arrest certainty and crime rates.  None indicates whether a 
relationship exists between arrest certainty and recidivism. To explore this 
relationship, multilevel regressions were estimated for each of the seven 
recidivism measures, controlling for the nine individual level risk factors.  Each of 
these seven multilevel models is included in its entirety in Appendix C. For 
clarification, the arrest-offense ratio is defined as the number of arrests for Index 
Crimes (which include the crimes of murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, 
burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson) divided by the number of these 
crimes reported to the police. 
Table 26 - Multilevel Regressions for Seven Outcomes on Individual Level 
Characteristics and Statewide Arrest-Offense Ratios 
Final estimation of fixed effects (Unit specified model). 
Arrest-Offense Ratio b S.E. Exp(b) 
Any Rearrest -0.024463 0.073690 0.975834 
Rearrest for a Violent Offense -0.014311 0.015594 0.985791 
Rearrest for a Property Offense -0.010984 0.018681 0.989076 
Rearrest for a Drug Offense -0.017078 0.025529 0.983067 
Rearrest for a Public Order Offense -0.029950 0.034942 0.970494 
Reconviction 0.023951 0.032943 1.024240 
Reimprisonment -0.003458 0.034677 0.996548 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
The results offer no evidence that the arrest-offense ratio helps to explain 
variation in any form of recidivism between states, when individual level factors 
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are controlled. There are several possible explanations for this non-finding. One 
explanation is that a relationship does, in fact, exist between recidivism and the 
arrest-offense ratio but that it only exists in states where arrest certainty is above a 
certain level (the tipping effect) and the analysis run was unable to pick this effect 
up. A second possibility is that the non-finding is based on the low level-two 
sample and that if a larger number of level two units had been used, a relationship 
would have been found. A third possibility is that the non-finding is correct and 
that between state variation in arrest certainty has no bearing on recidivism rates 
when individual level characteristics are controlled. 
 
6.5: Discussion 
This chapter has explored whether the inclusion of three separate 
contextual variables helps to explain the variation between states in various forms 
of recidivism with nine individual level characteristics controlled. The results of 
these multivariate analyses reveal that the state-level variables of statewide drug 
arrest rates and arrest-offense ratio do not help to explain variation in recidivism 
rates. Although the multivariate analysis revealed a statistically significant finding 
for the outcome measure of drug arrest rates when the state level contextual 
variable of statewide drug arrests was added to the model, this finding is 
substantively meaningless. What the finding basically says is that in states where 
people are more likely to be arrested for drug offenses, people released from 
prison are more likely to be arrested for drug offenses. 
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The state-level variable of police per 1,000 residents revealed one 
statistically significant finding and two marginally significant findings. In states 
with more police per 1,000 residents, released offenders were significantly more 
likely to be rearrested for a property offense, their likelihood of being rearrested 
for a drug offense was marginally greater and the likelihood of an offender who 
had been rearrested being reconvicted is also marginally greater. The finding of a 
contextual variable being related to probability of reconviction is noteworthy in 
light of the earlier finding that variations in individual level characteristics did not 
help explain variation between states in probability of reconviction. Future 
research should explore the effect of additional contextual variables on this 
measure of recidivism. While the proceeding three chapters have looked at 
whether individual level or contextual characteristics can help explain variations 
in recidivism rates across space, the focus of chapter seven is on how useful 
individual level characteristics are at explaining changes in rearrest rates over 
time. 
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CHAPTER 7 - EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
CHARACTERISTICS ON REARREST RATES OVER TIME 
 
7.1: Introduction 
While the results from chapter four have shown that variations in 
individual level characteristics help explain differences in rearrest rates across 
space, they do not tell if changes in the individual characteristics of released 
prisoners also help to explain changes in recidivism rates over time. To more fully 
explore this, two separate logistic regressions models were run, using a combined 
dataset that included offenders released from the same 11 states in 1983 and 1994. 
Although the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset included inmates from four 
additional states (Arizona, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia) that were not 
included in the 1983 dataset, these inmates were not included in the combined 
dataset as offender information was not available for offenders from those states 
released in 1983. In total, the sample consisted of 42,301 weighted cases that 
represented 342,602 offenders. 
In the dataset, year of release is coded as a dichotomous variable, with a 
value of zero meaning the offender was released in 1983 and a value of one 
meaning the offender was released in 1994. In line with the “fixed effects” models 
used in chapters four and five, these models again estimate the odds ratio (with 
1994 as the contrast state). In the first logistic regression model, the only variables 
entered into the regression equation are the outcome variable (i.e., rearrest) and 
the year of release. This tells if and to what extent there is a difference in rearrest 
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rates over time. In the second logistic regression model, the nine previously 
described individual level characteristics are added to the model. 
Table 27 outlines the results of a logistic regression model based on year 
of release. These results show that those released in 1994 were significantly more 
likely to be rearrested than those released in 1983. This is not surprising, given 
that the proportion of offenders rearrested was over four percentage points higher 
for the 1994 cohort than for the 1983 cohort. 
Table 27: Logistic Regression Results for Rearrest for Any Offense 
Comparing Offenders Released in 1983 and 1994 
REARRD Odds Ratio Std. Error 
Released in 1994 1.271295*** .0357694 
Model Statistics 
Observations Pseudo R2 Log Pseudolikelihood 
42301 0.0021 -218762.08 
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001 
 
When each of the nine individual level characteristics is added to the 
model, most of the individual level characteristics remain significant in the 
predicted direction. Females are less likely to be rearrested than males 
(O.R.=1.592, p<.001); blacks are more likely to be rearrested than whites 
(O.R.=1.601, p<.001); those released at a younger age are more likely to be 
rearrested than those released at an older age (O.R.=0.936, p<.001); those with 
more prior arrests are more likely to be rearrested than those with fewer prior 
arrests (O.R.=1.092, p<.001); property offenders are more likely to be rearrested 
than violent offenders (O.R.=0.759, p<.001), drug offenders (O.R.=0.752, 
p<.001) and public order offenders (O.R.=0.749, p<.001); inmates who served 
less time in prison during their last incarceration are more likely to be rearrested 
  
155 
than those who served more time in prison (O.R.=0.998, p<.001); those admitted 
via parole violation are more likely to be rearrested than those admitted via new 
court sentence (O.R.=1.526, p<.001); and those released via discretionary parole 
are less likely to be rearrested than those released via mandatory supervised 
release (O.R.=1.353, p<.001) or expiration of sentence (O.R.=1.499, p<.001). In 
addition to these findings, the model reveals that those of other races are less 
likely to be rearrested than whites (O.R.=0.697, p<.05); that there is no significant 
difference in the prevalence of rearrest of property offenders and those offenders 
released for an offense classified as other (O.R.=0.737, n.s); that those who 
entered prison on a probation violation have a lower prevalence of rearrest than 
those released on a new court commitment (O.R.=0.780, p<.01); and that those 
released via other release types (beyond discretionary parole, mandatory 
supervised release and expiration of sentence) are more likely to be rearrested 
compared to those released via discretionary parole (O.R.=1.263, p<.05). Finally, 
with the individual level characteristics in the model, age of first arrest is not a 
significant predictor of rearrest (O.R.=1.005, n.s.). This model is displayed in 
Table 28. 
Table 28: Logistic Regression Results for Rearrest for Any Offense 
Comparing Offenders Released in 1983 and 1994 with Individual Level 
Characteristics Added to the Model 
REARRD Odds Ratio Std. Error 
Released in 1994 1.439505*** 0.0493237 
Gender 1.592985*** 0.1015887 
Age of First Arrest 1.004918 0.0044235 
Black 1.601155*** 0.0540726 
Other Race 0.6968868* 0.1201743 
Age at Release 0.9356963*** 0.0029949 
Prior Arrests 1.091794*** 0.0050182 
Violent Offense 0.7591705*** 0.0298471 
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Drug Offense 0.7516201*** 0.0362762 
Public Order Offense 0.749285*** 0.0492074 
Other Offense 0.7375587 0.1664747 
Time Served 0.9981553** 0.0006829 
Parole Violation 1.5257*** 0.0793994 
Probation Violation 0.7804044** 0.056075 
Other Admission Type 1.263271* 0.1410873 
Unknown Admission Type 1.057993 0.0447077 
Mandatory Supervised Release 1.353116*** 0.0509955 
Expiration of Sentence 1.49922*** 0.0748854 
Other Release Type 1.424681*** 0.0779771 
Model Statistics 
Observations Pseudo R2 Log Pseudolikelihood 
42301 0.1132 -194405.63 
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001 
 
Most importantly, however, is that with individual level characteristics 
included in the model, the odds ratio for the release year variable increases by 
13.23 percent. This indicates that changes in individual level characteristics 
cannot be used to explain the increase in rearrest rates that occurred between the 
1983 and 1994 cohorts. If they did explain differences in prevalence of rearrest 
over time, then the odds ratio for the year variable would have decreased. What 
the increase indicates, instead, is that there are factors other than individual level 
characteristics responsible for the increase in prevalence of rearrest between 1983 
and 1994. 
Table 29: Logistic Regression Results for Rearrest for Any Offense 
Comparing Offenders Released in 1983 and 1994 with Individual Level 
Characteristics and State of Release Added to the Model 
REARRD Odds Ratio Std. Error 
Released in 1994 1.471607*** 0.0512288 
California 1.206444* 0.0992839 
Florida 1.723475*** 0.1330589 
Illinois 1.389428*** 0.1178957 
Michigan 0.7613157*** 0.0510884 
Minnesota 1.10703 0.0891658 
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New York 1.136958 0.0866285 
North Carolina 0.988149 0.0712122 
Ohio 0.6418645*** 0.0493907 
Oregon 1.652417*** 0.1251161 
Texas 0.7161433*** 0.0544163 
Gender 1.580552*** 0.1018312 
Age of First Arrest 1.001957 0.0044159 
Black 1.62208*** 0.0569342 
Other Race 0.6674645* 0.1162995 
Age at Release 0.9380546*** 0.0030096 
Prior Arrests 1.082739*** 0.0049907 
Property Offense 0.7094233*** 0.0286814 
Drug Offense 0.7258174*** 0.035602 
Public Order Offense 0.7353339*** 0.0489907 
Other Offense 0.6872783 0.1561032 
Time Served 0.998389* 0.0006979 
Parole Violation 1.594247*** 0.0851933 
Probation Violation 0.8310647* 0.0648874 
Other Admission Type 1.446371** 0.1731308 
Unknown Admission Type 1.410627*** 0.0774637 
Mandatory Supervised Release 1.148271* 0.0638529 
Expiration of Sentence 1.278675*** 0.0715531 
Other Release Type 1.152716* 0.0730878 
Model Statistics 
Observations Pseudo R2 Log Pseudolikelihood 
42301 0.1213 -192636.37 
* p<.05 , ** p <.01, *** p<.001 
 
When states are added to the model which includes individual level 
characteristics (as displayed in Table 29), most of the findings remain unchanged. 
Age of first arrest and serving time for another offense remain non-significant. 
One notable finding, however, is that the odds ratios for mandatory supervised 
release, expiration of sentence and other release type each drop by at least 14 
percent when the state variables are added. This change indicates that a nontrivial 
amount of the difference in rearrest rates based on release type is the result of 
distinctive release patterns used by different states.  
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Similar to the models on rearrest rates over time, the Pseudo R2 value from 
the logistic regression model with year of release and the nine individual level 
characteristics in the model indicate that there still remains over 88 percent of 
variation not explained by the state of release or the nine individual level factors. 
When state of release is added to the model, the Pseudo R2 value increases by less 
than one percent (from 0.1132 to 0.1213). This indicates, again, that many 
additional individual, contextual and policy variables need to be added to the 
model to fully account for differences between time periods in rearrest rates. The 
log pseudolikelihood value indicates improved fit when individual level 
characteristics are added to the model and further improvement when state of 
release is added. 
 
7.2: Using Predicted Probability Models to Clarify the Findings 
Before proceeding on to possible explanations of why the models 
produced the findings that they did, it will first be informative to graphically 
display the differences between the actual changes in rearrest rates over time and 
the expected rearrest rates over time based on the predicted probabilities from the 
regression models. For the following graphical displays of rearrest rates for 1983 
and 1994, information is displayed for 42,301 cases representing 99,681 offenders 
released from 11 states in 1983 and for 242,921 offenders released from the same 
11 states in 1994.  On the following page, Figure 8 displays the actual rearrest 
rates of prisoners released from 11 states in 1983 and 1994 while Figure 9 
displays  the  predicted  1983  prisoners  based  on  the coefficients from 1983 and  
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1994. The graphs clearly show that the rearrest rates would have been predicted to 
decrease had the individual level characteristics had the anticipated effect. 
Although the percentages in the figure do not include all inmates from 
both datasets, Figure 8 nevertheless displays findings very similar to those from 
Langan and Levin (2002) and from Beck and Shipley (1989). What the figure 
shows is that offenders released in 1994 were 7.25 percent more likely to be 
rearrested than offenders released in 1983. The logistic regression model shown in 
Table 27, however, reveals that this was not what was expected based on the 
changing demographics of the offenders released from prison in each respective 
year. According to this model, rearrest rates should have gone down, not up, if the 
only factors that influenced rearrest rates were the nine individual level factors. 
This is shown in Figure 9, which displays the anticipated rates using two 
predicted probability models. The first model answers the question: Using 
predicted probabilities, what would have been the anticipated rearrest rates of 
prisoners released in 1983 using the 1983 sample and 1983 coefficients? This is 
an important question to answer as it tells what the expected rearrest rates for 
1983 should have been based on the nine individual level characteristics of 
offenders released that year. It is also important because it gives a base percentage 
to compare the 1994 cohort to. The second model answers the question: What 
would the anticipated rearrest rates in 1994 have been if the 1994 coefficients 
were used but the sample of released prisoners were identical to that in 1983? 
This question is relevant because it helps us understand what the predicted 
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rearrest rates for 1994 would have been if the only variables which influenced the 
rearrest rates were the nine individual level characteristics. 
While Figure 8 shows that rearrest rates went up over time, the results 
displayed in Figure 9 show that, based on the predicted probabilities of changing 
demographics between the 1983 and 1994 cohort, rearrest rates should have gone 
down if the only factors that influenced variation in rearrest rates were changes in 
demographic characteristics of the release cohorts. These findings indicate that 
the nine individual level factors previously discussed do not explain the increase 
over time in the rearrest rates of released prisoners. 
This leads to the question: Since variations in individual level factors do 
not do a good job at explaining changes in rearrest rates over time, what other 
factors might be used to explain the variation? While the discussion that follows 
is necessarily speculative, evidence will be presented suggesting that three factors 
which may help to explain variations in rearrest rates over time include: 1) 
America’s War on Drugs, 2) Increased Numbers of Police Officers and 3) 
Changing Police Procedures. 
 
7.3: America’s War on Drug 
 The single factor which likely had the greatest impact on why prevalence 
of rearrest went up involves the changing political climate in America and the 
increased focus on combating drug crime. One clear example of why this factor 
had an impact on prevalence of rearrest comes from the reports written by Beck 
and Shipley (1989) and Langan and Levin (2002). These reports highlight that the 
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percentage of offenders released from prison for drug offenses more than tripled 
from just 9.28 percent of releases in 1983 to over 33.12 percent of releases in 
1994. A further analysis of these two datasets reveals that the proportion of 
inmates released from prison in 1983 rearrested only on drug related charges, 
increased by over 170 percent between 1983 and 1994. While only 3.51 percent 
of releases in 1983 were rearrested solely on drug related charges within three 
years of their release from prison, this percentage increased to 9.55 percent of 
releases in 1994. It should be noted that, alone, the increase in the number 
arrested solely on drug related charges explains the increase in prevalence of 
rearrest between 1983 and 1994. 
 The United States prison population’s steady increase in size began in 
1974, a few years after the punitive shifts began in America following the 
Republican Party adopting a tough on crime platform in the late 1960s (Tonry, 
1999) and the publication of a widely influential piece by Martinson (1974) that 
“nothing works” in rehabilitating criminal offenders. But many of the enhanced 
sentencing strategies aimed at drug offenders weren’t implemented until the rise 
of drug related crime began in the mid 1980s. In line with the increasing public 
concern that coincided with this crime increase, the federal government passed 
two laws – the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1988 – both containing new mandatory minimum sentences for specific drug 
offenses. 
Although these federal laws did not directly affect state court cases, the 
“tough on drug crime” trend nevertheless followed in state criminal filings. 
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Roberts (1993) wrote, “In New York State, for example, drug felony filings 
increased by 288% between 1985 and 1989; the rate of felony drug convictions 
increased by 21.6% in the first quarter of 1989; and the number of prison inmates 
serving sentences for drug-related offenses increased by over 300% between 1986 
and 1990” (footnote 53, page 1957). The massive increase in drug incarceration 
rates was not unique to New York, however. Zimring and Hawkins (1994) 
reported: “Between 1980 and 1990 the annual total of males in prison for drug 
offenses in California grew fifteenfold from approximately 1,500 to 22,600” (p. 
88). They further suggested that the actual cause of the tremendous increase in 
drug arrests and drug incarceration rates had more to do with changes in drug 
enforcement policies than with an actual increase in drug use, as national surveys 
conducted throughout the 1980s showed a fairly persistent decline in illegal drug 
use during that decade. 
 
7.4: Increased Numbers of Police Officers 
 A second factor which likely contributed to the increase in prevalence of 
rearrest for offenders released from prison in 1994 compared to those released in 
1983 was the increase in the number of full time police officers patrolling 
American cities during this time period. This number was undoubtedly affected 
by the passage of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (VCCA), 
which was signed into law in September 1994. One of the components of VCCA 
established the Community Oriented Police Services (COPS) office and 
authorized the distribution of grants to local police. The bulk of these grants were 
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designated for the Universal Hiring Program, which provided grants to local 
police agencies to pay 75% of the cost of new police hires. The grants provided 
for the hiring of additional police officers beginning in 1995 and as of the end of 
the 2008 Fiscal Year, the COPS Office had provided funding for approximately 
117,000 additional officers. 
 
Figure 10 highlights that the number of law enforcement officers increased 
between October, 1982 and October, 1993 by 8.27 percent, as the average number 
of police officers per 1,000 residents increased from 2.020 per 1,000 to 2.202 per 
1,000. This averages out to an annual increase of 0.75 percent per year between 
October 1982 and October 1993. The chart also shows that the rate of law 
enforcement officers per 1,000 residents increased at a substantially higher rate 
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than in previous years in the year following the passage of VCCA. From 1994 to 
1995, the ratio of police per 1,000 residents increased by 3.84 percent. This 
increase is over five times the average increase that occurred between 1982 and 
1993. 
As previously stated, findings by Zhao, Schneider and Thurman (2003) 
indicated that more police were related to more arrests for violent crimes, drug 
offenses and social disorder offenses. Additionally, although the multilevel 
analyses conducted in chapter six did not find a significant relationship between 
police per 1,000 residents and rearrest rates across states, there was a marginally 
significant relationship between police per 1,000 residents and rearrest for drug 
offenses. It is reasonable to assume that the growth in the number of police 
officers contributed to the very large increase in the percentage of released 
prisoners rearrested for a drug related offense between 1983 and 1994 
 
7.5: Changing Police Procedures 
 In addition to the increase in the number of law enforcement officers on 
the street, another possible reason for the increase in prevalence of rearrest has to 
do with changes in police procedures which occurred between 1983 and 1994. 
These changes involved a shift away from a reactive response to a proactive one. 
One such change involved increased use of what is commonly referred to 
as community policing. According to a United States Department of Justice 
(2009b) report, “Community policing is a philosophy that promotes 
organizational strategies, which support the systematic use of partnerships and 
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problem-solving techniques, to proactively address the immediate conditions that 
give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime” 
(p. 3). Even though community policing techniques probably did not become 
widespread until the passage of VCCA in 1994, Eck and Maguire (2006) report 
that the implementation of this form of policing began in the early 1980s. 
A second change in policing involved a combination of aggressive 
policing strategies known as “order maintenance” or “zero-tolerance” policing. 
This strategy was widely influenced by the work of Wilson and Kelling (1982) 
which described the “Broken Windows” thesis. Under this thesis, community 
level disorder and crime are closely related because disorder (“broken windows”) 
is a signal to the community that nobody cares. Under this strategy, the police 
attempt to control crime through strict enforcement of minor, public order 
offenses (Eck and Maguire, 2006). The most well known example of “zero-
tolerance” policing was that implemented by former Police Commissioner 
William Bratton in New York City in 1993. 
Regardless of whether community policing or zero-tolerance policing has 
any effect on crime rates, both could be expected to result in an increase in arrests 
for drug offenses and public order offenses. With community policing, this is 
because the police are on the street and are more likely to observe first hand what 
some people refer to as “victimless crimes” (such as public drunkenness, 
prostitution and drug sales), which would be unlikely to be reported to police if 
they utilized a reactive approach. With zero-tolerance policing, this is because the 
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police are instructed to not be tolerant of minor offenses, which would have been 
overlooked in the past. 
Some evidence in support of this hypothesis comes from looking at the 
change in the percentage of prisoners, by offense type, released from the 11 states 
for 1983 compared to 1994. While there was an increase from 1983 to 1994 in the 
numbers for all types of offenders released from prison, the percent increase was 
not uniform. Instead the percent increase was much greater for drug offenders and 
public-order offenders than for violent offenders and property offenders. 
Specifically, although the release of violent offenders increased by 51 percent and 
property offenders by 67 percent, the increase for public order offenders was 256 
percent and the increase for drug offenders was 752 percent. The dramatic 
increase in the percentage of offenders who were released after serving time for 
drug related offenses could be explained by the national campaign against drug 
offenses that ensued in the mid 1980s. Similarly the large increase of offenders 
released from prison for public order offenses compared to violent and property 
offenses can be explained by changes to more proactive policing strategies. This 
change in strategy could also explain why prevalence of rearrest went up for the 
1994 cohort. Since police took a more proactive approach in the 1990s than they 
did in the 1980s, arrests for public order and drug offenses would increase even if 
actual rates of offending did not. 
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7.6: Discussion 
Although this chapter is limited in scope, the findings presented indicate 
that changes in the composite individual level characteristics of offenders released 
from prison in 11 states in 1983 and 1994 do not explain changes in rearrest rates 
over time. This finding stands in contrast to this dissertation’s analyses regarding 
variation in rearrest rates across space for the 1994 cohort. The findings from 
those analyses revealed that changes in individual level characteristics help to 
explain variation in rearrest rates across states. 
While multivariate analyses were not conducted to test these hypotheses, 
three possible explanations were given of why rearrest rates may have gone up in 
1994, despite a predicted probability model anticipating that they would go down. 
The first of these was that the increase in rearrest rates was due to the increased 
emphasis placed on arresting drug offenders which occurred in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. The second of these was that the increase in rearrest rates was due to 
the increase in the average number of police officers per capita which were 
employed across the United States. The third of these was that changes in police 
procedures, more specifically a shift away from a reactive response to a proactive 
one, were responsible for the increases in rearrest rates. While a multivariate test 
of each of these explanations is beyond the scope of this dissertation, future 
research should investigate the extent to which each helps to account for the 
increase in rearrests of released prisoners between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s. 
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CHAPTER 8 – CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS: POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
8.1: Introduction 
The results of the analyses presented in this study help provide a more 
detailed understanding of the individual and contextual factors related to specific 
forms of recidivism across both space and time. The major findings are reviewed 
below. 
The study examined eight separate forms of recidivism across space and 
ran two sets of analyses to test whether variations in nine separate individual level 
characteristics could help explain variation between states in recidivism rates, 
using offenders from the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset as the source. These 
eight types of recidivism are: 1) rearrest for a new offense, 2) rearrest for a new 
violent offense, 3) rearrest for a new property offense, 3) rearrest for a new drug 
offense, 5) rearrest for a new public order offense, 6) reconviction, 7) 
reimprisonment, and 8) parole violations. 
Estimating separate models for each form of recidivism, one which 
involved an omitted state model and the second which involved a state-by-state 
comparison model, revealed that the variations in the individual level 
characteristics explain some of the between state variation for five of the eight 
forms of recidivism. The omitted state model revealed that variations in individual 
level characteristics helped explain on average about 35% of the state differences 
in rates of rearrest for any offense, 20% of the state differences in rates of rearrest 
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for a new property offense, 34% of the state differences in rates of rearrest for a 
new drug offense, 27% of the state differences in rates of rearrest for a new public 
order offense and 9% percent of the state differences in reimprisonment 
probabilities of reconvicted offenders. 
The results for the models involving rearrest for a violent offense, 
reconviction for rearrested offenders and parole violations were mixed. In each of 
the cases, one of the models revealed that the individual level characteristics 
helped to explain variation between states in recidivism rates, while the other 
revealed no such effect. For rates of rearrest for a new violent offense, while the 
omitted state model revealed that differences in the characteristics of released 
prisoners explained on average about 31% of the state differences in rates of 
rearrest for a new violent offense, the state-by-state comparison revealed a very 
small increase in the number of states with similar violent rearrest rates when the 
individual level characteristics were added to the model. For reconvictions of 
rearrested offenders and for parole violation, while a state-by-state comparison 
revealed a sizeable increase in the number of states with similar reconviction 
probabilities and parole violations when individual level characteristics were 
added, the omitted state model revealed that differences in the characteristics of 
released prisoners explained on average almost none of the variation in state 
differences. 
Several possible explanations were given that might explain the mixed 
findings for three of the forms of recidivism. For rearrest for a violent offense, 
one possible explanation is that the omitted state model did not pick up a 
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difference because of the similarity in violent rearrest rates across states. A 
second explanation pointed out that prior research has shown that factors other 
than the nine individual level factors being tested are associated with violent 
offending – including childhood behavioral problems, prior aggression, 
psychopathy, antisocial personality and deviant sexual arousal – and that it was 
quite possible that these other factors had a stronger effect than the nine 
investigated in this dissertation. For reconviction probability, evidence was 
presented that the nine individual level characteristics might not be useful 
predictors of recidivism rates because prior research (Rasmussen et al., 2009; 
Blaine et al., 2010) had found that contextual, as opposed to individual level, 
factors determined the conviction rate of a given jurisdiction. Evidence was 
presented from former studies that political motivation and monetary resources 
were two contextual level factors that influenced conviction rates. Evidence was 
also presented from the multilevel analysis conducted in Chapter 6 that the 
contextual factor of police per 1,000 residents may have had some influence on 
conviction probabilities between states. For parole violation differences, evidence 
was presented that it was likely that different statewide parole policies had a 
greater impact on explaining variations in parole revocation rates than individual 
level characteristics.  
In addition to using these nine individual level characteristics to see to 
what extent they were useful in helping explain various forms of recidivism 
across space, two additional sets of analysis were conducted. The first was a 
multilevel analysis which looked at whether, with the nine individual level 
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characteristics controlled, the state level factors of drug arrests per 100,000 
residents, police per 1,000 residents, and the arrest-offense ratio help to explain 
between state variation for seven of the eight forms of recidivism previously 
described (parole violations were not analyzed due to only having data available 
from nine states). While there was no relationship found between the contextual 
variables of drug arrests per 100,0006 or arrest-offense ratio and any form of 
recidivism, the number of police officers per 1,000 residents was found to be 
significantly related (p<.01) to the probability of rearrest for a property offense 
and marginally related (p<.10) to the probability of rearrest for a drug offense and 
the probability of reconviction for rearrested offenders. 
Besides looking at the effect of contextual variables, a separate analysis 
was conducted to see if changes in the composition of individual level 
characteristics could help explain the increase in rearrest rates which occurred in 
11 states comparing offenders released in 1983 with offenders released in 1994. 
The analysis revealed that the changes in individual level characteristics do not 
explain increases in rearrest rates over time. Using predicted probability models, 
it was found that, while rearrest rates had increased by 7.25 percentage points 
between 1983 and 1994, had the nine individual level characteristics produced the 
anticipated effect based on the predicted probability models, rearrest rates should 
have decreased by 3.13 percentage points. Evidence was given for three possible 
explanations: 1) America’s War on Drugs, 2) Increased Number of Police 
Officers and 3) Changing Police Procedures. 
                                                
6 Although there was a finding that as drug arrests per 100,000 inmates increased in a state, more 
offenders were rearrested for a drug offense, as described in Chapter 6, this finding is 
substantively meaningless. 
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8.2. The Impact of Individual Level Factors on Different Forms of 
Recidivism 
While the primary goal of this dissertation was to examine the extent to 
which nine individual level factors explain eight forms of recidivism across space 
and one form of recidivism over time, a second finding was that some of the 
individual level characteristics by themselves help to explain increased risk for 
specific forms of recidivism while others do not. This finding has tremendous 
importance from both social and correctional policy perspectives. Perhaps the 
most important point to take away from this finding is that one size does not fit all 
in looking at different types of offenders and different forms of recidivism. 
Instead, each individual form of recidivism needs to be evaluated and dealt with 
separately. 
When we look at offense rearrest and compare significant predictors 
across the nature of the rearrest, we see general stability in the characteristics 
associated with increased odds of rearrest, regardless of the offense. For rearrest 
for a violent offense, property offense, drug offense, and public order offense, 
common risk factors include: 1) being male, 2) being younger at age of release, 3) 
having more prior arrests, 4) having served less time in prison, 5) having entered 
prison on a parole violation, 6) and having been released from prison via 
expiration of sentence. Another notable result is evidence of specialization for 
every type of offense, with violent offenders being most likely to be rearrested for 
a violent offense, property offenders being the most likely type to be rearrested 
for a property offense, drug offenders being the most likely type to be rearrested 
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for a drug offense, and public order offenders being the most likely type to be 
rearrested for a public order offense. This finding provides evidence that 
offenders would benefit if correctional officials developed programming designed 
specifically for the offense for which an inmate was currently incarcerated. In this 
regard, one question policy makers and corrections officials should ask is this: 
While there are prison based programs specifically designed for violent offenders 
which have been shown to reduce recidivism rates (Dowden and Andrews, 2000) 
along with similarly effective programs specifically designed for drug offenders 
(Knight, Simpson, and Hiller, 2004; Burdon, Messina, and Prendergast, 2004), 
would it not also make sense to design programs specifically for property 
offenders, especially given the finding that they have higher overall rates than any 
other type of offender? 
Although there are many similarities among the offenders who were 
rearrested, regardless of the offense they were rearrested for, there were also a 
few differences. One notable difference with both treatment and social policy 
implications is that those who are first arrested at an earlier age are more likely to 
be rearrested for a violent offense (O.R.=0.967, p<.001). Given that violent 
offenses are the most serious type of offense, this finding points towards the need 
to develop early intervention programming specifically targeting those who begin 
engaging in serious criminal behavior at a young age. Prior literature has shown 
that children with serious behavioral problems often do not receive appropriate 
mental health treatment (Burns, Phillips, Wagner, Barth, Kolko, Campbell, and 
Landsverk, 2004). Instead, treatment is not provided, if it is provided at all, until a 
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child has reached adolescence (Oliver, 2007). This is unfortunate because by then 
the problem is likely much more difficult to treat. 
There is also quite a bit of variation in the extent to which individual level 
characteristics are risk factors for specific types of recidivism. These variations 
should lead to questions about how police, prosecutors, judges and probation and 
parole officials handle offenders with specific characteristics. For example, why is 
that males are more likely than females to be rearrested for a new offense and to 
be reimprisoned if reconvicted, but not more likely to have their parole revoked? 
Alternatively, why does serving a longer amount of time in prison significantly 
decrease the odds of rearrest and the probability of reconviction for rearrested 
offenders, but significantly increase the odds of parole revocation and the 
probability of reimprisonment for reconvicted offenders? These questions, and 
others like them, cannot be answered with data available from the datasets used 
for this dissertation, but they are nevertheless questions which future research 
should address. 
 
8.3: Policy Implications 
 The findings from this dissertation provide evidence for four specific 
policy recommendations. The first is that to effectively lower recidivism rates, 
treatment services need to be based on offender need and risk level. The second is 
that certain contextual factors affect recidivism rates above and beyond individual 
level characteristics and these contextual factors need to be taken into account in 
deciding how to respond to crime. The third is that discretionary parole should be 
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brought back in states that have abandoned it. The fourth is that states should 
consider offering offense-specific treatment programs to those offenders who 
have a criminal record associated with offense specialization. 
 
8.3.1: Treatment Services Need to Be Based on Offender Need and Risk Level 
The findings from this dissertation that differences between states in 
individual level characteristics can explain between 20 and 30 percent of the 
variation in rearrest rates for both overall arrests and arrests for specific types of 
offenses make it very clear that lawmakers and policymakers must be attentive to 
the specific risk factors that inmates in their jurisdictions face in deciding what 
programs to develop and how to appropriately implement them. In many states, 
inmates who get treatment end up involved in a relatively ineffective form of 
treatment in the form of a short-term program, designed not because studies have 
shown it was most effective, but instead because it is all the Department of 
Corrections can afford to offer (Harrison, 2001; Petersilia, 2001). Other states use 
a poorly designed, one-size-fits-all approach, which may be appropriate for some 
inmates but not others (Matthews, Hubbard, and Latessa, 2001; Latessa, Cullen, 
and Gendreau, 2002). While well-intentioned, such approaches can actually be 
detrimental to some offenders as research has found that placing low risk 
offenders in an inappropriate treatment setting, designed for moderate and high 
risk offenders, can actually increase their risk of reoffending (Lowenkamp and 
Latessa, 2005). Still other inmates find themselves receiving no treatment at all 
(Mumola, 1999; Harrison, 2001; Matthews et al., 2001; Burdon et al., 2004). 
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Several studies (Andrews, Bonta, and Hoge, 1990; Andrews and Dowden, 
1999; Lowenkamp, Latessa, and Holsinger, 2006) have found that offenders 
receive the most benefit if the level of services they receive is congruent with 
their level of risk. Lawmakers and corrections officials need to be attentive to the 
specific risk factors faced by those in prison if they are to design programs that 
effectively reduce recidivism rates. It would be a mistake, for example, to have 
Delaware adopt the reentry procedures used in Michigan, because the 
backgrounds of offenders from these two states are vastly different. The most 
noticeable difference between the two groups of offenders is that offenders 
released from Delaware have, on average, over three times as many prior arrests 
as those released from Michigan. Therefore, the majority of programming 
designed for inmates being released from prison in Delaware should be tailored to 
meet the needs of high risk offenders while the majority of programming for 
inmates being released from prison in Michigan should be tailored to meet the 
needs of low risk offenders (in both states, however, the programming should be 
tailored to address the treatment issues associated with specific offense types – 
such as sex offender treatment, drug counseling and anger management). 
Programming in each respective state should be tailored to reflect the different 
levels of risk. Parole and correctional officials in Delaware should design longer, 
more intensive reentry programs to meet the needs of their returning high risk 
offender population.  
The weaker findings related to predicting violent recidivism highlight that 
the individual level factors analyzed in this study are most certainly not the only 
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risk factors that need to be looked at in determining the programs that need to be 
developed to enhance the chance of success. They also highlight that different 
types of offenders have different treatment needs and that what is appropriate for 
one class of offender may not be appropriate for a separate class of offender.  
 
8.3.2: Certain Contextual Variables Affect Recidivism Rates Above and Beyond 
Individual Level Characteristics 
 The results from Chapters 6 and 7 provide some evidence that certain 
changes in policy have an effect on the rates of various forms of recidivism. In 
Chapter 6, while the contextual factors of drug arrests per 100,000 and arrest-
offense ratio were not found to be related to significant increases or decreases in 
the probability of any type of recidivism, evidence was produced that, with the 
nine individual level characteristics controlled, the rate of police per 1,000 
residents was significantly and positively related to probability of rearrest for a 
property offense and positively related, though only at a marginally significant 
level, to probability of rearrest for a drug offense. This model further provided 
evidence that police per 1,000 residents was positively related, though only at a 
marginal level, to reconviction rates. The finding related to reconviction rates 
provides additional evidence to that from previous studies (Rasmussen et al., 
2009; Blaine et al., 2010) that differences in conviction rates between 
jurisdictions are largely the result of policy-driven contextual factors. 
 The results from the analysis in chapter 7 are a bit of a surprise in that it 
showed that changes in criminal justice policies can lead to an increase in rearrest 
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rates even when models based on individual level characteristics indicate that the 
rearrest rates should have gone down. While there is certainly the likelihood that 
other individual level characteristics besides the nine used in the model had some 
influence in recidivism rates, in the case of recidivism over time, changes in law, 
policy and practice that occurred between the mid 1980’s and mid 1990’s across 
the United States apparently had a stronger influence on rearrest rates than the 
individual level characteristics used in the model. 
The evidence presented suggested that three contextual changes that 
caused rearrest rates to go up between the mid 1980’s and mid 1990’s were 
America’s increased emphasis on drug crimes, a larger number of police on the 
street, and a change to a more proactive style of policing. This is an important 
finding from both a political and an economic perspective because increased 
arrest rates also increase the costs for jailing, feeding, and prosecuting more 
defendants. Potential extra costs thus need to be taken into account when 
implementing new criminal justice policies. While the motive behind such 
changes may be to help make cities safer for the residents who live in them, 
policy makers need to be sure they also take into consideration potential extra 
costs such policy changes may require. 
 
8.3.3: States Should Implement Discretionary Parole 
 Earlier in the dissertation, Petersilia (2003) was quoted as arguing that 
allowing states to maintain the option of discretionary parole could enhance the 
likelihood of success after release. Rosenfeld et al.’s (2005) study provided 
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support for this claim by showing that those released via discretionary parole had 
markedly lower rearrest rates than those released via mandatory supervised 
release or expiration of sentence. The results from this dissertation provide further 
support that those released via discretionary parole do better than those released 
via mandatory supervised released or expiration of sentence. This study finds that 
those released via discretionary parole have lower rearrest rates for violent 
offenses, property offenses, drug offenses and public order offenses than those 
released via either mandatory supervised release or expiration of sentence. 
Additional evidence was produced in Chapter 5 showing that those released via 
discretionary parole had significantly lower rates of being sent back to prison for 
a parole violation than those released via mandatory supervised release, even 
when state of release was controlled (O.R.=1.503, p<.001). This new finding, that 
release via discretionary parole is related to significantly lower probability of 
parole revocation, provides evidence as to why states that have abolished this 
option should seriously consider bringing it back.  
 One reason why discretionary parole should be brought back is it gives 
greater discretion back to corrections officials’ over when to release inmates, 
particularly when they have completed programming and no longer represent a 
high risk to society. This would help to free up scarce prison space for the most 
dangerous offenders. In addition to this, bringing back discretionary parole will 
serve as an incentive to many inmates to become involved in prison based 
therapeutic programming, education, self-help groups and other activities which 
will benefit them when they are released from prison. Numerous published reports 
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have found that inmates involved in prison based drug treatment (Knight et al., 
2004; Prendergast, Hall, Wexler, Melnick and Cao, 2004; Burdon et al., 2004), 
cognitive-behavioral treatment programming (Lipsey, Chapman and 
Landenberger, 2001; Pearson, Lipton, Cleland and Yee, 2002) and educational 
programming (Wilson, Gallagher and MacKenzie, 2000; Brewster and Sharp, 
2002) have lower recidivism rates than those who are not involved in such 
programming. Thus, bringing back discretionary parole will increase the chances 
that inmates will become involved in prison based programming and this will 
likely result in lower recidivism rates. 
 One specific area that policymakers need to factor in if they switch back to 
a system that allows discretionary parole, however, deals with sentence length. In 
a Bureau of Justice Statistics Report, Hughes et al. (2001) found that those 
released via discretionary parole served on average more time in prison than those 
released by mandatory supervised release. This may because the sentence length 
given to those in states with parole was longer than those in states without parole, 
with the understanding that low risk offenders and offenders who do well in 
prison would be released by parole earlier while high risk offenders would not. 
Because determinate and indeterminate sentencing schemes do not necessarily 
operate under the same principals, some adjustments may have to be made to 
sentencing policies in states which switch to an indeterminate sentencing scheme 
to ensure the switch doesn’t result in large variations related to the amount of time 
most inmates serve as a result of when they were sentenced. While longer 
sentences are certainly more appropriate for some inmates, judges and parole 
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boards will need to take the new policies into account in sentencing and releasing 
offenders. 
 Another area policymakers will need to take into account if they switch to 
discretionary parole deals with how its existence may cause certain groups of 
offenders to be unfairly discriminated against. This is particularly true for those 
serving time for particularly violent crimes or for crimes of a sexual nature. 
Bringing back discretionary parole may cause additional harm to these offenders 
if parole boards bow to political pressure and refuse to parole these offenders 
because they would look soft on crime if they did, even when, in actuality, the 
inmates represent low risks to public safety. Parole statistics from the State of 
Missouri (Missouri Department of Corrections, 2010) highlight that violent 
offenders convicted of a class A or class B felony and sexual offenders convicted 
of any felony served a much longer percentage of their prison sentences than 
other types of offenders. While the average amount of time served in 2010 was 
48.3 percent of their sentence for the entire 5,287 release cohort, the 612 
offenders released for a class A or B violent felony served 68.0 percent of their 
sentence, the 226 offenders released for a class C or D sex offense served 69.4 
percent of their sentence and the 211 offenders released for a class A or B sex 
offense served 72.1 percent of their sentence. Requiring violent and sexual 
offenders to serve a noticeably greater portion of their sentence by repeatedly 
denying them parole, due to the nature of their crime, can have negative 
consequences. Going to parole hearings and being repeatedly denied can cause 
additional stress. Repeated denial can also make these offenders less likely to 
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become involved in treatment if they come to believe that it doesn’t matter if they 
try to better themselves. This is a potential drawback for certain violent and 
sexual offenders who might fare better emotionally under a determinate 
sentencing scheme. For this reason, if discretionary parole exists in a state, parole 
boards need to be very careful in how they deal with these classes of offenders 
and need to ensure that their decisions are based on what is in the best interest of 
society and the offender’s readiness to be released and not on political 
considerations. 
 
Section 8.3.4: States Should Provide Offense Specific Treatment for Certain 
Repeat Offenders 
 One finding from this study with policy implications is that offenders 
convicted of one specific type of offense (violent, property, drug or public order) 
are more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for the same type 
of offense in the future. This finding provides evidence of offense specialization 
and corrections officials should consider offering offense-specific programming 
for offenders with a history of committing the same type of offense on multiple 
occasions. Such program would be tailored specifically to the offense and would, 
for example, teach property offenders how to find a job and earn a decent living, 
violent offenders how to resolve disputes in non-violent manners, and drug 
offenders of alternative ways to deal with stress. 
Because of budgetary constraints, some of the programming might have to 
be limited to chronic offenders who commit repeat property, drug or public order 
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offenses (i.e., requiring treatment for those with three or more similar 
convictions). However, officials might consider requiring non-violent offenders 
who have been convicted of the same offense two or more times in the past to 
complete a specialized treatment program as part of their prison sentence. The 
same could hold true for violent offenders who have one prior conviction. Due to 
prison overcrowding and other prison issues, states probably shouldn’t mandate 
that an offender must complete treatment to be paroled, but it would seem quite 
feasible for parole boards to give weight to completion of this programming in 
making a release decision. Similarly, in states with determinate sentencing 
schemes, one possible solution would be to allow offenders who complete such a 
treatment program to have their release date moved up by three or more months. 
 
8.4: Study Limitations 
There are several limitations to this study that need to be acknowledged. 
One limitation that may have influenced the findings is the small number of states 
available for use in the multilevel analysis. As stated in Chapter 6, one problem 
with having only 15 states to use as level 2 units in the multilevel analysis is that 
it may bias estimates of the second-level standard errors. This means that the 
results from the multilevel analysis need to be viewed with caution. An additional 
limitation is that having so few level two units prevented hierarchal linear models 
with multiple level two units from being estimated. This prevented running tests 
to see if the level of police per 1,000 continued to have an impact on property 
crime rates when additional contextual variables were added to the model. In line 
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with this limitation, it would be beneficial for researchers if the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics included information on the specific county to which the prisoners were 
released in future multi-state data sets of prisoners released during a specific year 
as this would provide much greater statistical power and allow much more 
detailed multi-level models to be estimated. 
A second limitation that may have influenced the findings deals with the 
different ways different states handled public order offenses. Although the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics was very clear that they were examining the arrest histories of 
inmates released from 15 states in 1994, the fact that some states arrested 
offenders who committed minor traffic violations, probation violations and 
possibly other relatively minor public order offenses while others issued traffic 
tickets, sought probation violations without arrest or issued citations in lieu of an 
arrest may have had an influence on the findings. The problem inherent in having 
one state issue an arrest while a second does not for the same action which is a 
violation of law in both states is that there is no way of knowing if or how the 
missing data influenced the degree to which states varied in terms of rearrest for 
any offense or rearrest for a public order offense. 
A third limitation is the limited number of individual level characteristics 
available for inclusion in analysis. Part of this problem resulted from certain 
variables having to be excluded due to problems with missing data in the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics datasets. Although prior research has found that suffering 
from a chemical dependency increases an offender’s odds of recidivism (Harer, 
1994; Gendreau et al., 1996; Mills, Kroner, and Hemmati, 2003), this individual 
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level risk factor could not be included in either the analysis across space or the 
analysis over time. Although data on this variable were collected for some of the 
offenders in the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset, the total number of cases 
coded as missing was over 70 percent. As a result, the variable could not be used 
in the models that explored various forms of recidivism over space. While a 
definite benefit involved in this study was the large number of offenders who 
were able to be included in the analysis (along with the fact that there were 
offenders released from 15 states from the 1994 cohort and from 11 states from 
the 1983 cohort), problems with missing data left several possible individual level 
characteristics unusable and this potentially limits the usefulness of the findings. 
A fourth limitation of this research was that it did not include an analysis 
of the effect of either state level parole policies or individual level types of 
supervision for offenders. Runda, Rhine, and Wetter (1994, as cited by Peterselia, 
1999) report that 90 percent of states use a classification system to assign parolees 
to specific levels of supervision. Having information on the level of supervision 
an inmate was under once released may help further explain some of the 
differences between states for various measures of recidivism. Additionally, 
examining the specific parole policies, particularly as they relate to arresting and 
prosecuting parolees who commit a criminal offense, may further help explain 
some of the variation across states for multiple forms of recidivism. These 
differences in policies may well explain differences in recidivism beyond just 
parole revocations if some states use technical violations in lieu of arrest for all 
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but serious criminal offenses while others have a policy to rearrest any offender 
who has committed a new crime. 
A fifth limitation of this study was that it failed to take into account 
individual level state’s prison capacity / prison overcrowding as a contextual 
variable. Marvell (1995) reported that several states specifically included prison 
capacity as a factor to take into consideration in setting up sentencing guidelines. 
It is likewise reasonable to speculate that parole officials’, police officers’, 
prosecutors’ and judges’ decisions all may be influenced by the capacity of 
prisons to take in new inmates. This would be an especially important issue if a 
state were under a court order to reduce its prison population. In such states, 
officials may be less likely to revoke, rearrest, prosecute or imprison due to the 
fact that sending an offender back to prison would require the department of 
corrections to release someone else. Thus, the inclusion of this variable may 
further help explain differences in recidivism rates across states. 
 
8.5. Suggestions for Future Research 
 While the findings from this study provide valuable information that 
differences in individual level characteristics do help explain variation between 
states in overall rearrest rates, rearrest rates for property offense, rearrest rates for 
drug offenses, rearrest rates for public order offenses and reimprisonment 
proportions for reconvicted offenders, there remain several avenues for future 
research. One avenue would be to replicate the analyses regarding variation over 
space for rearrests, rearrests for specific offenses, reconvictions and 
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reconfinements using the Prisoners Released in 1983 dataset. Such a study 
replication using a large, multi-state sample of prisoners released during a 
different period of time would be useful in determining the robustness of the 
findings from this study. Such a replication would also be useful in specifically 
evaluating the policy recommendations made in this study. 
 Another avenue for future research would involve exploring the specific 
parole policies in place in California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, New 
York, North Carolina, Oregon and Texas that led to the revocation rates that 
occurred for offenders released from each of the respective states. Travis (2005) 
reported that parole violators accounted for over one third of those admitted to 
prison in 1999.  This staggering rate ends up costing states billions of dollars each 
year. Therefore, using the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset along with 
information on specific parole policies that were in place would offer possible 
solutions to develop statewide parole policies that are able to be cost effective 
without compromising public safety. 
 A final avenue for future research would involve looking at the effect 
additional contextual variables have on recidivism rates when individual level 
characteristics are controlled. Such an avenue would be especially worthwhile if 
future multi-state datasets provide information that result in a larger number of 
level 2 units to be used. As mentioned, one possible solution to this would be to 
include county of release as a variable in future data 
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APPENDIX A 
MATCHING PROCEDURES FOR THE MERGED DATA FILE 
 
Appendix A describes how the arrest recidivism outcome measure and the 
nine measures of the individual-level recidivism risk factors investigated in the 
dissertation were generated from the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset and the 
Prisoners Released in 1983 dataset. 
 
How Rearrest Was Measured 
The variable REARRD was used as the rearrest measure for the Prisoners 
Released in 1994 dataset. The REARREST variable was further created using the 
following variables from the Prisoners Released in 1983 dataset. Variables v1049 
(month of actual prison release date), v1050 (day of actual prison release date), 
and v1051 (year of actual prison date) give information related to the exact date of 
release from prison. Variables v2010 (month of arrest), v2011 (day of arrest) and 
v2012 (year of arrest) provide the exact date of arrest for offenses that are "cycle 
based," and variables v5012 (month of event), v5013 (day of event) and v5014 
(year of event) give the exact date of arrest for offenses that are "event based". 
For each offender, separate cases exist for each arrest. To determine if an inmate 
who has been released from prison in 1983 should be designated as 
REARRESTED, all the inmate's arrests were examined. If an arrest was recorded 
as having occurred within three years of the release date, the inmate was 
designated as having been rearrested. 
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How Individual-Level Recidivism Risk Factors Were Be Measured  
1) Gender – Offender gender was generated from variable SEX in the 
Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset and from v1018 in the Prisoners Released in 
1983 dataset.  
2) Age at Release – Offender age at release was generated from variable 
RELAGE in the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset and from a newly created 
variable from the Prisoners Released in 1983 dataset. The new variable 
determines age at release by subtracting an offender’s date of birth (v1015 – 
month of birth; v1016 – day of birth; v1017 – year of birth) from the date of the 
offender’s release (v1049 – month of actual release; v1050 – day of actual 
release; v1051 – year of actual release).  
3) Race – Race was divided into four separate categories: White, Black, 
Other and Unknown. The categorical variables were generated from variable 
RACE4 in the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset and v1019 in the Prisoners 
Released in 1983 dataset.  
4) Age at First Arrest – The age at first arrest was calculated for the 
Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset by subtracting the offender’s date of birth 
(MONTHOB1 – month of birth; DAYOB1 – day of birth; YEAROB1 – year of 
birth) from the date of first arrest (A001MO – month of first arrest; A001DA – 
day of first arrest; A001YR – year of first arrest). Age at first arrest was generated 
from the Prisoners Released in 1983 dataset by subtracting an offender’s date of 
birth from the offender’s date of first arrest (calculated from v2010 – month of 
arrest, v2011 – day of arrest and v2012 – year of arrest, if the first arrest was a 
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"cycle based" arrest, or from v5012 – month of arrest; v5013 – day of arrest and 
v5014 – year of arrest, if the first arrest was an "event based" arrest). 
5) Number of Prior Arrests – The number of prior arrests was generated 
from variable PRIR in the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset and was calculated 
for the Prisoners Released in 1983 dataset based on the number of arrest cycles 
the inmate had gone through prior to their current release from prison (not 
including the arrest which led to the current imprisonment). 
6) Current Offense Type – The current offense type was generated from 
variable SMPOFF5 in the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset (Violent; Property; 
Drugs; Public Order; Other or Unknown). It was calculated based on the NCRP 
(National Corrections Reporting Program) code for the most serious offense 
gathered from variables v1030, v1033 and v1036 of the Prisoners Released in 
1983 dataset.  
7) Time Served – For the purpose of this dissertation, time served refers 
to the amount of time served on the current incarceration based on the date the 
offender was admitted to prison and the date the offender was released from 
prison. For the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset, the date of admission to 
prison came from MONTHAD (Month of Admission), DAYAD (Day of 
Admission) and YEARAD (Year of Admission) and the date of release from 
prison came from MONTHRLS (Month of Release), DAYRLS (Day of Release) 
and YEARRLS (Year of Release). For the Prisoners Released in 1983 dataset, 
the date of admission to prison came from v1022 (Month of Admission), v1023 
(Day of Admission) and v1024 (Year of Admission) and the date of release from 
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prison came from v1049, v1050 and v1051.  
8) Type of Admission – The type of admission was calculated based on 
the variable ADTYP in the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset and from v1025 in 
the Prisoners Released in 1983 dataset.  
9) Type of Release – The type of release was calculated based on the 
variable RELTYP in the Prisoners Released in 1994 dataset and from v1053 in 
the Prisoners Released in 1983 dataset.  
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Table A1: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Rearrest Rates 
 CA FL IL MI MN NJ NY NC OH OR TX AZ DE MD VI 
CA -------               
FL -0.441 -------              
IL -0.363 0.078 -------             
MI 1.140 1.581 1.503 -------            
MN 0.490 0.930 0.853 -0.651 -------           
NJ 0.387 0.828 0.750 -0.753 -0.103 -------          
NY 0.134 0.574 0.497 -1.007 -0.356 -0.253 -------         
NC 0.442 0.882 0.805 -0.699 -0.048 0.055 0.308 -------        
OH 0.594 1.034 0.957 -0.547 0.104 0.207 0.460 0.152 -------       
OR -0.091 0.350 0.272 -1.231 -0.581 -0.478 -0.225 -0.533 -0.685 -------      
TX 0.570 1.011 0.933 -0.570 0.081 0.183 0.437 0.129 -0.023 0.661 -------     
AZ 0.369 0.809 0.732 -0.772 -0.121 -0.018 0.235 -0.073 -0.225 0.460 -0.201 -------    
DE -0.966 -0.525 -0.602 -2.106 -1.455 -1.353 -1.099 -1.407 -1.559 -0.875 -1.536 -1.334 -------   
MD -0.007 0.433 0.356 -1.148 -0.497 -0.394 -0.141 -0.449 -0.601 0.084 -0.578 -0.376 0.958 -------  
VI 0.317 0.758 0.681 -0.823 -0.172 -0.070 0.184 -0.124 -0.276 0.409 -0.253 -0.051 1.283 0.325 ------- 
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue 
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Table A2: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Rearrest Rates with Individual Level Characteristics added to Model 
 CA FL IL MI MN NJ NY NC OH OR TX AZ DE MD VI 
CA -------               
FL -0.610 -------              
IL -0.216 -0.332 -------             
MI 0.736 1.305 0.992 -------            
MN -0.056 1.031 0.105 -0.673 -------           
NJ 0.357 0.923 1.258 -0.492 0.494 -------          
NY -0.288 -0.140 0.050 -0.679 -0.300 -0.260 -------         
NC 0.437 0.566 0.563 -0.656 0.264 -0.147 0.011 -------        
OH 0.036 0.903 0.762 -0.520 0.162 -0.258 0.173 0.059 -------       
OR -0.345 0.782 -0.161 -0.803 -0.194 -0.496 -0.213 -0.364 -0.423 -------      
TX 0.179 1.036 0.273 -0.467 -0.018 0.049 0.216 0.073 0.012 0.510 -------     
AZ 0.109 0.403 0.291 -0.572 -0.494 -0.222 0.131 0.040 -0.361 -0.034 -0.404 -------    
DE -1.105 -0.318 1.628 -1.582 -1.229 -1.779 0.122 -0.923 -1.206 -1.188 -1.413 -0.891 -------   
MD -0.358 0.492 0.051 -0.836 -0.218 -0.449 -0.293 -0.191 -0.303 0.018 -0.370 0.021 0.820 -------  
VI -0.141 0.374 0.058 -0.491 -0.044 0.019 0.189 -0.058 0.163 0.365 -0.048 0.240 0.589 0.202 ------- 
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue 
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Table B1: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Violent Rearrest Rates 
 CA FL IL MI MN NJ NY OH OR TX AZ DE VI 
CA -------             
FL -0.242 -------            
IL -0.607 -0.365 -------           
MI 0.643 0.885 1.251 -------          
MN -0.062 0.180 0.545 -0.705 -------         
NJ 0.107 0.349 0.714 -0.536 0.169 -------        
NY -0.127 0.115 0.480 -0.770 -0.065 -0.234 -------       
OH 0.063 0.305 0.670 -0.580 0.125 -0.044 0.190 -------      
OR -0.114 0.128 0.494 -0.757 -0.051 -0.221 0.013 -0.176 -------     
TX 0.536 0.778 1.143 -0.107 0.598 0.429 0.663 0.473 0.650 -------    
AZ -0.036 0.206 0.571 -0.680 0.026 -0.144 0.091 -0.099 0.077 -0.573 -------   
DE -0.670 -0.428 -0.063 -1.313 -0.608 -0.777 -0.543 -0.733 -0.556 -1.206 -0.633 -------  
VI -0.106 0.136 0.501 -0.749 -0.044 -0.213 0.021 -0.169 0.007 -0.642 -0.070 0.564 ------- 
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue 
 
Table B2: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Violent Rearrest Rates with Individual Level Characteristics added to Model 
 CA FL IL MI MN NJ NY OH OR TX AZ DE VI 
CA -------             
FL -0.257 -------            
IL -0.301 -1.363 -------           
MI 0.609 0.711 0.847 -------          
MN -0.218 0.237 0.307 -0.723 -------         
NJ 0.329 0.784 1.505 -0.364 1.139 -------        
NY -0.492 0.091 0.003 -0.581 -0.371 -0.229 -------       
OH 0.479 0.032 0.993 0.006 -0.473 -0.287 0.256 -------      
OR -0.361 -0.011 0.473 -0.649 0.022 -0.251 -0.114 -0.352 -------     
TX 0.250 0.098 0.612 0.154 0.267 0.347 0.692 0.158 0.371 -------    
AZ 1.773 -0.391 0.923 -0.861 -0.825 -0.738 -0.279 -0.670 -0.354 -0.637 -------   
DE -0.417 -0.136 2.107 -0.853 -0.530 -1.413 -0.252 -0.077 -0.264 -0.152 0.583 -------  
VI -0.278 -0.269 0.049 -0.560 -0.124 -0.152 0.122 -0.306 -0.012 -0.486 0.426 0.268 ------- 
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue 
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Table C1: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Property Rearrest Rates 
 CA FL IL MI MN NJ NY OH OR TX AZ DE VI 
CA -------             
FL 0.034 -------            
IL -0.540 -0.574 -------           
MI 0.717 0.683 1.257 -------          
MN -0.001 -0.034 0.540 -0.717 -------         
NJ 0.165 0.131 0.705 -0.552 0.166 -------        
NY -0.186 -0.220 0.354 -0.903 -0.185 -0.351 -------       
OH 0.138 0.105 0.679 -0.578 0.139 -0.027 0.324 -------      
OR -0.168 -0.201 0.373 -0.884 -0.167 -0.333 0.018 -0.306 -------     
TX 0.602 0.569 1.143 -0.114 0.603 0.437 0.788 0.464 0.770 -------    
AZ 0.077 0.044 0.618 -0.639 0.078 -0.088 0.263 -0.061 0.245 -0.525 -------   
DE -0.228 -0.262 0.312 -0.945 -0.228 -0.393 -0.042 -0.367 -0.061 -0.831 -0.306 -------  
VI 0.190 0.156 0.730 -0.527 0.191 0.025 0.376 0.052 0.358 -0.412 0.113 0.418 ------- 
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue 
 
Table C2: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Property Rearrest Rates with Individual Level Characteristics added to Model 
 CA FL IL MI MN NJ NY OH OR TX AZ DE VI 
CA -------             
FL -0.062 -------            
IL -0.533 -1.274 -------           
MI 0.364 0.350 0.792 -------          
MN -0.402 -0.254 0.005 -0.707 -------         
NJ -0.090 -0.223 0.692 -0.525 -0.045 -------        
NY -0.679 -0.864 -0.144 -0.866 -0.301 -0.337 -------       
OH -0.321 -0.292 0.451 -0.444 -0.263 -0.091 0.392 -------      
OR -0.045 -0.084 0.486 -0.496 0.326 0.118 0.133 0.220 -------     
TX 0.310 0.042 0.611 -0.037 0.514 0.479 0.847 0.368 0.464 -------    
AZ -0.488 -0.179 -0.036 -0.326 -0.267 0.060 0.284 0.116 -0.155 -0.548 -------   
DE -0.410 0.057 0.930 -0.389 0.119 0.018 0.490 0.549 0.021 -0.011 0.222 -------  
VI -0.190 -0.697 0.286 -0.065 0.332 0.367 0.691 0.454 0.198 -0.192 0.335 0.047 ------- 
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue 
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Table D1: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Drug Rearrest Rates 
 CA FL IL MI MN NJ NY OH OR TX AZ DE VI 
CA -------             
FL 0.363 -------            
IL 0.219 -0.145 -------           
MI 1.899 1.536 1.680 -------          
MN 1.645 1.282 1.426 -0.254 -------         
NJ 0.034 -0.330 -0.185 -1.866 -1.612 -------        
NY -0.026 -0.390 -0.245 -1.926 -1.672 -0.060 -------       
OH 0.955 0.591 0.736 -0.945 -0.691 0.921 0.981 -------      
OR 0.300 -0.063 0.081 -1.599 -1.345 0.267 0.327 -0.654 -------     
TX 1.067 0.704 0.848 -0.832 -0.578 1.033 1.094 0.112 0.767 -------    
AZ 0.862 0.499 0.643 -1.037 -0.783 0.828 0.889 -0.093 0.562 -0.205 -------   
DE 0.846 0.483 0.627 -1.053 -0.799 0.813 0.873 -0.109 0.546 -0.221 -0.016 -------  
VI 0.917 0.553 0.698 -0.983 -0.729 0.883 0.943 -0.038 0.616 -0.150 0.055 0.071 ------- 
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue 
 
Table D2: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Drug Rearrest Rates with Individual Level Characteristics added to Model 
 CA FL IL MI MN NJ NY OH OR TX AZ DE VI 
CA -------             
FL 0.281 -------            
IL 0.192 0.141 -------           
MI 1.251 1.297 1.183 -------          
MN 1.121 0.540 0.683 -0.385 -------         
NJ -0.088 0.163 -0.894 -1.428 -0.977 -------        
NY -0.278 -0.867 -0.420 -1.541 -1.225 -0.058 -------       
OH 0.201 0.520 -0.316 -0.917 -0.279 0.343 0.737 -------      
OR 0.164 -0.416 -0.538 -1.359 -1.034 0.150 -0.006 -0.593 -------     
TX 0.828 0.437 0.260 -0.918 -0.384 0.710 0.721 -0.029 1.052 -------    
AZ 0.811 0.054 -1.039 -0.772 -0.823 0.548 0.753 -0.310 0.192 -0.424 -------   
DE 0.728 0.943 -0.205 -0.169 -0.054 0.801 1.583 0.455 0.821 0.067 0.508 -------  
VI 0.461 -0.567 0.152 -0.655 -0.514 0.780 0.831 0.337 0.881 0.102 0.274 -1.131 ------- 
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue 
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Table E1: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Public Order Rearrest Rates 
 CA FL IL MI MN NJ NY OH OR TX AZ DE VI 
CA -------             
FL -1.182 -------            
IL -0.605 0.577 -------           
MI 0.898 2.080 1.503 -------          
MN -0.081 1.102 0.524 -0.978 -------         
NJ 0.140 1.322 0.745 -0.758 0.220 -------        
NY -0.107 1.075 0.498 -1.005 -0.026 -0.247 -------       
OH 0.564 1.746 1.168 -0.334 0.644 0.424 0.670 -------      
OR -0.922 0.260 -0.317 -1.820 -0.841 -1.062 -0.815 -1.486 -------     
TX 0.159 1.341 0.764 -0.739 0.240 0.019 0.266 -0.405 1.081 -------    
AZ -0.814 0.368 -0.209 -1.712 -0.733 -0.954 -0.707 -1.378 0.108 -0.973 -------   
DE -2.284 -1.102 -1.679 -3.182 -2.203 -2.424 -2.177 -2.847 -1.362 -2.443 -1.470 -------  
VI -0.375 0.807 0.230 -1.273 -0.295 -0.515 -0.268 -0.939 0.547 -0.534 0.439 1.909 ------- 
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue 
 
Table E2: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Public Order Rearrest Rates with Individual Level Characteristics added to 
Model 
 CA FL IL MI MN NJ NY OH OR TX AZ DE VI 
CA -------             
FL -1.295 -------            
IL -0.558 0.428 -------           
MI 0.621 1.822 1.142 -------          
MN -0.356 1.075 0.186 -0.832 -------         
NJ 0.095 1.423 0.684 -0.634 1.044 -------        
NY -0.605 0.767 -0.027 -0.787 -0.310 -0.195 -------       
OH 0.303 1.530 0.938 -0.193 0.350 0.198 0.586 -------      
OR -0.980 0.390 -0.485 -1.079 -0.468 -1.030 -0.800 -1.016 -------     
TX -0.339 0.903 0.138 -0.425 -0.057 -0.006 0.223 -0.387 0.595 -------    
AZ -0.032 0.096 -0.301 -1.336 -0.873 -1.046 -0.702 -1.273 -0.303 -0.849 -------   
DE -2.353 -0.981 -0.915 -2.918 -2.284 -3.052 -1.504 -2.540 -1.655 -2.106 -1.196 -------  
VI -0.884 0.534 -0.363 -0.884 -0.427 -0.413 -0.237 -0.508 0.303 -0.453 0.564 1.427 ------- 
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue 
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Table F1: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Reconviction Probabilities for Rearrested Offenders 
 CA FL IL MI MN NJ NY NC OR TX AZ DE MD VI 
CA -------              
FL 0.558 -------             
IL 0.438 -0.121 -------            
MI -0.206 -0.764 -0.643 -------           
MN -0.038 -0.596 -0.476 0.167 -------          
NJ 0.067 -0.492 -0.371 0.272 0.105 -------         
NY -0.918 -1.476 -1.355 -0.712 -0.880 -0.985 -------        
NC -0.400 -0.959 -0.838 -0.195 -0.362 -0.467 0.517 -------       
OR -0.588 -1.146 -1.025 -0.382 -0.550 -0.654 0.330 -0.187 -------      
TX 0.582 0.023 0.144 0.787 0.620 0.515 1.499 0.982 1.169 -------     
AZ 0.461 -0.097 0.023 0.666 0.499 0.394 1.379 0.861 1.049 -0.121 -------    
DE -0.888 -1.446 -1.325 -0.682 -0.850 -0.954 0.030 -0.487 -0.300 -1.469 -1.349 -------   
MD -0.160 -0.719 -0.598 0.045 -0.122 -0.227 0.757 0.240 0.427 -0.742 -0.621 0.727 -------  
VI 0.086 -0.472 -0.351 0.292 0.124 0.019 1.004 0.487 0.674 -0.495 -0.375 0.974 0.247 ------- 
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue 
 
Table F2: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Reconviction Probabilities for Rearrested Offenders with Individual Level 
Characteristics added to Model 
 CA FL IL MI MN NJ NY NC OR TX AZ DE MD VI 
CA -------              
FL 0.369 -------             
IL 0.315 -0.308 -------            
MI -0.769 -1.013 -0.972 -------           
MN -0.529 -0.719 -0.807 0.324 -------          
NJ -0.098 -0.376 -0.439 0.469 0.864 -------         
NY -1.262 -2.028 -1.452 -0.406 -0.649 -1.032 -------        
NC -0.476 -2.030 -0.943 -0.049 -0.229 -0.647 0.280 -------       
OR -0.602 -1.416 -1.001 -0.068 -0.111 -0.987 0.300 0.092 -------      
TX 0.503 0.210 0.007 0.680 0.764 0.367 1.354 1.025 1.575 -------     
AZ 1.648 -0.429 -0.368 1.126 0.165 0.228 1.444 1.233 0.777 -0.312 -------    
DE -1.333 -1.484 -2.163 -0.630 -1.418 -2.111 -0.191 -0.115 -0.514 -2.346 -0.888 -------   
MD -0.732 -0.859 -0.834 0.459 0.085 -0.081 0.804 0.225 0.512 -0.566 -0.412 0.895 -------  
VI -0.371 -1.389 -0.658 0.484 0.257 0.126 1.168 0.528 0.649 -0.422 -0.430 1.667 0.100 ------- 
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue 
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Table G1: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Reimprisonment Probabilities for Reconvicted Offenders 
 CA FL IL MI MN NJ NY NC OR TX AZ DE MD 
CA -------             
FL 0.237 -------            
IL -0.635 -0.872 -------           
MI 0.508 0.270 1.143 -------          
MN -0.253 -0.490 0.382 -0.761 -------         
NJ -0.242 -0.479 0.393 -0.750 0.011 -------        
NY 0.378 0.141 1.013 -0.130 0.631 0.620 -------       
NC -0.739 -0.976 -0.104 -1.247 -0.486 -0.497 -1.117 -------      
OR 0.848 0.611 1.483 0.341 1.101 1.090 0.470 1.587 -------     
TX 0.315 0.078 0.950 -0.192 0.568 0.557 -0.063 1.054 -0.533 -------    
AZ 0.365 0.127 1.000 -0.143 0.618 0.607 -0.013 1.104 -0.484 0.049 -------   
DE 1.580 1.343 2.215 1.073 1.833 1.822 1.202 2.319 0.732 1.265 1.216 -------  
MD -0.111 -0.348 0.524 -0.619 0.142 0.131 -0.489 0.628 -0.959 -0.426 -0.476 -1.691 ------- 
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue 
 
Table G2: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Reimprisonment Probabilities for Reconvicted Offenders with Individual 
Level Characteristics added to Model 
 CA FL IL MI MN NJ NY NC OR TX AZ DE MD 
CA -------             
FL 0.293 -------            
IL -0.556 -1.298 -------           
MI 0.610 0.497 1.235 -------          
MN -0.456 -0.026 -0.172 -1.126 -------         
NJ -0.257 -0.392 0.671 -0.925 -1.879 -------        
NY 0.453 0.043 1.002 -0.254 0.911 0.585 -------       
NC -0.936 -0.815 -0.355 -1.453 -0.600 -0.459 -1.131 -------      
OR 0.957 0.570 1.202 -0.156 1.250 0.971 0.261 1.918 -------     
TX 0.695 0.460 1.118 -0.706 0.894 0.447 -0.271 1.315 -0.424 -------    
AZ 0.701 0.025 1.095 -0.640 -0.066 0.516 -0.067 1.110 -0.579 -0.379 -------   
DE 1.500 1.508 2.622 0.964 1.409 3.440 1.839 2.887 0.726 0.878 1.527 -------  
MD -0.166 -0.481 0.357 -0.657 0.233 0.158 -0.579 0.832 -0.992 -0.310 -0.103 -2.141 ------- 
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue 
 
  
215 
Table H1: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Rates of Technical Violations of 
Parole Resulting in Reimprisonment and Arrests for Parole Violations 
 CA FL IL MI MN NY NC OH TX 
CA -------         
FL 0.418 -------        
IL 2.028 1.610 -------       
MI .0961 -0.543 1.067 -------      
MN 1.571 1.153 -0.457 0.610 -------     
NY 0.391 -0.027 -1.637 -0.570 -1.180 -------    
NC 1.289 0.872 -0.738 0.328 -0.282 0.899 -------   
OH -0.157 -0.575 -2.185 -1.118 -1.728 -0.548 -1.446 -------  
TX 1.687 1.269 -0.341 0.726 0.116 1.296 0.397 1.844 ------- 
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue 
 
Table H2: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Rates of Technical Violations of 
Parole Resulting in Reimprisonment and Arrests for Parole Violations with Individual Level 
Characteristics added to Model 
 CA FL IL MI MN NY NC OH TX 
CA -------         
FL -0.440 -------        
IL 2.012 2.659 -------       
MI 0.870 0.275 1.215 -------      
MN 1.669 1.252 -0.285 -1.179 -------     
NY 0.470 -3.648 -1.626 -0.524 -1.032 -------    
NC 1.134 -0.149 -0.801 0.793 -0.018 0.791 -------   
OH -0.186 -0.074 -2.137 -0.837 -1.649 -0.820 -2.069 -------  
TX 1.359 0.792 -0.628 0.640 -0.339 1.179 0.249 1.375 ------- 
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue 
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Table I1: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Rates of Technical Violations of 
Parole and Criminal Convictions of Parole Violation Resulting in Reimprisonment 
 CA FL IL MI MN NY NC OH TX 
CA -------         
FL 0.594 -------        
IL 2.247 1.653 -------       
MI 0.962 0.370 0.962 -------      
MN 1.630 1.036 -0.617 0.668 -------     
NY 0.389 -0.205 -1.858 -0.573 -1.241 -------    
NC 1.320 0.726 -0.927 0.358 -0.310 0.931 -------   
OH 0.502 -0.092 -1.745 -0.460 -1.128 0.113 -0.818 -------  
TX 1.702 1.108 -0.545 0.740 0.072 1.313 0.382 1.200 ------- 
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue 
 
Table I2: Regression Coefficients for State-by-State Comparison of Rates of Technical Violations of 
Parole and Criminal Convictions of Parole Violation Resulting in Reimprisonment with Individual 
Level Characteristics added to Model 
 CA FL IL MI MN NY NC OH TX 
CA -------         
FL -0.456 -------        
IL 2.233 2.874 -------       
MI -1.447 0.118 -.0870 -------      
MN 1.754 1.092 -0.404 -1.183 -------     
NY 0.466 -3.866 -1.840 -0.530 -1.117 -------    
NC 1.177 -0.252 -0.956 0.789 -0.002 0.814 -------   
OH 0.518 0.653 -1.594 -0.187 -0.970 -0.117 -1.481 -------  
TX 1.390 0.637 -0.802 0.652 -0.382 1.197 0.251 0.686 ------- 
States with Similar (p>.05) Probabilities are Bolded, Underlined and in Blue 
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Table 6A - Multilevel Regressions of Rearrests on Individual Level 
Characteristics and State Level Drug Arrests per 100,000 
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model): 
 b S.E. Exp(b) 
Intercept, γ00 0.343223 0.325956 1.409483 
Individual-Level       
  Gender -0.487658*** 0.043548 0.614063 
  Age of First Arrest 0.003511 0.002771 1.003517 
  Age at Release -0.061786*** 0.00217 0.940084 
  Prior Arrests 0.075855*** 0.002548 1.078806 
  Time Served -0.002878*** 0.000591 0.997126 
  Black 0.509141*** 0.027707 1.663861 
  Other Race -0.391184*** 0.121698 0.676256 
  Property Offense 0.379605*** 0.036661 1.461706 
  Drug Offense 0.066626* 0.035808 1.068896 
  Public Order Offense 0.069666 0.050021 1.07215 
  Other Offense -0.020887 0.096547 0.97933 
  Parole Revocation 0.413448*** 0.032869 1.512022 
  Probation Revocation 0.185581 0.152056 1.203918 
  Other Admission Type -0.152339 0.147317 0.858698 
  Unknown Admission Type -0.344545** 0.167951 0.708543 
  Mandatory Supervised Released -0.344545** 0.047613 1.125342 
  Expiration of Sentence 0.223232*** 0.069899 1.250111 
  Other Release Type -0.06385 0.07392 1.250111 
State-Level       
  Drug Arrests per 100,000 0.000311 0.000497 1.000311 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 6B - Multilevel Regressions of Violent Rearrests on Individual Level 
Characteristics and State Level Drug Arrests per 100,000 
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model): 
 b S.E. Exp(b) 
Intercept, γ00 -1.457979*** 0.278645 0.232706 
Individual-Level       
  Gender -0.792380*** 0.066837 0.452766 
  Age of First Arrest -0.033645*** 0.003945 0.966915 
  Age at Release -0.040651*** 0.002614 0.960164 
  Prior Arrests 0.022899*** 0.001974 1.023163 
  Time Served -0.002914*** 0.000755 0.997091 
  Black 0.561588*** 0.031476 1.753455 
  Other Race 0.244696* 0.140161 1.277234 
  Property Offense -0.400762*** 0.039353 0.669810 
  Drug Offense -0.608528*** 0.040264 0.544151 
  Public Order Offense -0.334533*** 0.059785 0.715672 
  Other Offense -0.576501*** 0.116014 0.561861 
  Parole Revocation 0.307753*** 0.035440 1.360365 
  Probation Revocation -0.036893 0.160378 0.963779 
  Other Admission Type -0.434499** 0.204893 0.647589 
  Unknown Admission Type -0.036575 0.267429 0.964086 
  Mandatory Supervised Released 0.372755*** 0.068844 1.451728 
  Expiration of Sentence 0.605104*** 0.075445 1.831442 
  Other Release Type 0.264119*** 0.083750 1.302284 
State-Level    
  Drug Arrests per 100,000 0.000146 0.000417 1.000146 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 6C - Multilevel Regressions of Property Rearrests on Individual Level 
Characteristics and State Level Drug Arrests per 100,000 
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model): 
 b S.E. Exp(b) 
Intercept, γ00 -1.518187*** 0.305483 0.219109 
Individual-Level     
  Gender -0.197114*** 0.049690 0.821097 
  Age of First Arrest 0.005540* 0.003170 1.005555 
  Age at Release -0.038506*** 0.002354 0.962226 
  Prior Arrests 0.052234*** 0.001979 1.053622 
  Time Served -0.001858*** 0.000693 0.998143 
  Black 0.322055*** 0.028541 1.379961 
  Other Race -0.280005** 0.140781 0.755780 
  Property Offense 0.800331*** 0.037109 2.226279 
  Drug Offense -0.244618*** 0.038966 0.783003 
  Public Order Offense -0.009107 0.057061 0.990935 
  Other Offense 0.197726** 0.098328 1.218629 
  Parole Revocation 0.247695*** 0.032328 1.281070 
  Probation Revocation 0.314289** 0.145601 1.369285 
  Other Admission Type -0.145988 0.175626 0.864168 
  Unknown Admission Type 0.018913 0.225739 1.019092 
  Mandatory Supervised Released 0.226202*** 0.063975 1.253829 
  Expiration of Sentence 0.370939*** 0.071258 1.449094 
  Other Release Type 0.120510 0.078240 1.128072 
State-Level    
  Drug Arrests per 100,000 0.000812 0.000458 1.000813 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 6D - Multilevel Regressions of Drug Rearrests on Individual Level 
Characteristics and State Level Drug Arrests per 100,000 
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model): 
 b S.E. Exp(b) 
Intercept, γ00 -2.626172*** 0.244850 0.072355 
Individual-Level     
  Gender -0.204735*** 0.048726 0.814863 
  Age of First Arrest -0.001566 0.003134 0.998435 
  Age at Release -0.034835*** 0.002337 0.965765 
  Prior Arrests 0.042163*** 0.001906 1.043065 
  Time Served -0.002931*** 0.000752 0.997073 
  Black 0.411015*** 0.028616 1.508349 
  Other Race -0.556840*** 0.158693 0.573017 
  Property Offense 0.145062*** 0.039408 1.156111 
  Drug Offense 0.777919*** 0.038038 2.176936 
  Public Order Offense 0.130370** 0.057915 1.139250 
  Other Offense 0.268918*** 0.096652 1.308548 
  Parole Revocation 0.179209*** 0.031886 1.196271 
  Probation Revocation 0.101977 0.156722 1.107358 
  Other Admission Type -0.205593 0.200600 0.814164 
  Unknown Admission Type -0.479645* 0.291257 0.619003 
  Mandatory Supervised Released 0.108287* 0.065638 1.114367 
  Expiration of Sentence 0.299452*** 0.073111 1.349120 
  Other Release Type -0.095989 0.082103 0.908474 
State-Level    
  Drug Arrests per 100,000 0.002088*** 0.000365 1.002090 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 6E - Multilevel Regressions of Public Order Rearrests on Individual 
Level Characteristics and State Level Drug Arrests per 100,000 
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model): 
 B S.E. Exp(b) 
Intercept, γ00 -0.339791 0.626145 0.711919 
Individual-Level    
  Gender -0.286883*** 0.052268 0.750600 
  Age of First Arrest -0.006055* 0.003425 0.993964 
  Age at Release -0.054320*** 0.002459 0.947129 
  Prior Arrests 0.034740*** 0.001901 1.035351 
  Time Served -0.002406*** 0.000737 0.997597 
  Black 0.046413 0.029361 1.047507 
  Other Race -0.024376 0.135019 0.975919 
  Property Offense -0.028356 0.038483 0.972042 
  Drug Offense -0.007035 0.038559 0.992990 
  Public Order Offense 0.394774*** 0.054880 1.484049 
  Other Offense -0.356521*** 0.112737 0.700108 
  Parole Revocation 0.190726*** 0.033433 1.210128 
  Probation Revocation 0.133172 0.140377 1.142446 
  Other Admission Type -0.467820*** 0.172307 0.626366 
  Unknown Admission Type -0.076702 0.244847 0.926165 
  Mandatory Supervised Released 0.425357*** 0.064839 1.530136 
  Expiration of Sentence 0.345620*** 0.075473 1.412866 
  Other Release Type 0.213642*** 0.080279 1.238179 
State-Level    
  Drug Arrests per 100,000 -0.001033 0.000942 0.998968 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 6F - Multilevel Regressions of Reconviction Probabilities for Rearrested 
Offenders on Individual Level Characteristics and State Level Drug Arrests per 
100,000 
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model): 
 B S.E. Exp(b) 
Intercept, γ00 0.306590 0.564046 1.358784 
Individual-Level    
  Gender -0.055833 0.062622 0.945697 
  Age of First Arrest -0.000800 0.003872 0.999200 
  Age at Release -0.011394*** 0.002878 0.988671 
  Prior Arrests 0.016276*** 0.002429 1.016409 
  Time Served -0.004148*** 0.000863 0.995861 
  Black 0.052596 0.035386 1.054004 
  Other Race -0.319940* 0.170189 0.726192 
  Property Offense 0.348763*** 0.046478 1.417313 
  Drug Offense 0.212847*** 0.047072 1.237195 
  Public Order Offense 0.114151* 0.066167 1.120922 
  Other Offense -0.037316 0.124824 0.963372 
  Parole Revocation 0.119978*** 0.039237 1.127472 
  Probation Revocation 0.083021 0.192618 1.086564 
  Other Admission Type -0.165178 0.202570 0.847742 
  Unknown Admission Type -0.277428 0.221756 0.757730 
  Mandatory Supervised Released -0.003429 0.067138 0.996577 
  Expiration of Sentence 0.309010*** 0.107038 1.362076 
  Other Release Type -0.144670 0.109621 0.865307 
State-Level    
  Drug Arrests per 100,000 0.000760 0.000841 1.000760 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 6G - Multilevel Regressions of Reimprisonment Probabilities for 
Reconvicted Offenders on Individual Level Characteristics and State Level 
Drug Arrests per 100,000 
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model): 
 B S.E. Exp(b) 
Intercept, γ00 0.230218 0.576054 1.258874 
Individual-Level    
  Gender -0.523832*** 0.074418 0.592247 
  Age of First Arrest 0.020876*** 0.004766 1.021096 
  Age at Release -0.019826*** 0.003470 0.980370 
  Prior Arrests 0.008637*** 0.002631 1.008674 
  Time Served 0.004851*** 0.001111 1.004863 
  Black 0.127696*** 0.041953 1.136207 
  Other Race -0.702011*** 0.224580 0.495588 
  Property Offense 0.250003*** 0.056466 1.284029 
  Drug Offense 0.126288** 0.057328 1.134609 
  Public Order Offense 0.017624 0.080922 1.017780 
  Other Offense -0.141371 0.154806 0.868167 
  Parole Revocation 0.028530 0.045979 1.028941 
  Probation Revocation -0.288199 0.236519 0.749612 
  Other Admission Type 0.270440 0.258911 1.310541 
  Unknown Admission Type 0.117904 0.267334 1.125136 
  Mandatory Supervised Released -0.078161 0.079387 0.924815 
  Expiration of Sentence -0.188148 0.118226 0.828492 
  Other Release Type -0.179221 0.136857 0.835921 
State-Level    
  Drug Arrests per 100,000 -0.000112 0.000845 0.999888 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 6H - Multilevel Regressions of Rearrests on Individual Level 
Characteristics and Statewide Level of Police Officers per 1,000 Residents 
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model): 
 b S.E. Exp(b) 
Intercept, γ00 0.408421 0.367580 1.504441 
Individual-Level    
  Gender -0.487645*** 0.043548 0.614071 
  Age of First Arrest 0.003535 0.002771 1.003541 
  Age at Release -0.061797*** 0.002170 0.940074 
  Prior Arrests 0.075869*** 0.002547 1.078822 
  Time Served -0.002889*** 0.000591 0.997115 
  Black 0.508769*** 0.027713 1.663243 
  Other Race -0.391022*** 0.121697 0.676366 
  Property Offense 0.379352*** 0.036657 1.461337 
  Drug Offense 0.066560* 0.035810 1.068825 
  Public Order Offense 0.069749 0.050022 1.072239 
  Other Offense -0.020299 0.096544 0.979906 
  Parole Revocation 0.413983*** 0.032871 1.512831 
  Probation Revocation 0.185534 0.152176 1.203862 
  Other Admission Type -0.152167 0.147341 0.858845 
  Unknown Admission Type -0.345728** 0.168037 0.707705 
  Mandatory Supervised Released 0.120829** 0.047661 1.128432 
  Expiration of Sentence 0.221354*** 0.069857 1.247765 
  Other Release Type -0.067349 0.073823 0.934869 
State-Level    
  Police per 1,000 Residents 0.053538 0.145160 1.054998 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 6I - Multilevel Regressions of Violent Rearrests on Individual Level 
Characteristics and Statewide Level of Police Officers per 1,000 Residents  
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model): 
 b S.E. Exp(b) 
Intercept, γ00 -1.711056*** 0.259809 0.180675 
Individual-Level    
  Gender -0.792006*** 0.066835 0.452935 
  Age of First Arrest -0.033594*** 0.003944 0.966964 
  Age at Release -0.040626*** 0.002614 0.960188 
  Prior Arrests 0.022916*** 0.001973 1.023181 
  Time Served -0.002941*** 0.000754 0.997063 
  Black 0.559868*** 0.031483 1.750441 
  Other Race 0.246504* 0.140159 1.279545 
  Property Offense -0.400764*** 0.039340 0.669808 
  Drug Offense -0.609024*** 0.040265 0.543881 
  Public Order Offense -0.334968*** 0.059778 0.715361 
  Other Offense -0.575534*** 0.116013 0.562405 
  Parole Revocation 0.308714*** 0.035407 1.361673 
  Probation Revocation -0.018011 0.160112 0.982151 
  Other Admission Type -0.426868** 0.204758 0.652550 
  Unknown Admission Type -0.054909** 0.266895 0.946571 
  Mandatory Supervised Released 0.385261*** 0.067875 1.469997 
  Expiration of Sentence 0.613087*** 0.074956 1.846121 
  Other Release Type 0.278507*** 0.082645 1.321156 
State-Level    
 Police per 1,000 Residents 0.139806 0.101452 1.150050 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 6J - Multilevel Regressions of Property Rearrests on Individual Level 
Characteristics and Statewide Level of Police Officers per 1,000 Residents 
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model): 
 b S.E. Exp(b) 
Intercept, γ00 -1.841191*** 0.235243 0.158628 
Individual-Level    
  Gender -0.196561*** 0.049689 0.821552 
  Age of First Arrest 0.005679* 0.003170 1.005695 
  Age at Release -0.038559*** 0.002353 0.962175 
  Prior Arrests 0.052348*** 0.001977 1.053742 
  Time Served -0.001947*** 0.000691 0.998055 
  Black 0.318929*** 0.028522 1.375653 
  Other Race -0.275791* 0.140800 0.758971 
  Property Offense 0.799288*** 0.037089 2.223957 
  Drug Offense -0.245558*** 0.038966 0.782268 
  Public Order Offense -0.010614 0.057045 0.989442 
  Other Offense 0.200574** 0.098340 1.222104 
  Parole Revocation 0.250465*** 0.032269 1.284622 
  Probation Revocation 0.347531** 0.144294 1.415569 
  Other Admission Type -0.132454 0.175274 0.875943 
  Unknown Admission Type -0.024673 0.224098 0.975629 
  Mandatory Supervised Released 0.262409*** 0.061578 1.300059 
  Expiration of Sentence 0.378509*** 0.070308 1.460106 
  Other Release Type 0.131446*** 0.076009 1.140477 
State-Level    
 Police per 1,000 Residents 0.341012*** 0.091807 1.406370 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 6K - Multilevel Regressions of Drug Rearrests on Individual Level 
Characteristics and Statewide Level of Police Officers per 1,000 Residents 
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model): 
 b S.E. Exp(b) 
Intercept, γ00 -2.049450*** 0.433793 0.128806 
Individual-Level    
  Gender -0.204921*** 0.048726 0.814712 
  Age of First Arrest -0.001548 0.003135 0.998453 
  Age at Release -0.034843*** 0.002338 0.965757 
  Prior Arrests 0.042036*** 0.001908 1.042932 
  Time Served -0.003054*** 0.000755 0.996951 
  Black 0.409816*** 0.028673 1.506540 
  Other Race -0.555793*** 0.158717 0.573617 
  Property Offense 0.145115*** 0.039411 1.156172 
  Drug Offense 0.778627*** 0.038043 2.178478 
  Public Order Offense 0.129681** 0.057925 1.138465 
  Other Offense 0.271949*** 0.096649 1.312520 
  Parole Revocation 0.183994*** 0.031957 1.202009 
  Probation Revocation 0.077469 0.159767 1.080548 
  Other Admission Type -0.200755 0.201469 0.818112 
  Unknown Admission Type -0.429589 0.294572 0.650777 
  Mandatory Supervised Released 0.151749** 0.069052 1.163868 
  Expiration of Sentence 0.265058*** 0.074601 1.303506 
  Other Release Type -0.157843* 0.085438 0.853984 
State-Level    
  Police per 1,000 Residents 0.309174* 0.168984 1.362300 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 6L - Multilevel Regressions of Public Order Rearrests on Individual 
Level Characteristics and Statewide Level of Police Officers per 1,000 
Residents 
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model): 
 B S.E. Exp(b) 
Intercept, γ00 -1.185286 0.677762 0.305659 
Individual-Level    
  Gender -0.286794*** 0.052266 0.750666 
  Age of First Arrest -0.006066* 0.003425 0.993953 
  Age at Release -0.054292*** 0.002459 0.947155 
  Prior Arrests 0.034703*** 0.001901 1.035312 
  Time Served -0.002396*** 0.000737 0.997607 
  Black 0.046398 0.029365 1.047491 
  Other Race -0.024345 0.135020 0.975949 
  Property Offense 0.027924 0.038482 1.028318 
  Drug Offense 0.020769 0.034066 1.020986 
  Public Order Offense 0.422849*** 0.051339 1.526303 
  Other Offense -0.328789*** 0.110836 0.719795 
  Parole Revocation 0.190399*** 0.033431 1.209732 
  Probation Revocation 0.134174 0.140431 1.143591 
  Other Admission Type -0.467820*** 0.172363 0.626366 
  Unknown Admission Type -0.072029 0.244939 0.930504 
  Mandatory Supervised Released 0.422962*** 0.064879 1.526476 
  Expiration of Sentence 0.348797*** 0.075462 1.417362 
  Other Release Type 0.217973*** 0.080251 1.243553 
State-Level    
   Police per 1,000 Residents 0.073105 0.264072 1.075843 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 6M - Multilevel Regressions of Reconviction Probabilities for Rearrested 
Offenders on Individual Level Characteristics and Statewide Level of Police 
Officers per 1,000 Residents 
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model): 
 B S.E. Exp(b) 
Intercept, γ00 -0.324498 0.552864 0.722890 
Individual-Level    
  Gender -0.055823 0.062618 0.945707 
  Age of First Arrest -0.000731 0.003872 0.999269 
  Age at Release -0.011387*** 0.002877 0.988678 
  Prior Arrests 0.016289*** 0.002428 1.016423 
  Time Served -0.004192*** 0.000863 0.995817 
  Black 0.050899 0.035385 1.052217 
  Other Race -0.318548* 0.170199 0.727204 
  Property Offense 0.348211*** 0.046469 1.416531 
  Drug Offense 0.212111*** 0.047073 1.236285 
  Public Order Offense 0.114413* 0.066158 1.121215 
  Other Offense -0.036094 0.124821 0.964550 
  Parole Revocation 0.122149*** 0.039230 1.129923 
  Probation Revocation 0.090786 0.192240 1.095035 
  Other Admission Type -0.161607 0.202521 0.850776 
  Unknown Admission Type -0.279493 0.221224 0.756167 
  Mandatory Supervised Released 0.006680 0.067057 1.006702 
  Expiration of Sentence 0.305307*** 0.106714 1.357042 
  Other Release Type -0.148446 0.108819 0.862047 
State-Level    
  Police per 1,000 Residents 0.450621* 0.216014 1.569287 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 6N - Multilevel Regressions of Reimprisonment Probabilities for 
Reconvicted Offenders on Individual Level Characteristics and Statewide Level 
of Police Officers per 1,000 Residents 
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model): 
 B S.E. Exp(b) 
Intercept, γ00 0.521297 0.608975 1.684210 
Individual-Level    
  Gender -0.523812*** 0.074419 0.592259 
  Age of First Arrest 0.020855*** 0.004766 1.021074 
  Age at Release -0.019838*** 0.003470 0.980358 
  Prior Arrests 0.008641*** 0.002630 1.008679 
  Time Served 0.004874*** 0.001111 1.004886 
  Black 0.128560*** 0.041968 1.137190 
  Other Race -0.702348*** 0.224576 0.495421 
  Property Offense 0.250140*** 0.056459 1.284205 
  Drug Offense 0.126655** 0.057333 1.135025 
  Public Order Offense 0.017668 0.080922 1.017825 
  Other Offense -0.141753 0.154804 0.867835 
  Parole Revocation 0.027695 0.045990 1.028082 
  Probation Revocation -0.292684 0.236530 0.746258 
  Other Admission Type 0.269249 0.258852 1.308982 
  Unknown Admission Type 0.121601 0.267279 1.129303 
  Mandatory Supervised Released -0.082303 0.079529 0.920993 
  Expiration of Sentence -0.189522 0.118075 0.827355 
  Other Release Type -0.183027 0.136309 0.832746 
State-Level    
  Police per 1,000 Residents -0.145565 0.236350 0.864534 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 6O - Multilevel Regressions of Rearrests on Individual Level 
Characteristics and Statewide Arrest-Offense Ratios 
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model): 
 b S.E. Exp(b) 
Intercept, γ00 1.182165** 0.472425 3.261427 
Individual-Level    
  Gender -0.487598*** 0.043549 0.614100 
  Age of First Arrest 0.003559 0.002771 1.003566 
  Age at Release -0.061816*** 0.002170 0.940056 
  Prior Arrests 0.075881*** 0.002547 1.078834 
  Time Served -0.002891*** 0.000591 0.997113 
  Black 0.509112*** 0.027701 1.663814 
  Other Race -0.391308*** 0.121690 0.676172 
  Property Offense 0.379173*** 0.036654 1.461076 
  Drug Offense 0.066670* 0.035806 1.068942 
  Public Order Offense 0.070258 0.050018 1.072784 
  Other Offense -0.020320 0.096541 0.979885 
  Parole Revocation 0.414070*** 0.032864 1.512963 
  Probation Revocation 0.182533 0.151848 1.200254 
  Other Admission Type -0.155509 0.147248 0.855979 
  Unknown Admission Type -0.345114** 0.167736 0.708140 
  Mandatory Supervised Released 0.120994** 0.047416 1.128618 
  Expiration of Sentence 0.219513*** 0.069759 1.245471 
  Other Release Type -0.071638 0.073690 0.930868 
State-Level    
  Arrest-Offense Ratio -0.024463 0.073690 0.975834 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 6P - Multilevel Regressions of Violent Rearrests on Individual Level 
Characteristics and Statewide Arrest-Offense Ratios 
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model): 
 b S.E. Exp(b) 
Intercept, γ00 -0.982991** 0.408147 0.374190 
Individual-Level    
  Gender -0.792280*** 0.066836 0.452811 
  Age of First Arrest -0.033613*** 0.003944 0.966945 
  Age at Release -0.040640*** 0.002614 0.960175 
  Prior Arrests 0.022860*** 0.001974 1.023123 
  Time Served -0.002917*** 0.000755 0.997087 
  Black 0.561817*** 0.031486 1.753857 
  Other Race 0.243604* 0.140161 1.275839 
  Property Offense -0.400567*** 0.039347 0.669940 
  Drug Offense -0.608377*** 0.040265 0.544234 
  Public Order Offense -0.334515*** 0.059787 0.715685 
  Other Offense -0.575684*** 0.116014 0.562320 
  Parole Revocation 0.307758*** 0.035450 1.360372 
  Probation Revocation -0.048505 0.160510 0.952653 
  Other Admission Type -0.444475** 0.204955 0.641161 
  Unknown Admission Type -0.037618 0.267615 0.963081 
  Mandatory Supervised Released 0.361330*** 0.068359 1.435237 
  Expiration of Sentence 0.599165*** 0.076683 1.820598 
  Other Release Type 0.258346*** 0.084594 1.294787 
State-Level    
  Arrest-Offense Ratio -0.014311 0.015594 0.985791 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 6Q - Multilevel Regressions of Property Rearrests on Individual Level 
Characteristics and Statewide Arrest-Offense Ratios 
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model): 
 b S.E. Exp(b) 
Intercept, γ00 -0.703265 0.489060 0.494966 
Individual-Level    
  Gender -0.197088*** 0.049690 0.821119 
  Age of First Arrest 0.005604 0.003170 1.005620 
  Age at Release -0.038536*** 0.002354 0.962197 
  Prior Arrests 0.052265*** 0.001980 1.053655 
  Time Served -0.001916*** 0.000694 0.998086 
  Black 0.321380*** 0.028551 1.379030 
  Other Race -0.280775** 0.140790 0.755198 
  Property Offense 0.799674*** 0.037105 2.224815 
  Drug Offense -0.244312*** 0.038967 0.783244 
  Public Order Offense -0.009827 0.057065 0.990222 
  Other Offense 0.199405** 0.098333 1.220676 
  Parole Revocation 0.249873*** 0.032349 1.283862 
  Probation Revocation 0.301927** 0.146036 1.352462 
  Other Admission Type -0.152757 0.175728 0.858338 
  Unknown Admission Type 0.020237 0.226194 1.020443 
  Mandatory Supervised Released 0.236166*** 0.064079 1.266385 
  Expiration of Sentence 0.359807*** 0.072088 1.433053 
  Other Release Type 0.103940 0.079116 1.109534 
State-Level    
  Arrest-Offense Ratio -0.010984 0.018681 0.989076 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 6R - Multilevel Regressions of Drug Rearrests on Individual Level 
Characteristics and Statewide Arrest-Offense Ratios 
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model): 
 b S.E. Exp(b) 
Intercept, γ00 -0.836000 0.668383 0.433441 
Individual-Level    
  Gender -0.204984*** 0.048727 0.814661 
  Age of First Arrest -0.001582 0.003135 0.998419 
  Age at Release -0.034857*** 0.002337 0.965744 
  Prior Arrests 0.042007*** 0.001908 1.042902 
  Time Served -0.003015*** 0.000755 0.996990 
  Black 0.411185*** 0.028676 1.508605 
  Other Race -0.556519*** 0.158698 0.573201 
  Property Offense 0.145353*** 0.039413 1.156448 
  Drug Offense 0.779069*** 0.038044 2.179442 
  Public Order Offense 0.130341** 0.057928 1.139217 
  Other Offense 0.271286*** 0.096646 1.311650 
  Parole Revocation 0.182903*** 0.031968 1.200698 
  Probation Revocation 0.066267 0.159902 1.068512 
  Other Admission Type -0.205083 0.201460 0.814580 
  Unknown Admission Type -0.420531 0.294794 0.656698 
  Mandatory Supervised Released 0.137609** 0.069285 1.147526 
  Expiration of Sentence 0.260358*** 0.075222 1.297394 
  Other Release Type -0.168064* 0.086220 0.845300  
State-Level    
  Arrest-Offense Ratio -0.017078 0.025529 0.983067 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 6S - Multilevel Regressions of Public Order Rearrests on Individual 
Level Characteristics and Statewide Arrest-Offense Ratios 
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model): 
 b S.E. Exp(b) 
Intercept, γ00 -0.224166 0.914972 0.799182 
Individual-Level    
  Gender -0.286842*** 0.052267 0.750630 
  Age of First Arrest -0.006066* 0.003425 0.993953 
  Age at Release -0.054292*** 0.002459 0.947155 
  Prior Arrests 0.034697*** 0.001901 1.035306 
  Time Served -0.002394*** 0.000737 0.997609 
  Black 0.046518 0.029362 1.047617 
  Other Race -0.024492 0.135017 0.975805 
  Property Offense -0.027930 0.038482 0.972456 
  Drug Offense -0.007121 0.038559 0.992905 
  Public Order Offense 0.394996*** 0.054880 1.484379 
  Other Offense -0.356759*** 0.112733 0.699941 
  Parole Revocation 0.190374*** 0.033432 1.209701 
  Probation Revocation 0.132899 0.140371 1.142135 
  Other Admission Type -0.469136*** 0.172335 0.625543 
  Unknown Admission Type -0.074979 0.244841 0.927763 
  Mandatory Supervised Released 0.420395*** 0.064753 1.522563 
  Expiration of Sentence 0.346325*** 0.075706 1.413861 
  Other Release Type 0.215484*** 0.080425 1.240463 
State-Level    
  Arrest-Offense Ratio -0.029950 0.034942 0.970494 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 6T - Multilevel Regressions of Reconviction Probabilities for Rearrested 
Offenders on Individual Level Characteristics and Statewide Arrest-Offense 
Ratios Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model): 
 B S.E. Exp(b) 
Intercept, γ00 0.177213 0.868182 1.193886 
Individual-Level    
  Gender -0.055843 0.062622 0.945687 
  Age of First Arrest -0.000771 0.003872 0.999229 
  Age at Release -0.011421*** 0.002878 0.988644 
  Prior Arrests 0.016324*** 0.002429 1.016458 
  Time Served -0.004145*** 0.000863 0.995864 
  Black 0.052305 0.035386 1.053697 
  Other Race -0.320263* 0.170197 0.725958 
  Property Offense 0.348281*** 0.046473 1.416630 
  Drug Offense 0.212909*** 0.047072 1.237272 
  Public Order Offense 0.113756* 0.066169 1.120479 
  Other Offense -0.036770 0.124824 0.963898 
  Parole Revocation 0.119885*** 0.039242 1.127367 
  Probation Revocation 0.081794 0.192716 1.085232 
  Other Admission Type -0.165598 0.202598 0.847387 
  Unknown Admission Type -0.281813 0.221901 0.754415 
  Mandatory Supervised Released -0.001452 0.067139 0.998549 
  Expiration of Sentence 0.310223*** 0.107162 1.363729 
  Other Release Type -0.143832 0.109838 0.866033 
State-Level    
  Arrest-Offense Ratio 0.023951 0.032943 1.024240 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 6U - Multilevel Regressions of Reimprisonment Probabilities for 
Reconvicted Offenders on Individual Level Characteristics and Statewide 
Arrest-Offense Ratios 
Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit specified model): 
 B S.E. Exp(b) 
Intercept, γ00 0.244801 0.899047 1.277367 
Individual-Level    
  Gender -0.523838*** 0.074418 0.592243 
  Age of First Arrest 0.020870*** 0.004766 1.021089 
  Age at Release -0.019820*** 0.003470 0.980375 
  Prior Arrests 0.008628*** 0.002630 1.008665 
  Time Served 0.004851*** 0.001111 1.004863 
  Black 0.127746*** 0.041952 1.136264 
  Other Race -0.701858*** 0.224574 0.495664 
  Property Offense 0.250081*** 0.056461 1.284129 
  Drug Offense 0.126267** 0.057329 1.134585 
  Public Order Offense 0.017713 0.080925 1.017871 
  Other Offense -0.141461 0.154804 0.868089 
  Parole Revocation 0.028538 0.045986 1.028949 
  Probation Revocation -0.287762 0.236495 0.749940 
  Other Admission Type 0.270581 0.258906 1.310726 
  Unknown Admission Type 0.118500 0.267369 1.125807 
  Mandatory Supervised Released -0.078608 0.079271 0.924403 
  Expiration of Sentence -0.188203 0.118387 0.828447 
  Other Release Type -0.179033 0.137146 0.836079 
State-Level    
  Arrest-Offense Ratio -0.003458 0.034677 0.996548 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
